Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Zbrodnia wołyńska 1943 roku i mit buntu ludowego

100%

Motyka G.

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nr 1

PL

The Volhynian Massacre of 1943 and the Myth of a Peasant RevoltThe discussion about the events, which took place in Volhynia in 1943, includes a hypothesis presenting the anti–Polish outbreaks as an expression of a spontaneous revenge of the local Ukrainian peasants for the discrimination experienced at the time of the Second Republic. The author of the article based himself on unknown documents to demonstrate that in reality the mass–scale massacre of the Poles was organized by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists–Bandera (OUN–B) Underground and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) partisan units it commanded. The peasants participating in the events were mobilised (at least partly by force) to special auxiliary detachments, ordered by the Bandera–led superiors to set fire to Polish settlements and to kill their inhabitants. Both in Volhynia and in Galicia peasants were incorporated into groups attacking localities inhabited by the Poles, despite the fact that partisan forces sufficed to destroy them. The victims were cruelly murdered with axes and other tools so as to produce the impression among the observers that they were dealing with a local Jacquerie while in reality the massacre was a planned ethnic cleansing campaign. The idea to resolve the Polish–Ukrainian territorial controversy with the assistance of an ethnic purge had been devised by the OUN already prior to 1939. Initially, it was assumed that the future Ukrainian state would be devoid of all landowners and colonists who settled down in the conflict–ridden terrains after 1918, but in time the opinion calling for ”ejecting” the entire Polish population became increasingly popular. The population in question was to be murdered at least partly by the incited local peasants. At the beginning of 1943 UPA detachments commenced a battle against the Germans and Soviet partisans while simultaneously initiating the so–called anti–Polish campaign. The organised de–Polonisation operation, inaugurated on 9 February 1943 by attacking the village of Parośle in Volhynia, lasted until 18 May 1945 and claimed the lives of about 100 000 victims.

2

Nie tylko likwidacja prowidnyka „Stiaha”. Działania grupy operacyjnej „Lubaczów” w 1947 r.

100%

Motyka G.

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nr 1

523-540

PL

Artykuł przedstawia działalność Grupy Operacyjnej KBW „Lubaczów”, która w 1947 r., po zakończeniu akcji „Wisła”, prowadziła działania przeciwpartyzanckie przeciwko OUN i UPA. W wyniku intensywnych poszukiwań oddziałom KBW udało się w ciągu nieco ponad trzech miesięcy wykryć i zlikwidować ośrodek kierowniczy OUN w Polsce, na czele z krajowym prowidnykiem Jarosławem Staruchem „Stiahem”, jak również wszystkie większe grupy partyzanckie na terenie pow. lubaczowskiego. W ten sposób faktycznie położono kres istnieniu zorganizowanego podziemia ukraińskiego. W oparciu o analizę mało znanych dokumentów archiwalnych autor pokazuje, iż celem KBW nie była jedynie likwidacja podziemia ukraińskiego. Równolegle bowiem prowadzono aresztowania członków polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego, a także czystki personalne w szeregach partii politycznych i organizacji społecznych regionu. Pod egidą KBW stworzono liczne placówki ORMO i wzmocniono powiatowe struktury PPR. Podstawowym celem GO „Lubaczów” było więc umocnienie władzy komunistów w powiecie lubaczowskim.

3

Służba Bezpeky OUN-B (Służba Bezpieczeństwa OUN-B). Z warsztatów badawczych

100%

Motyka G.

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nr 1(9)

255-264

EN

The Ukrainian resistance security police established in 1940 by S. Bandera and S. Łenkawskyj performed the role of a secret service and counter intelligence agency within Bandera’s faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The first security police was commander was M. ¸ebed. From March 1941 he was replaced by M.Arsenych. The hierarchy of the service was closely connected with the hierarchy of OUN. Besides the leadership centre, there were also local departments consisting of two sections: information gathering and investigations. Fighting squads of the security police, which among others arrested people and executed death penalty were reporting to the department empoloyees of each level. Security police members were the most reliable members of OUN. The investigation conducted by OUN security police was merciless. What are known as third degree methods, i.e. torture, was used. In the case of minor offences, security police members thrashed suspects with beech sticks. People sentenced to death were shot or hanged. There were also cases of brutal murders. Between 1943 and 1945 OUN security police took an active part in the slaughter of Polish people. In the years 1945–1948, those Poles who collaborated with the communist government or were actively opposed to the Ukrainian resistance were executed. In practice, executions of Poles were not just limited to those two groups. OUN security police applied the principle of collective responsibility (i.e. killing entire families). At the same time, Ukrainians suspected of collaboration with the communists were also executed. The orders to apply solely the principle of personal responsibility were not given until May 1945. However, entire families were massacred beyond that date. Local OUN security police department employees were entitled to order the execution of a person. They enjoyed practically unlimited prerogatives. As a result, investigations were often brief and resistance members were executed in spite of unsubstantiated charges. The Soviets took advantage of the situation by staging numerous provocations, the result of which was the death of many OUN members wrongly accused of cooperation with the communist security police. OUN security police was law unto itself. The power of the OUN security police chief M. Arsenych (until his death in January 1947) was almost equal to the power of the leader of the Ukrainian National Insurgent Army (UPA). Separate departments of OUN security police survived until 1951 when most of the remaining members of this organisation took over positions as leaders of the OUN underground. The activities of OUN security police stirred a lot of controversy among Ukrainian researchers. On the one hand, they emphasize that the collective responsibility used by the OUN security police OUN discouraged local people from supporting the underground, but on the other they regard the liquidation of communist agents as legitimate.

4

Jeszcze o stosunku Polaków do sowieckich partyzantów – byłych jeńców

50%

Motyka G.

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2007

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nr 1(11)

462-467