This article analyses the amendments of January 2018 to the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance (INR) of 1998, which has raised doubts in light of international law and provoked diplomatic tensions between Poland on one side and Germany, Ukraine, United States of America and Israel on the other. The INR is a national institution whose role is, among others, to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes committed between 19171990. The article proves that the wording of the amendments is inconsistent with international law, as it ignores the principles of international responsibility, definitions of international crimes, and disproportionately limits freedom of expression. In consequence, it cannot be expected that third states will cooperate with Poland in the execution of responsibility for violation of the newly adopted norms.
Review of a book: Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham: 2019
The aim of the article is to answer the following questions: did Russia violate international law by executing an armed intervention in Crimea and what are the legal consequences of the Crimean crisis? The author claims that Russia committed aggression against Ukraine, thus violating a peremptory norm of international law. As a consequence, not only Russia is legally responsible for the commission of an internationally wrongful act but also third states and international organisations obliged to bring to an end serious breaches of international law. As well, these latter two are obliged to not recognise the unlawful annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia. The author analyses legal justifications of the Russian actions, such as defence of nationals, intervention by invitation, humanitarian intervention and the right to exercise self-determination. The author claims that the legal arguments presented by Russia are not convincing, taking into account the circumstances of the crisis.
The aim of this article is to classify the armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia in light of international law. Firstly, the Russian armed activities are qualified through the lens of use of force and it is shown that Russia committed an aggression. Secondly, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is qualified according to the law of armed conflict, not only identifying the applicable norms of law of armed conflict but examining whether atrocities have been committed and whether they are war crimes or mere crimes or acts of terror. The article posits that there is an international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine and in addition a non-international one between Ukrainian insurgents and governmental forces. The methodology used in the article is legal analysis of documents and international law doctrine.
The article presents main stages of development of the just war theory from the ancient times to the modern ones in terms of a right to use force (ius ad bellum). This analysis is indispensable to answer the question whether opinions of the greatest lawyers and philosophers of past times justify a return from the distinction on a bellum legale and a bellum illegale to a bellum iustum and a bellum iniustum. The problem is increasingly serious because references to justness are nowadays more and more frequent especially when there is a need to justify armed operations. Furthermore a general revival of the just war argumentation can be observed in recent publications which inclines to a deeper meaning, historical reflection. The article starts with a few remarks on the Greek attitude towards the war and a Roman ius fetiale which are usually considered as roots of the just war theory. It describes also an impact of the Christian thought on perceiving the war with great emphasis on the achievements of the Middle Ages thinkers. Reflections on the modern times start with description of ideas represented by the Spanish lawyers like Vitoria or Suarez who are often perceived as continuators of mediaeval thinkers. Then there is a part devoted to representatives of the modern times like Machiavelli, Bodin or Gentili who redefined the just war theory and used it to justify an unrestricted right to use force by a sovereign. The article presents also a period of general rejection of the just war theory by lawyers like Zouche, Pufendorf, Rachel, Textor or Bynkershoek with significant exceptions of Grotius, Wolff or Vattel who is perceived as the last supporter of the just war theory.
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