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1

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S SEARCH FOR POLITICAL ALLIES IN THE KINGDOM OF POLAND, 1914-1918

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Gaul J.

Studia Historyczne

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2006

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tom 49

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nr 2(194)

153-171

EN

As AustriaHungary and Russia went to war in 1914, Vienna could not but start looking round for political allies in the Kingdom of Poland, then part of the Russian Empire. Obviously, the ideal partner of the archconservative Habsburg monarchy would be a pro-Austrian party representing the propertied classes. The trouble was that eligible politicians of the centreright lacked significant popular support, a matter of vital importance in the age of mass political movements and universal suffrage. Meanwhile, the national democrats (ND) and the socialists, two parties with political clout, were singularly illfitted for an alliance with AustriaHungary. The right-wing HD could hardly have been expected to give up their traditional orientation on Russia and the Entente, while their reputation for radical extremism made talks with the Socialists unpalatable for Vienna. Yet the local Austrian representatives, Andrian in Warsaw and Hoenning in Lublin were more flexible. Especially Hoenning was keen on building bridges to political forces that had more than token support in the Kingdom of Poland. He urged the authorities in Vienna to establish contacts with left-wing nationalists and cultivate good relations with Józef Pilsudski. However, the secret mission of Police Superintendent Charwat to Warsaw in July 1917 ran into difficulties and eventually failed because of the German authorities were not prepared to ease their repressive regime in the occupied territories. Had the agreement reached at those meetings been finalized, Austria would have gained a strategic partner in Warsaw. However, there was another major obstacle. The Polish negotiators made their cooperation with Austria dependent on Vienna abandoning its alliance with Germany, an unlikely development even though the Habsburg Empire was too exhausted to hold on for much longer. While the Germans remained intransigent, no compromise with the radical Polish independence movement was possible.

2

Austro-Hungary and the Catholic Church in the Kingdom of Poland (August 1914 - August 1915)

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Gaul J.

Kwartalnik Historyczny

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2005

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tom 112

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nr 4

73-91

EN

The entry of Austro-Hungarian armies into the Kingdom of Poland (August 1914) created numerous tasks for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The key to guaranteeing peace and order in the hinterland lay in attaining a modus vivendi with the population inhabiting the Russian partition area. In order to normalise the situation, the occupation authorities considered it indispensable to establish friendly contacts with the Church hierarchy, and to amicably resolve all emergent problems in order to win over the local clergy, whose members undoubtedly exerted a great impact upon the population. The presented article deals with the policy applied by the Austro-Hungarian authorities towards the Catholic Church in the Kingdom of Poland - assorted plans and their realisation from the outbreak of the war to the establishment of a permanent occupation administration in the summer of 1915. The Austro-Hungarian authorities performed assorted conciliatory gestures towards the Catholic creed and Church in Polish lands. In February 1915 the supreme army command guaranteed full freedom of religious beliefs and conscience; the rights of legally recognised religious associations were to be identical to those enjoyed in the monarchy. It was recommended to support the Catholic creed, to maintain friendly contacts with the clergy, and to stir an awareness of belonging to a Roman Catholic empire. The authorities supported the provision of the Roman Catholic clergy with heretofore revenues - a task entrusted to the military administration. The improvement of relations with the Catholic Church involved also civilian authorities (Leopold Adrian), which attached great importance to the pro-Austrian political stance of the Polish population and Church authorities. Relations with the Catholic clergy in the occupied regions remained unsatisfactory, a situation aggravated by the uncompromising activity of both sides. The pro-reconciliation plans of the supreme Austrian authorities were not fully reflected in the steps made by the local authorities. Up to August 1915 the 'carrot and stick' policy produced extremely limited effects. The fact that it proved impossible to win the co-operation of the bishops and the parish clergy challenged a further successful impact of the Austro-Hungarian authorities upon the Polish population in the Kingdom of Poland and, consequently, reduced chances for an effective solution of the Polish question according to Austrian plans.

3

THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELEASE OF JÓZEF PILSUDSKI FROM MAGDEBURG

100%

Gaul J.

Dzieje Najnowsze

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2006

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nr 3

3-16

EN

The titular question has been discussed in literature on the subject upon numerous occasions. One of the heretofore unexamined sources are the papers of General Hans von Beseler, the German general governor, kept at the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg. They cast new light on the controversies between the German central authorities in Berlin and their occupation counterparts in Warsaw, the negotiations conducted with Pilsudski, the premises observed by the German government while making the decision about Pilsudski's release, and the protest voiced by Beseler and other representatives of the General Government in Warsaw. The key to the release of Pilsudski was the stand represented by the new authorities in Berlin. Prince Maximilian of Baden took this step because he wanted to guarantee a further economic exploitation of Polish lands and to protect them against their seizure by the Bolsheviks. On the other hand, the authorities in Warsaw - General Beseler, Colonel Nethe, the chief of staff, and Erich Schultze, commissar of the secret field police - opposed Pilsudski's return to Warsaw. At the beginning of November 1918 Beseler intervened in Berlin both personally and through the intermediary of Count Lerchenfeld, but to no avail. In view of the revolution progressing in Germany, on 5 November the German cabinet decided to release Pilsudski under the condition that he would sign a declaration promising not to embark upon anti-German activity. Despite Pilsudski's refusal, the possibility of his longer internment was excluded by the outbreak of the revolution. The German government dispatched a mission headed by Count Harry Kessler, who transported the Commander and Kazimierz Sosnkowski from Magdeburg to Warsaw. Pilsudski conducted a conciliatory policy towards the Germans and avoided bloodshed; at the same time, he skilfully achieved a withdrawal of the German army from Poland and thus prevented it threatening the construction of an independent Polish state.