Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na https://bibliotekanauki.pl
Ograniczanie wyników
Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 3

Liczba wyników na stronie
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
Wyniki wyszukiwania
help Sortuj według:

help Ogranicz wyniki do:
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The author compares the anthropology of Karol Wojtyla as developed in his main philosophical work 'The acting person' with the vision of the human person found in 'La conscience', the analysis of man's being conscious carried out by the eminent French psychiatrist Henri Ey. He tries to show that Wojtyla's conception of man as a person who develops morally through his or her free actions is confirmed by the results of psychiatric investigation. Psychiatry, as the pathology of human freedom, has access to the inner mechanisms of human actions; these mechanisms become discernible only during the process of their disintegration. This is therefore an original way of understanding the acting person.
EN
The essay starts with Walter Biemel's report on the introduction of the concept of 'Lebenswelt' by Husserl who, in his lecture in Vienna in 1935, passed from accepting as basic the ideal world of science to stating that this world is grounded in the 'Lebenswelt', the world as we perceive it. The 'Lebenswelt' is for Husserl the topic of phenomenology as a discipline of the spirit - a discipline of a very special, not objectively-logical character. This leads to the problem of historicity, discussed by Ludwig Landgrebe in the context of its end. He argues that history may be understood as history only from the point of view of a teleological principle (Kant's regulative principle of action) mediating between expecting the Last Things and the actual consequences of actions. But this must be connected with understanding time as the time of 'action' as analyzed by Heidegger, not as a continuous linear process directed by causal laws. The continuity of history is achieved by the free actions of people and the unpredictability in question is one of the free actions themselves. An outline of a consistent philosophy of the human person acting and morally developing on the strength of his or her actions has been given by Karol Wojtyla's 'perfectiorism'. Wojtyla stresses as basic the seemingly trivial distinction between a free action and what merely happens in us. Thomistic metaphysics can express both of those dynamisms only by the same terms 'agere-pati'. This is due, argues Wojtyla, to its basically cosmological character. Thus, there exists a tension between the personalistic approach of Thomism and its alleged empiricism. Thomistic philosophy is based, in fact, not on experience as understood by empiricism, but precisely on the exploration of the 'Lebenswelt'; and this field of investigation, being the domain of free action and moral development, i.e. of what is basically human, is not that of scientific theories and demonstrations but one of vision, persuasion, and testimonies.
EN
The text is a sketch of the author's philosophical itinerary, beginning with his studies under the direction of Roman Ingarden, through his collaboration with Karol Wojtyla to the problems of the basic presuppositions of accepting and defending human dignity, as elaborated by Karol Wojtyla and Robert Spaemann. The author stresses the indispensability of a philosophy of the absolute as the main theoretical basis of democracy understood as a regime in which human persons are really respected.
first rewind previous Strona / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.