Development of notion of energy resulted in appearing different interpretations in fields of physics and psychology. To psychology this concept was introduced by Mesmer. He believed that an influence of a physically perceptible fluid is the essence of therapeutic action. It was Freud who reformulated Mesmer's theory explaining that this influence should be understood as a transference. At the same time, the 19th century disputes between vitalism and mechanistic school of physiology brought a widespread consensus about the unity of all types of energy. This consensus led later to a gradual elimination of the concept of energy from psychology. In the 20th century interpretation of notion libido caused that idea of a specific vital energy returned in Reich's pieces. It is important that Reich was one of the most prominent psychotherapists of the 20th century. He created contemporary Bioenergetic Therapy. Representatives of this kind of therapy claim today that a notion of energy announces a rise of a new paradigm in science. Actually this notion creates a danger of introducing activities independent of any rational valuation into a field of healing procedures.
Participants of polemics connected with the psychotherapeutic aspect of psychoanalysis, discuss the most often about technique. Controversies considerable relating to psychological theory and philosophy, lying at bases of this technique, are treated as secondary. This approach creates conflicting directives of therapeutic technique, forges its ethical dimension and description of psychical life of individual, introduces in the area of culture notions and phenomena not dependent on the social control. Threats resulting from these should be counteracted by psychotherapist's theoretical and philosophical reflection.
The subject matter of the article is the genesis of John Locke’s criticism of the Malebranchean theory of ideas as cognitive content, put forward by Locke in his work An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God. This genesis will be shown by pointing out two types of motives for Locke's criticism: (1) biographical motives, related to the immediate historical circumstances of Locke's philosophical activity, as well as (2) substantive motives, i.e. those drawn directly from Locke’s philosophical views and are declared by him outright. In the first part of the article, I will present the biographical motives related to Locke's discussion with John Norris, and in the second part, I will refer to the philosophical motives that prompted Locke to criticize Malebranche's views.
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