Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Zasada podwójnego skutku, zasada moralnej symetrii i kwestia legalizacji eutanazji

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Janikowski W.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2013

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nr nr 22

125-138

EN

In this essay I scrutinize importance of Principles of Double Effect and MoralSymmetry in regard to the question of moral acceptance of euthanasia legalization.My conclusion is that although there is no substantially moral difference betweenpassive and active euthanasia, the problem of morally justifiable legalization ofeuthanasia is still not resolved. That is because some reasons suggest the possibilityof special discrepancy between moral acceptability of euthanasia in certain cases andmoral demand to preserve legal prohibition of euthanasia in general. In the paperI criticize the popular opinion that utilitarianism cannot account of why we giveweight to the question of moral permissibility of intentions. I claim that contraryto this false platitude utilitarianism can even accommodate practical relevance ofPrinciple of Double Effect, but not as a valid per se principle.

2

Truth of Analytic Statements in a Radically Empiricist Theory of Meaning

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Janikowski W.

Filozofia Nauki

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2009

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tom 17

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nr 2

87-97

PL

The author presents his own conception of semantic analyticity accounted for from a thoroughly empiricist perspective on (descriptive) meaning. This conception includes the following theses. Meanings as entities constituted in social interactions should be investigated empirically by sociolinguistic methods. Each meaning is determined by a cluster of platitudes, i.e. sentences held as true or known in a given form by all (or almost all) competent language users. Each such sentence can be equivalently expressed in a form of conditional inference, or just possess this form. All these inferences are held, by competent language users, as connected to others, thus building a global semantic space. A sentence is accepted as meaningful only if it is inferentially connected to other sentences so that together they, at least hypothetically, relate to some determinate experiences. Hence all meaningful sentences are a posteriori true. Analyticity/syntheticity of proposition is relative to a degree and scope of being accepted or known in a given form of sentence expressing it. Evidently analyticity/syntheticity is a psycho-social matter. Sufficient degree of analyticity is called 'platitudiness'. Analytic/synthetic distinction comes in degrees, is not strict, and a sentence's being analytic/synthetic may change over time. There are many cases in which we cannot determine whether a sentence is more analytic than synthetic, or conversely.

3

Response to Maciej Witek

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Janikowski W.

Filozofia Nauki

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2009

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tom 17

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nr 2

113-122

PL

Author of "Truth of analytic statements in a radically empiricist theory of meaning" answers to a critical essay written by Maciej Witek. He clarifies the metaphysical assumptions and implications of proposed conception, dealing with such issues as: sense/reference distinction; methodological versus realistic approach to theory of meaning; inferential/causal relations among meaningful items; mental aspect of meanings. Next, he makes explicit a view on the concept of truth to which this theory is committed. In addition, he formulates ways of sociolinguistic operationalization of concepts of 'platitude' and 'meaning'.

4

Utylitaryzm reguł, znaczenie intencji i ocena terroryzmu

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Janikowski W.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2018

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tom 44

5-23

EN

In this paper I consider the puzzling question of moral responsibility of some quite specific terrorist acts. One distinguishable, but highly controversial, example of such a case may be the allied terror-bombing of German cities by English and American forces during the end of World War II, with so many civilian victims. I propose strict definition of terrorism, and after that, go on with the question: Is it really so obvious and certain that all acts of terrorism are impermissible on moral grounds? Then I investigate the relevance of intention for moral evaluation of any case of terrorism. In these matters I get involved in dispute with Jeff McMahan’s thesis that all acts of terrorism are inherently morally wrong and impermissible, and criticize his employment of the Principle of Double Effect.

PL

W artykule rozważam intrygującą kwestię odpowiedzialności moralnej za pewne specyficzne akty terrorystyczne. Wyjątkowym przykładem są bombardowania miast niemieckich przez siły alianckie pod koniec II Wojny Światowej. Podaję najbardziej trafną moim zdaniem definicję terroryzmu. Następnie rozpatruję kontrowersyjne zagadnienie: Czy jest naprawdę pewne, że wszystkie akty terrorystyczne są moralnie absolutnie niedopuszczalne? Biorę przy tym pod uwagę wagę intencji przy osądzaniu takich czynów i wchodzę w polemikę z Jeffem McMahanem na temat stosowania w tym zakresie Zasady Podwójnego Skutku.

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Jak ‘powinien’ może wynikać z ‘jest’? Reewaluacja tezy Johna R. Searle’a

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Janikowski W.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2023

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tom 71

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nr 3

133-154

EN

In this article, I discuss the conception of normative sentences by John R. Searle. The conducted analysis is to prove its credibility. Also, its author in 2021, more than half a century after its first formulation, despite numerous discussions over that time, claims that he maintains the statement about the validity of this conception, and in particular also the famous thesis about the possibility of making an inferential transition from sentences about facts to sentences about duties (Searle 2021, 3–16). The creator of the commonly known theory of speech acts argues that some normative sentences result conceptually from factual (descriptive) sentences. I analyze his arguments in detail, trying to explain how to understand his thesis that talking about the so-called Naturalistic Fallacy may itself be a mistake. I focus here on the issue of implication (correct inferences) and the conditions of the truth of normative sentences. Considering the various possibilities of interpreting Searle’s thesis and arguments will also justify the claim that they are correct and retain their importance. A unique element of Searle’s conception that I argue with is his claim about the allegedly intrinsically motivating power of speech acts, such as making a promise.

PL

W niniejszym artykule omawiam koncepcję zdań normatywnych Johna R. Searle’a. Przeprowadzona analiza ma służyć wykazaniu jej wiarygodności. Również jej autor w 2021r., po ponad pół wieku od jej pierwszego sformułowania, mimo bardzo licznych dyskusji prowadzonych w przeciągu tego czasu, stwierdza, że podtrzymuje twierdzenie o ważności i trafności tej koncepcji, a w szczególności także słynną już tezę o możliwości dokonania inferencyjnego przejścia od zdań o faktach do zdań o powinnościach (Searle 2021, 3–16). Twórca powszechnie znanej teorii czynności mowy przekonuje, że niektóre zdania normatywne wynikają pojęciowo ze zdań faktualnych (opisowych). Analizuję szczegółowo jego argumentację, usiłując wyjaśnić, jak należy rozumieć jego tezę, że mówienie o tzw. błędzie naturalistycznym samo w sobie może być błędem. Skupiam się przy tym na istocie wynikania (poprawnych inferencji) oraz warunkach prawdziwości zdań normatywnych. Rozważenie różnych możliwości interpretacji tezy i argumentów Searle’a jest zarazem uzasadnieniem twierdzenia, że są one poprawne i zachowują swoją aktualność. Wyjątkowym elementem koncepcji Searle’a, z którym polemizuję, jest jego twierdzenie o rzekomo samoistnie motywującej mocy aktów mowy, np. dokonywania obietnicy.

6

Rationalist Pragmatism and the Critique of Empiricism in the Philosophy of Robert B. Brandom

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Janikowski W.

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tom 21

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nr 1

61-80

PL

At the outset of the article I set forth a general characterization of Robert B. Brandom’s philosophy, as belonging to the post-empiricist tradition with inferential-ism as its main idea. In section 2 I discuss four dichotomies important to the method-ology which allows Brandom to construct his philosophical system. My point is to indicate the arbitrariness of the absolutist account of these dichotomies, which gives rise to misuse of relative categories. In effect, Brandom’s dichotomic way of theo-retical exposition does not respect Davidson’s principle of relationism, which Bran-dom himself declares to accept. In the next section, I go on to consider two basic mo-tives for the resolute Brandomian attack on empiricism: strong inferentialist and an-tirepresentationalist theses. Pertaining to this view is also the claim of irreducible linguistic normativity. In section 4, these questions are treated in the context of the ap-parently novel theory of semantic pragmatism. Section 5 is crucial to my purposes. There I criticize the excessively narrow Brandomian conception of empiricism in the theory of meaning. I argue that Brandom’s attack on empiricism depends on a false analysis of the distinction between circumstances and consequences of application holding for sentences. In addition, the problem of conceptual content’s fine grainess is treated, as well as the Kantian dichotomy of reasons versus causes, interpreted by Brandom in terms of the social/natural distinction. Finally, section 6 deals with the relation holding between the concept of reason on the one hand, and the objectivism and representationalism theses, on the other. Despite appearances, in Brandom’s philosophical system there is no place for objective standards of procedural reason.