Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Religijne inspiracje Medytacji Kartezjusza

100%

Tomaszewska A.

Diametros

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2008

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nr 18

88-93

PL

Recenzja książki: Zbigniew Janowski, Teodycea Kartezjańska, Wydawnictwo ARCANA, Kraków 1998

2

On some (Hegelian) difficulties to be a Kantian in practice. A reader’s note

100%

Tomaszewska A.

Diametros

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2014

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nr 39

231-240

EN

Review of a book: Matthew C. Altman, Kand and Applied Ethics. The Uses and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 2011.

3

McDowell and Perceptual Reasons

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Tomaszewska A.

Forum Philosophicum

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2012

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tom 17

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nr 1

73-88

EN

John McDowell claims that perception provides reasons for empirical beliefs. Perceptual reasons, according to the author of Mind and World, can be identified with passively "taken in" facts. Concepts figure in the acts of acquiring perceptual reasons, even though the acts themselves do not consist in judgments. Thus, on my reading, McDowell's account of the acquisition of reasons can be likened to Descartes' account of the acquisition of ideas, rather than to Kant's theory of judgment as an act by means of which one's cognition comes to be endowed with objective validity. However, unlike Descartes, McDowell does not acknowledge the skeptical challenge which his conception of the acquisition of reasons might face. He contends that perception is factive without arguing for the background assumption (about a "perfect match" between mind and world) on which it rests. Hence, as I suggest in my article, the McDowellian claim that perception provides reasons for empirical beliefs is not sufficiently warranted.

4

Is perception concept-dependent according to Kant?

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Tomaszewska A.

Diametros

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2008

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nr 15

57-73

EN

The paper focuses on a discussion about McDowell’s "conceptualist" interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience, as one in which all representational content is identified with conceptual content. Both in Mind and WorldM and in his Woodbridge Lectures, McDowell furthers a reading on which the "picture of visual experiences as conceptual shapings of visual consciousness is already deeply Kantian", supporting it with Kant’s famous claim from the A51/ B75 passage of the Critique of Pure Reason, which can be called a Cooperation Thesis. However, much indicates that McDowell’s reading is, if not altogether false, then at least one-sided. In the "Transcendental Aesthetic", as well as in some of the pre-Critical writings (Concerning the ultimate foundation of the differentiation of regions in space or the "Inaugural Dissertation"), Kant presented a range of arguments for a subjective, non-discursive character of space and time, i.e. the forms of sensible intuition and pure intuitions themselves, underlying all conceptual cognition, and providing a non-conceptual basis for a special kind of synthetic a priori cognition (geometry). This allows us to conclude that he would rather take the side of the contemporary “nonconceptualists”, and could be regarded as their predecessor, to use R. Hanna’s formulation. On this reading of the Kantian theory of empirical cognition, intentionality is independent of and prior to any application of concepts to the objects of experience.

5

The transcendental object and the “problem of affection”. Remarks on some difficulties of Kant’s theory of empirical cognition

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Tomaszewska A.

Diametros

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2007

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nr 11

61-82

EN

The paper presents one of the sources of the incoherence objection to Kant’s transcendental idealism, i.e. the problem of “affection” between the “transcendental ground” and mental representations. It is divided into two sections: in the first the historical context of the problem is sketched; in the second two contemporary solutions to the problem are suggested. The latter include N. Rescher’s “conceptual idealist” interpretation, which postulates a logical (rational) relation between representational content and its “ground”, and A. Brook’s cognitivist explanation, which appeals to a materialist hypothesis that makes use of a kind of correlation between the mental and the physical. The conclusion grants both stances considerable plausibility, admitting that, as often is the case, Kant’s way of posing questions here too leads to contradictory answers. It seems that the options suggested cannot be reconciled: one has to choose between the presence of metaphysics in Kant’s critical philosophy or the naturalization of transcendental philosophy. This state of affairs reflects the history of Kant’s interpretations.

6

Experience and conceptual content in Kant and McDowell. Remarks on “empty thoughts” and “blind intuitions”

100%

Tomaszewska A.

Diametros

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2011

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nr 28

82-100

EN

In Mind and World, John McDowell appeals to Kant’s dictum that thoughts without content are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind as encapsulating the idea of conceptualism about the content of perceptual experience. I argue that the appeal is inadequate, and this for a variety of reasons, one of them being that if Kant endorsed conceptualism along the lines of McDowell, he would be committed to returning to positions which he explicitly criticized, i.e. those of rationalist metaphysics; alternatively, he would lapse into an idealism very much akin to Hegel’s. This is because McDowell’s conceptualism ultimately neglects the role of sensibility in mediating the relation between “mind” and “world”, which is crucial to recognizing the limits on cognition which Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism imposes upon subjects.

7

The Radicalism of the Enlightenment. An Introduction to the Special Edition

63%

Miklaszewska J. , Tomaszewska A.

Diametros

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2014

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nr 40

1-4

EN

This brief “Introduction” to the volume discusses the general idea of the special edition of the journal, which is dedicated to the radicalism of the Enlightenment in the context of Jonathan Israel’s recent work on the Enlightenment, and highlights the topics of the articles contained in the edition.