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1

Emperor’s recruitment in the Republic of Poland done by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635

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Nagielski M.

Przegląd Zachodniopomorski

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2019

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nr 4

83-100

EN

Emperor’s Ties in the Republic of Poland by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635.The truce signed by Wladyslaw IV with the Swedes in Sztumska Wieś in 1635 made it necessary to dissolve the military enlistments consisting of selected infantry and driving units. The Habsburgs as well as the French were striving for these troops in the face of the ongoing Thirty Years’ War. An imperial deputy, Arnoldin, was sent to the Republic of Poland. He received permission from Władysław IV to recruit soldiers. He succeeded in recruiting more than 5,000 men who took part in the Rhine War in the service of Emperor Ferdinand II. On the other hand, talks with Samuel Łaszcz of the Imperial Commissioners failed in the face of excessive financial demands made by the Crown Guard. The Polish Corps fought in Lorraine, Champagne, Picardy and Burgundy under the command of Gen. Matthias Gallas, giving a large service to the Habsburgs. The second enlistment on the territory of the Republic was carried out in September 1636 and was the work of Spanish diplomacy. In total, more than 15 thousand soldiers were led out of the borders of the Republic of Poland and the Habsburg diplomacy distanced the French diplomacy of Louis XIII.

PL

Podpisany rozejm przez Władysława IV ze Szwedami w Sztumskiej Wsi w 1635 r.spowodował konieczność rozpuszczenia zaciągów wojskowych złożonych z wyborowych oddziałów piechoty i jazdy. O te oddziały zabiegali tak Habsburgowie jak Francuzi wobec trwających działań wojny trzydziestoletniej. Do Rzeczpospolitej wysłano posła cesarskiego Arnoldina , który uzyskał od Władysława IV zgodę na werbunek żołnierzy. Udało się mu zwerbować ponad 5 tysięcy ludzi, którzy wzięli udział w walkach w Rzeszy nad Renem w służbie cesarza Ferdynanda II. Natomiast rozmowy z Samuelem Łaszczem komisarzy cesarskich nie powiodły się wobec wygórowanych żądań finansowych stawianych przez strażnika koronnego. Korpus polski walczył na terenie Lotaryngii, Szampanii, Pikardii i Burgundii pod komendą gen. Matthiasa Gallasa, oddając duże usługi Habsburgom.Drugi zaciąg na terenie Rzeczpospolitej przeprowadzono we wrześniu 1636 r. i był on dziełem dyplomacji hiszpańskiej. W sumie wyprowadzono ponad 15 tysięcy żołnierzy z granic Rzeczpospolitej a dyplomacja Habsburgów zdystansowała w tej kwestii dyplomację francuską Ludwika XIII.

2

Piotr Potocki, wojewoda bracławski - Hektor kamieniecki

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Nagielski M.

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nr 20

42-60

EN

Being a son of the Crown Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, and having inherited the title of the starosta of Kamieniec, Piotr Potocki distinguished himself before 1648 in battles at Kumejki (1637) and Ochmatów (1644), leading the charges of his father’s Cossack unit (rota). From 1643 on, as the starosta of Kamieniec, he was responsible for security of Kamieniec Podolski (a fortress), which proved especially significant during the Chmielnicki Uprising. Since he resided in the fortress also after he had taken office as the voivode of Bracław (1651), rarely did he appear in the General Sejm. Several times he repelled the attacks of Cossack-Tatar armies trying to seized Kamieniec; he participated in the Biała Cerkiew (1651) and Żwaniec campaigns (1653), leading a cavalry regiment. During the Cossack uprisings, he was in charge of organising the net of overt “intelligencers” (early intelligence agents) who would pass information of essence to Vasile Lupu, the voivode (hospodar) of Moldavia. He partook in another Ukraine campaign of the Polish Crown army (in the spring of 1654) resulting from B. Chmielnicki’s surrender in Moscow. In 1655, he appeared to be a faithful supporter of Jan Kazimierz, by guaranteeing the perpetuation of his influence in Kamieniec along with the military forces in his command. In order to acknowledge his military merits, as a defender of Podole and the Kamieniec fortress, the Ruthenian nobility recommended him to be awarded during dietines.

PL

Syn hetmana koronnego Mikołaja Potockiego, po ojcu starosta kamieniecki, przed 1648 rokiem odznaczył się w batalii pod Kumejkami (1637) oraz Ochmatowem (1644), dowodząc rotą kozacką swego ojca. Od 1643 roku jako starosta kamieniecki odpowiadał za bezpieczeństwo Kamieńca Podolskiego, co miało szczególne znaczenie w czasie powstania Bohdana Chmielnickiego. W związku z przebywaniem w murach twierdzy nawet po otrzymaniu urzędu wojewody bracławskiego (1651) Piotr Potocki rzadko pojawiał się na sejmach walnych. Kilkakrotnie odpierał ataki wojsk kozacko-tatarskich próbujących zdobyć Kamieniec; uczestniczył w wyprawie białocerkiewskiej (1651) oraz żwanieckiej (1653) na czele pułku jazdy. W trakcie powstań kozackich odpowiadał za organizację wywiadu płytkiego, przekazując istotne informacje o siłach kozacko-tatarskich m.in. od hospodara mołdawskiego Bazylego Lupula. Brał udział w wyprawie wojsk koronnych (wiosna 1654) na Ukrainie w związku z poddaniem się B. Chmielnickiego Moskwie. W 1655 roku okazał się oddanym stronnikiem Jana Kazimierza, utrzymując w wierności wobec monarchy Kamieniec i podległe mu siły. Za zasługi wojenne, jako obrońca Podola i twierdzy kamienieckiej, był zalecany przez szlachtę ruską na wielu sejmikach do nagrody.

3

Przygotowania Rzeczypospolitej do wojny z Moskwą w latach 1632–1633

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Nagielski M.

Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica

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2022

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nr 111

87-111

EN

The Smolensk campaign of 1632–1634 began the reign of the new ruler of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Władysław IV Vasa. Taking advantage of the death of Sigismund III Vasa, Moscow began operations in the eastern theater in the fall of 1632, with the goal of regaining the Smolensk lost in 1611. The Polish-Lithuanian side was unprepared for the war, and disputes between Hetmans Lew Sapieha and Krzysztof Radziwiłł continued about the purposefulness of the hauls. Thanks to the latter, the crews of the border fortresses were strengthened and a camp was established near Krasny, which blocked the Moscow forces besieging Smolensk. In view of the Thirty Years’ War, the Republic of Poland had to carry out hauls based on its own recruit, with the help of foreign officers recruited from abroad. Preparations to deploy a relief army took a long time and required a lot of money. As a result, an army of several thousand was raised, which under the command of Władysław IV in September 1633 reached Smolensk, unblocking the besieged fortress by the Moscow forces of M. B. Sheina.

PL

Kampania smoleńska 1632–1634 rozpoczynała panowanie nowego władcy Rzeczypospolitej, Władysława IV. Wykorzystując śmierć Zygmunta III, Moskwa już jesienią 1632 r. rozpoczęła działania na teatrze wschodnim, stawiając sobie za cel odzyskanie utraconego w 1611 r. Smoleńska. Do wojny strona polsko-litewska była nieprzygotowana, a na temat celowości zaciągów trwały spory między hetmanami Lwem Sapiehą i Krzysztofem Radziwiłłem. Dzięki temu ostatniemu wzmocniono załogi twierdz pogranicza oraz założono obóz pod Krasnym, który blokował siły moskiewskie oblegające Smoleńsk. Wobec trwania wojny trzydziestoletniej Rzeczpospolita musiała prowadzić zaciągi w oparciu o własnego rekruta, korzystając z pomocy werbowanych z zagranicy oficerów cudzoziemców. Przygotowania mające na celu wystawienie armii odsieczowej trwały długo i wymagały dużych nakładów finansowych. Ich rezultatem było wystawienie kilkunastotysięcznej armii, która pod dowództwem Władysława IV we wrześniu 1633 r. dotarła pod Smoleńsk, odblokowując obleganą twierdzę przez siły moskiewskie M. B. Szeina.

4

Jan III Sobieski i jego wpływ na odrodzenie staropolskiej sztuki wojennej w II połowie XVII wieku

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Nagielski M.

Tarnowskie Studia Historyczne

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2011

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tom 2

70-88

EN

This article contains an abbreviated biography of John III Sobieski (1629-1674), Lord Standard-Bearer of the Crown, Grand Marshal of the Crown, Field Hetman and Grand Crown Hetman, King of Poland. The author first presents the period during which Sobieski gathered military education that he could later use as a commander in the battlefield. He presents Sobieski in the context of the times in which he lived to show the military skills of an extraordinary Polish commander and a connoisseur of the Old Polish military art. The author devotes much space to the use the highly maneuverable cavalry by Sobieski who used it to disintegrate the backups of the opposing army or to severe the lines of communication. The author also notes Sobieski’s communication skills when talking to the nobility at that time, which helped reduce the costs of conducting the war. By contrast, the author shows the defeats of Sobieski and their impact on the society’s attitude towards the leader. The author provides an overview of Sobieski’s achievements and defeats based on the individual campaigns and battles in which he fought. He also analyzes the changes that took place in the structure of the Crown’s army in Sobieski’s times, including the hussars, harquebusiers, light cavalry, and foreign infantry regiments. The article is a summary of the opinions of the Polish historiographers on Sobieski’s achievements who basically agree that Sobieski went into history as a brilliant commander, the one who defeated the Turks at the battle of Chocim and at the Battle of Vienna, as well as the man who helped to revive the Old Polish war art in the 17th century.

5

Udział wojskowych w sejmie elekcyjnym 1648 roku

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Nagielski M.

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tom 12

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nr 17

9-23

PL

The following paper, which bases its research findings on Sejm journals, presents the involvementof the members of the military in the royal election of 1648, which resulted in the election of Jan Kazimierz.Moreover, the article discusses the attitudes of the civilian part of the society, which tendedto be predominantly negative on account of the perceived excessive involvement of the military in thepolitical matters of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. This, in turn, resulted in the involvementof entire military units (according to the calculations of the author, over ten thousand military troopsattended the royal election).The election was not the only important matter discussed during the proceedings. Those deliberationsincluded also the discussion on the reasons for the defeat in the battle of Piławce and assigningblame for the defeat to particular people. The article presents the state of the Polish-Lithuanian armyas well as the problems it encountered at that time, which were debated during the proceedings, andthe solutions to which included instituting new taxes and appointing new leaders. The author pointsto the hostility of the nobility towards the military, which stemmed from the belief in their incompetenceand thirst for personal gain. The problems included predominantly the issues of the costsof the campaign and the attempts on the military’s part at influencing the proceedings. In addition,the article presents the possible solutions - of varying levels of adequacy - for solving the Cossackuprising, pointing out the necessity for appointing new military leaders and increasing the army’sfinances through additional taxation.In the conclusion, the author remarks that the military involvement in the royal election couldhave significantly influenced their proceedings and outcomes.

EN

The following paper, which bases its research findings on Sejm journals, presents the involvement of the members of the military in the royal election of 1648, which resulted in the election of Jan Kazimierz. Moreover, the article discusses the attitudes of the civilian part of the society, which tended to be predominantly negative on account of the perceived excessive involvement of the military in the political matters of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. This, in turn, resulted in the involvement of entire military units (according to the calculations of the author, over ten thousand military troopsattended the royal election).The election was not the only important matter discussed during the proceedings. Those deliberations included also the discussion on the reasons for the defeat in the battle of Piławce and assigning blame for the defeat to particular people. The article presents the state of the Polish-Lithuanian army as well as the problems it encountered at that time, which were debated during the proceedings, and the solutions to which included instituting new taxes and appointing new leaders. The author points to the hostility of the nobility towards the military, which stemmed from the belief in their incompetenceand thirst for personal gain. The problems included predominantly the issues of the costs of the campaign and the attempts on the military’s part at influencing the proceedings. In addition, the article presents the possible solutions - of varying levels of adequacy - for solving the Cossackuprising, pointing out the necessity for appointing new military leaders and increasing the army’s finances through additional taxation.In the conclusion, the author remarks that the military involvement in the royal election could have significantly influenced their proceedings and outcomes.

6

Wydatki skarbu koronnego na poselstwo tatarskie w 1654 r. Część 2

63%

Nagielski M. , Milewski D.

Saeculum Christianum. Pismo Historyczne

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2022

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tom 29

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nr 2

286-300