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Meanders of the Theory of Social Choice

100%

Sosnowska H.

Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology

2010

tom 1

nr 1

187-191

I would like to thank Professor Gardawski for inviting me here. I must admit I accepted this invitation rather blindly as I am a 'migrant' both in the sense of place, as I graduated from the University, and faculty, because mine is mathematics. I have been dealing with the mathematical economics for many years and I think I can say I also deal with economics. However, my approach, my views and what I consider scientific knowledge is contrary to most opinions that have been expressed here so far. (fragment of text)

Transformation into anti-manipulation method in voting. Changes in properties

100%

Sosnowska H.

Control and Cybernetics

2022

tom Vol. 51, No. 4

487--499

This paper examines the properties of the anti-manipulation method in voting. Such a method can be used by committees and similar bodies to ensure that votes reflect genuine preferences. The anti-manipulation method is based on the Borda Count and discourages strategic voting by excluding scores that deviate excessively from the mean. The method does not eliminate strategic voting but diminishes the motivation to apply it. We compare the properties of the Borda Count and the anti-manipulation method. The properties, which are most often found in the literature, were chosen for comparison. Thus, the following properties are examined: consistency, vulnerability to the no-show paradox, vulnerability to the subset choice condition, homogeneity, monotonicity, and vulnerability to the reversal bias paradox as well as the Condorcet winner and loser paradoxes. The anti-manipulation method fails to satisfy most of these properties. A real data example, the voting of a certain jury, is used as a counterexample in most cases.

Differences Between Jurors in Classical Music Competitions: The MCDM and Network Theory Approaches

63%

Sosnowska H. , Zawiślak P.

Multiple Criteria Decision Making

2019

tom 14

93-107

This paper analyses the voting in two of the major international classical music competitions, which were held recently, viz. the International Henryk Wieniawski Violin Competition and the International Chopin Piano Competition, as well as the hypothesis, raised in some media reports, that there were juror cliques in the Wieniawski Competition. Network theory is used to compare the rankings of the two Chopin competitions. Jurors are nodes and they are linked if the correlation between the ordered list of competitors, as measured by the Kendall rank correlation coefficient, exceeds a given threshold value. The obtained networks were found linked in the case of the Chopin Competition, but disconnected in the case of the Wieniawski Competition. The results indicate that there may have been cliques in the Wieniawski Competition, but not in the Chopin Competition. The problem can be descibed in MCDM terminology by labelling the contestants ’variants’ and the jurors (or, more precisely, their musical preferences) – ’criteria’. The similarity of any two criteria is measured by correlating the orders of the alternatives (i.e. variants) that result from applying them. The problem of juror cliques is thereby transformed into one of finding groups of criteria that are similar in the case of these variants.