Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Vývoj vědy jako evoluční boj idejí? : K pojetí vědy jako konceptuální evoluce

100%

Havlík V.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2016

|

tom 64

|

nr 1

75-94

EN

The article focuses on a select group of arguments which are aimed at showing the advantages of an evolutionary conception of science and at indicating how the evolutionary perspective may be adopted and also further implemented in relation to the question of the development of knowledge. Stress is placed on treating conceptual evolution as the instantiation of universal evolution, and not, as traditionally, the application of the principles of biological evolution to epistemology. The prospects for approaches to conceptual evolution in Campbell, Toulmin and Hull are discussed, and some particular examples are used to demonstrate how one might, with the help of the instruments of an evolutionary conception, tackle critical arguments as well as a persisting misunderstanding on the part of the opponents of the evolutionary conception of science. The aim is to introduce into these discussions the term “level closure” and thus develop the argumentative instruments of the evolutionary conception. In conclusion, on the basis of the arguments presented above, a reply is sketched to the question posed in the title of the article: that is, whether the development of science is an evolutionary struggle of ideas.

2

Vědecký status darwinismu

100%

Havlík V.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2009

|

tom 57

|

nr 6

837-853

EN

The philosophical attempt to explain the scientific status of Darwinism has been given significant attention in the methodology of science. Darwinism, unlike the physical theories which act as the model of what is scientific, does not meet the usual mathematical-experimental requirements and, due to this exceptional character, raises the philosophical question of how we might either reformulate the what it means for theories to be scientific or deny the scientific status of Darwinism. The aim of this paper is review some of discussions of this question in the philosophy of science, to find an acceptable and defensible position in the spectrum of opinion, and to assess the future perspective for this evolutionary process of philosophical reflection. This paper endeavours to show, on the basis of a critique of M. Ruse, that Darwin’s theory, the core of Darwinism, is fully axiomisable and that, as such, it fits the traditional hypothetico-deductive model of scientific theories. At the same time, however, we show the reason why it has a scientific character that is exceptional and specific – we point here to the much more complex and multi-levelled theoretical synthesis of Darwinism, which is unparalleled in contemporary natural science. It is for this reason that it difficult to find methodological standards for the estimation of the scientificality of Darwinism in philosophico-methodological reflection.

3

Redukcionistický program fyziky a proměna fundamentální ontologie

100%

Havlík V.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2019

|

tom 67

|

nr 5

695-712

EN

The expanding knowledge of physics - especially in those areas remote from our empirical knowledge - have already, many times before, transformed our intuitive, ontological starting points and our assumptions about the ordering of nature. In the present time, we are prepared to accept that, for example, the simultaneity of an event is dependent on a reference frame, that particles in the microworld can be in multiple places at the same time, or that it is not possible to measure all of these particles’ physical attributes with the same precision at the same time. It is possible to say that we are altogether familiar with relativistic and quantum effects. In physics, however, further facts were also discovered that called for a change in our traditional assumptions. Their results could have a similarly revolutionary impact and could significantly influence not only knowledge in the area of physics, but also some other areas of the special sciences. In this article I try to show in what way the traditional assumptions touching on relationships between the parts and the wholes, which are the basis of traditional, reductionist methodology and fundamental ontology, would be transformed. At the same time, I try to analyze what the consequences of these changes in the explanatory topology will be.

CS

Rozvíjející se fyzikální poznání - především v těch oblastech, které jsou vzdáleny naší empirické zkušenosti - již vícekrát proměnilo naše intuitivní ontologická východiska a předpoklady týkající se uspořádání přírody. V dnešní době jsme již připraveni akceptovat, že například současnost událostí je závislá na vztažné soustavě, že částice mikrosvěta mohou být na více místech najednou, nebo že nelze změřit se stejnou přesností všechny jejich fyzikální vlastnosti. Lze říci, že s relativistickými a kvantovými efekty jsme již celkem obeznámeni. V rámci fyziky byly již ale objeveny i další fakty, které volají po změně našich tradičních předpokladů. Jejich důsledky mohou mít obdobně revoluční dopad a mohou významně ovlivnit nejen fyzikální poznání, ale i některé další oblasti speciálních věd. V této stati se snažím ukázat, jakým způsobem by se v současné době měly proměnit tradiční předpoklady týkající se vztahů mezi částmi a celky, které zakládají tradiční redukcionistickou metodologii a fundamentální ontologii. Zároveň se snažím analyzovat, k jakým důsledkům vedou tyto změny v explanační topologii.

4

Donald Gillies a modifikovaný faksifikacionismus

100%

Havlík V.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

|

2015

|

tom 63

|

nr 3, Special No: Sedmkrát z logiky a metodologie vědy

77-100

EN

Popper’s critical rationalism and especially his solution of the problem of induction, which is based on the fact that beliefs are not inferences and rejection is not induc-tive, has little orthodox followers but more critics and revisers. Many of Popper’s fol¬lowers admit that his concept is rightly criticized from various positions and they seek to further develop Popper’s legacy by adopting diﬀerent strategies and correc¬tions. Unlike the orthodox followers of Popper (e.g. David Miller) they tend to make serious changes to Popper’s conception (e.g. John Watkins, John Worrall) under the inﬂuence of Imre Lakatos and his discussions with Popper. Donald Gillies belongs to the seemingly moderate revisers of Popper’s legacy. He tries to deal with the objec¬tions raised, especially against falsiﬁcationism, and he calls his elaborate conception modiﬁed falsiﬁcationism. This article deals with the question as to what extent Gillies’ attempt is successful and how it responds to the real problems of falsiﬁcationism within contemporary debates.

5

Simulace a instrumentální pojetí vědy

100%

Havlík V.

Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)

|

2016

|

tom 38

|

nr 2

131-157

EN

The article deals with the discussions about the epistemological and methodological role of simulation in contemporary science. It focuses firstly on the current status of these discussions in the methodology of science, and then to its continuity with a certain thinking traditions of the 1980s, when discussions about modeling raised numerous questions challenging the traditional conceptual distinctions, especially between experiment and theory. The article adheres to the view that simulation is a new and specific tool of science that will also require new and specific methodology and epistemological assessment. To support this point of view, some recent analyzes of specific examples of simulations, and their specific status in modern science, are discussed in detail.

CS

Stať se zabývá diskusemi o epistemologicko-metodologické roli simulací v soudobé vědě. Soustředí se nejprve na aktuálnost těchto diskusí v současné metodologii vědy a následně na její návaznost na určitou myšlenkovou tradici z osmdesátých let 20. století, kdy diskuse kolem modelování vyvolaly řadu otázek zpochybňujících tradiční pojmové distinkce, především mezi experimentem a teorií. Stať se přiklání v rámci těchto diskusí k názorům, které řadí simulace k novým a specifickým nástrojům vědy, jež také vyžadují novou a specifickou metodologii a epistemologické postavení. Pro podporu této názorové pozice jsou uvedeny některé aktuální analýzy konkrétních příkladů simulací a jejich specifického postavení v moderní vědě.