The dual issue of judgment and decision-making is currently popular especially in behavioural economics, emphasizing the “bounded rationality” of a human being. However, it is originally a topic of decision theory, which is now being explored more broadly also from the perspective of cognitive sciences, combining knowledge of psychology, philosophy, linguistics, computer science and neuroscience. In addition to its use in economics, the application of respective theories becomes gradually more and more popular also in the field of moral decision-making and in general in practical decision-making of professionals, where medical doctors or judges are most often invoked as examples. This paper takes this route in focusing on the faculty of judgment and on decision-making of lawyers – in particular judges and attorneys.
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