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Content available remote Je vágnost sémantický či ontický fenomén?
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EN
The article presents the current discussion about ontical vagueness in contemporary analytical metaphysics. It enumerates the main arguments that advocate the introduction of vague objects into ontology and the argument for remaining with the dominant semantic concept of vagueness. The main obstacle to the acceptance of vague objects is presented by the conclusion of Evans’ argument, according to which assertions about the uncertain identity of the objects, to which singular expressions certainly refer to, lead to incoherence. If then vague objects imply such assertions about uncertain identity, they cannot exist. The article shows the main objections against Evans’ argument and also the rationales that demonstrate that the existence of vague objects is compatible with its acceptance.
CS
Článek představuje dnešní diskusi o ontické vágnosti v současné analytické metafyzice. Uvádí hlavní argumenty obhajující zavedení vágních objektů do ontologie i argument pro setrvání u dominantního sémantického pojetí vágnosti. Hlavní překážku přijetí vágních objektů představuje závěr Evansova argumentu, podle něhož tvrzení o neurčité identitě objektů, k nimž určitě referují singulární výrazy, vedou k nekoherenci. Pokud tedy vágní objekty implikují taková tvrzení o neurčité identitě, nemohou existovat. Článek ukazuje hlavní námitky vůči Evansovu argumentu i zdůvodnění, která dokazují, že existence vágních objektů je slučitelná s jeho přijetím.
DE
Im vorliegenden Artikel wird die aktuelle Diskussion über die ontische Vagheit in der heutigen analytischen Metaphysik vorgestellt. Dabei werden die Hauptargumente für die Einführung vager Objekte in die Ontologie sowie das Argument für die Beibehaltung der dominanten semantischen Auffassung der Vagheit aufgeführt. Das Haupthindernis für die Akzeptanz vager Objekte ist der Schluss von Evans’ Argument, demgemäß die Behauptung der unbestimmten Identität von Objekten, auf die sich bestimmte singuläre Ausdrücke beziehen, zu Inkohärenz führt. Wenn daher vage Objekte derartige Behauptungen einer unbestimmten Identität implizieren, können diese Objekte nicht existieren. Im Artikel werden die wesentlichen Einwände gegen Evans’ Argument aufgezeigt, und es wird begründet dargelegt, dass die Existenz vager Objekte mit dessen Akzeptanz vereinbar ist.
2
Content available remote Neurčité situace a logika
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EN
The article surveys and evaluates various approaches to the logic of indeterminate situations. Two types of such situations are discussed: future contingents and quantum indeterminacy. Approaches differ according to whether they can salvage (i) classical tautologies (such as the law of excluded middle) as logical truths, (ii) bivalence and (iii) truth-functionality. What I call “the first solution” denies bivalence and either saves classical logical truths (supervaluations) or truth-functionality (multi-valued approach), but not both. The so-called “second solution”, saving all aforementioned features, harbors difficulties for the contingency of future contingents and is inapplicable in the quantum realm. Finally, the third solution saves bivalence but, at least in the case of quantum logic, abandons truth-functionality.
3
Content available remote The Relational Logic of Franciscus Toletus and Petrus Fonseca
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EN
The well-known Ratio Studiorum of 1599 states that logical instruction should follow F. Toletus (Toledo) or P. Fonseca. The latter authored the famous Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo (1564), the former a similar manual, Introductio in Dialecticam Aristotelis (1561). As is often observed, the contrast between the Aristotelian and present symbolic logics is perhaps most striking in their analysis of relational statements. Both authors recognize the relational logical form as independent from the traditional subject-predicate form and see the need to recognize relational inferential rules. They differ in their specific rules, however, so neither of the authors has captured the system of relational syllogism in its entirety.
EN
Czechia lost more than 3,000,000 inhabitants as a result of the WW II. Germans displaced from the borderland formed the largest part. The newcomers after 1945 were of a different character – without any relation to their new settlements. This population formed a special social milieu familiar with the socialist way of thinking and that of a suppressed middle class. The consequences of it are seen in demographic, economic, environmental and social areas. After 1989, the factories in the borderland were mostly closed down, armies left the territory, people were not prepared to start their own businesses. Large-scale landscape protection formed a new barrier. Tourism is not able to substitute for the decrease in employment. The hope in cross-border collaboration has been overestimated.
EN
Czechia lost more than 3,000,000 inhabitants as a result of the WW II. Germans displaced from the borderland formed the largest part. The newcomers after 1945 were of a different character – without any relation to their new settlements. This population formed a special social milieu familiar with the socialist way of thinking and that of a suppressed middle class. The consequences of it are seen in demographic, economic, environmental and social areas. After 1989, the factories in the borderland were mostly closed down, armies left the territory, people were not prepared to start their own businesses. Large-scale landscape protection formed a new barrier. Tourism is not able to substitute for the decrease in employment. The hope in cross-border collaboration has been overestimated.
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