Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

The Parliamentary Opposition and the Senate Under the French Fifth Republic

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tom 56

36-53

PL

Artykuł jest poświęcony roli francuskiego Senatu (pod rządami konstytucji V Republiki) jako organu, który może stanowić narzędzie w gestii opozycji antyrządowej. Wskazano, że we francuskiej formule systemu semiprezydenckiego, która została stworzona w efekcie racjonalizacji systemu parlamentarnego, bikameralizm może stanowić obszar szczególnej ekspansji egzekutywy, która dąży do efektywnego wdrożenia swoich własnych zamierzeń legislacyjnych. Autor dowodzi, że ma to szczególnie negatywny wpływ na status opozycji parlamentarnej. Jest tak nawet wtedy, gdy opozycja dysponuje większością w Senacie. Francuska izba druga, choć jest to organ relatywnie silny, może być neutralizowana w procesie ustawodawczym zmierzającym do implementacji programu rządowego. Autor poddaje analizie problem marginalizacji opozycji parlamentarnej w odniesieniu do dwóch podstawowych układów politycznych V Republiki: tak zwanego efektu większościowego (władza wykonawcza jest politycznie jednorodna) oraz koabitacji (władza wykonawcza jest politycznie podzielona).

EN

The paper is devoted to the role of the French Senate (under the constitution of the Fifth Republic) as an organ that can remain a tool in the hands of opposition to the government. It has been pointed out that in the French formula of the semi-presidential system, which was created as a result of the rationalisation of a parliamentary model, bicameralism may be the field of special expansion of the executive which aims at the effective implementation of its own legislative activities. The author argues that this has a particularly negative impact on the status of the parliamentary opposition. This is the case even when the opposition has a majority in the Senate. The French second chamber, although the body is relatively strong, can be neutralised in legislative proceedings designed to implement the government’s programme. The author analyses the problem of marginalising the parliamentary opposition in relation to the two major political arrangements of the Fifth Republic: the so-called majority effect (the executive branch is politically homogeneous) and cohabitation (the executive branch is politically divided).

2

Model prezydentury w konstytucjonalizmie frankofońskich państw Afryki Zachodniej

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nr 3(116)

95-114

EN

The article deals with the model of presidency adopted in the basic laws of eight West African francophone states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. In many aspects, those acts were based on the systemic solutions applied in the Constitution (1985) of the Fifth French Republic. According to them, the President is the most important element of the constitutional system of government and the basic holder of the executive power. The following aspects were considered in the analysis of the existing model of presidency: the procedure for election of the head of state, incompatibility of the office of President with other posts, performance of the duties of President in the event of vacancy in the office, the status within the executive power and in relation to Parliament, presidential extraordinary powers, requirements of political and legal accountability. The solutions used in the above-mentioned states provide for establishing a presidency more powerful than that existing not only in the parliamentary cabinet system, but also in the French current legal framework. However, the extent of this enhancement in particular states varies, thereby influencing the nature of the existing system of government. In some states included in the article, the constitutions directly draw on the presidential model in which the executive is not responsible to Parliament politically. Others have implemented the basic principle of the semi-presidential system, namely the responsibility of the government to both the head of state and the representative body (Parliament). Notwithstanding the specific nature of the detailed solutions, the said states have implemented a model of presidency adapted to particular political, social and cultural circumstances.

3

Zmiany w pozycji ustrojowej prezydenta Francji po przyjęciu ustawy konstytucyjnej z 23 lipca 2008 roku o modernizacji instytucji V Republiki

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nr 3(21)

355-364

EN

The paper concerns the political position of the head of state in France after the adoption of the constitutional law of 23 July 2008 on the modernization of the institutions of the Fifth Republic. There have been 24 revisions of the Constitution of 1958 so far, but the aforementioned one is the most extensive. The constitutional changes were prepared by The committee of reflection and proposal on the modernisation and the re -balancing of the institutions of the Fifth Republic, presided over by Édouard Balladur, a former Prime Minister (1993-1995). The committee was created in 2007 at the initiative of Nicolas Sarkozy, the then president of the Republic. Some of the proposed changes went too far and were not eventually incorporated into the Constitution. The other ones were added at the stage of parliamentary work on the bill. The author draws attention to the amendments that refer to the president of the Republic and discusses their influence on his political position. The noteworthy modifications are inter alia: a two -term limit; the parliamentary control over presidential nominations; the increased control over the so -called exceptional powers based on the article 16 of the Constitution; the right to convene the Congress in order to present a presidential message. The author claims that the adopted modifications did not cause significant changes regarding the status of the president of France.

4

Przesłanki rozwiązania parlamentu w praktyce ustrojowej V Republiki Francuskiej

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nr 2

57-70

EN

The paper discusses the grounds required for the dissolution of the parliament in the political practice of the French Fifth Republic. The Constitution of October 4, 1958 adopted a model of strengthened political power of the head of state, granting them instruments of executive influence on the functioning of other state organs. Paragraph 12 of the Constitution gives the President practically unlimited power to dissolve the National Assembly – the lower chamber of French parliament. The conditions for applying this paragraph are not stipulated in the legal regulations. It is not necessary for the President to respond to a motion of another body, or even to obtain a countersignature. These constitutional factors have led to various political practices. The author of the paper puts forward the thesis that giving freedom to the head of state as regards the application of paragraph 12 on the one hand provides the necessary foundations to exercise a power model with a considerable degree of decisiveness, but on the other may lead to a situation where the dissolution of the National Assembly no longer has a power function in its conventional sense, but serves the purpose of providing the head of state with an instrument for considerably strengthening his own political position. Since the present Constitution of the Fifth Republic has been in force, the National Assembly has been dissolved five times. The author identifies three basic grounds for applying paragraph 12: to defuse a political or social conflict (1962 and 1968), to restore a politically homogenous executive power (1981 and 1988), and to maintain a given political configuration (1997). Since the 1980s the dissolution of parliament has become a tool for the president to avoid cohabitation and, by this token, to provide a political system where the role of the leader of the executive is in the hands of the head of state. On account of the defeat of the formation supporting the president in 1997 this strategy failed to produce the expected outcome. The dissolution of the National Assembly has not taken place since. In 2000, the length of the mandate of the head of state was shortened to five years, which makes it more likely for parliamentary elections to occur directly after presidential elections. This may for a long time to come eliminate the main grounds for the dissolution of the lower chamber, which in the 1980s and 1990s stemmed from the desire to ensure a political system favorable for the head of state. This reason alone may mean that the significance of paragraph 12 in the political practice of the Fifth Republic will continue to be limited.

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Partially Presidentialized Bicameral Parliament of France and Its Impact on the Course of Legislative Proceedings During Emmanuel Macron’s Term of Office in the Light of the Fifth Republic’s Institutional Logic

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nr 2

51-71

PL

Artykuł dotyka wpływu bliskości wyborów prezydenckich i parlamentarnych na skład polityczny izb francuskiego parlamentu, jak również na ich funkcjonowanie w ramach parlamentaryzmu zracjonalizowanego. Wybory z 2017 roku stanowiły, ze względu na zwycięstwo Emmanuela Macrona – kandydata spoza dwóch głównych obozów politycznych, szczególny test dla tzw. efektu większościowego, który może być definiowany jako przeciwieństwo koabitacji. Autor wskazuje na utrzymanie, nawet po wyborach z 2017 roku, opartej na dominacji prezydenckiej logiki instytucjonalnej V Republiki. Jej częścią jest także fakt, że Senat, francuska izba druga, nie musi być włączony w strukturę efektu większościowego. Może to skutkować, pomimo silnej pozycji obozu prezydenta, wystąpieniem bikameralizmu niekongruentnego. Taka konfiguracja może być traktowana jako wskaźnik częściowej prezydencjalizacji francuskiego parlamentu dwuizbowego. Z tej racji autor dowodzi, że obie częściowe elekcje senackie z lat 2017 i 2020 wzmocniły słabszą wersję efektu większościowego stosowanego w ramach francuskiego semiprezydenckiego systemu rządów. Wszystko to ma wpływ na stosowanie niektórych procedur parlamentarnych odnoszących się do przebiegu postępowania ustawodawczego (takie jak mieszane komisje parytetowe oraz tzw. ostatnie słowo Zgromadzenia Narodowego), które to procedury zostały wpisane w ramy parlamentaryzmu zracjonalizowanego V Republiki.

EN

The article refers to the impact of the proximity of the presidential and parliamentary elections on the political composition of the chambers of the French parliament, as well as on their functioning in the framework of rationalized parliamentarianism. The 2017 elections were, due to the victory of Emmanuel Macron as a candidate from outside the two main political camps, a special test for the so-called majoritarian fact, which may be defied as an opposite of cohabitation. The author points to the maintenance, even after the 2017 elections, of the Fifth Republic’s institutional logic based on presidential dominance. Its part is also the fact that the Senate – the French second chamber – does not have to be included into the majoritarian fact. this may result in the occurrence, despite the aforementioned strong position of the president’s camp, of incongruent bicameralism. Such a configuration may be treated as an indicator of a partial presidentialization of France’s bicameral parliament. Hence, the author argues that both partial senatorial elections of 2017 and 2020 strengthened a weaker version of majoritarian fact applied within the French semi-presidential system of government. All this has an impact on the use of selected parliamentary procedures concerning the course of legislative proceedings (such as mixed parity commissions and the last word given to the National Assembly), which have been inscribed into the framework of the Fifth Republic’s rationalized parliamentarism.