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Space language in Heidegger, part 1

100%

Buczynska-Garewicz H.

2005

nr 4(94)

9-28

The article analyses the Heidegger works with regard to their significance for phenomenology of space. Heidegger outlined certain concepts for pregeometric meaning of space. At the same time, however, by means of his works in their entirety, he has reached beyond the phenomenological issue of source experience of spatiality, thus creating an entirely new philosophy of space. The issue of space is there in the centre of his philosophy of being. On the one hand, the thinking of the truth of being determines the space anew, whilst on the other, space becomes of essence for a new non-metaphysical way of speaking about being. The present article shows in what a way Heidegger radically changed the philosophical thinking about space. In our contemporary times, physical sciences have assumed revolutionary approaches in their concepts of time and space. So has philosophy, and completely independently so. Heidegger has reached beyond the Cartesian stretch or extent, as well as beyond the Kantian notion of an a-priori form of insight into things.

'Without Truth' - A Better Prospect?

100%

Buczynska-Garewicz H.

2007

tom 16

nr 2(62)

103-119

There is a widespread belief that philosophy, to neopragmatism, was a struggle against monsters created by metaphysics. But this attitude predates neopragmatism, and can be found in the Vienna Circle or Tadeusz Kotarbinski. What the authoress find typical for pragmatism is a tendency to simplify the role and conception of truth as direct depiction or copying of the world in the mind. This simplification, perhaps most conspicuous in the writings of Richard Rorty, leads to an absolute dichotomy between a Platonic conception of truth, and an empirically oriented view that truth is what science finds to be true, favored by neopragmatism.