Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

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Stanowisko Niemiec wobec jednolitego mechanizmu nadzoru bankowego w Unii Europejskiej

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Płóciennik S.

Ekonomia - Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroclawiu

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2013

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nr 4 (25)

241-259

EN

Efforts to create a banking union in the European Union focused in 2012 primarily on the common banking supervision. It was found in particular that the joint supervision should have been located in the European Central Bank, but would cover only the largest banks of the Member States. Smaller banks would remain under the control of the existing supervision on the national level. Among the countries that strongly supported such a solution was Germany. This paper tries to analyze the reasons why Germany preferred a “split” supervision despite the significant disadvantages of such a solution. The strongest argument concerns the intention to protect the banking sector against interference by the Community authorities. The reason is its specific shape dominated by small and medium-sized financial institutions. They play a crucial role in providing financial services to the sector of medium-sized businesses, so called Mittelstand, which is the most distinct element of the Rhenish capitalism. Smaller banks have developed with these companies an almost symbiotic, long-term oriented relationship. This is why they have become universal banks offering a variety of services to a single company. This feature, highly controversial after the crisis, is defended in Germany due to tradition and lower costs generated for small companies. The preference to leave the smaller banks under the supervision of national authorities may be also explained by their specific ownership structure. Most of the small-sized banks belong to the state or are cooperatives, so it is possible to use them for the implementation of local and regional economic policy. This is not the only reason for their attractiveness to the politicians. Places in the management and supervisory boards of public banks can be an attractive instrument for personnel policy of political parties. For these reasons, the number of adherents to subordinate the medium and small banks to a supervision outside Germany, which could impeach certain practices, is quite limited. An addition argument against a centralized supervision on the EU-level is related to the functional independence of the central bank. This issue is important for Germany because of its traditional anti-inflationary macroeconomic policy orientation. Since the crisis Germany has seen the European Central Bank losing its restrictive pattern of the monetary policy based on the experience of the Bundesbank and moving towards more and more expansionary monetary policy. In this context, the ECB as a body responsible for the overall supervision of European banks could easily fall into internal conflicts with the principles of monetary policy. The last argument explaining the position of Germany on the joint supervision is the shape of its own institutions of supervision. Germany has adopted a bipolar model in which tasks are divided between the central bank and a special authority, supported by other bodies and associations of financial institutions.

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Towards “Disorder” or “Dictatorship”? Labor market reform in Germany from the perspective of new comparative economics

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Płóciennik S.

Economic and Environmental Studies

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2013

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tom 13

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nr 3(27)

311-325

EN

After decades of increasing prosperity, the economic performance in Germany was relatively poor between 1995 and 2005 with a yearly average growth rate of 1.5%, while unemployment rose to over 5 million people in 2005. The author addresses two questions How can the economic downturn be explained in terms of institutional arrangements, which features caused the impact and why? Have reforms undertaken in recent years changed the institutional arrangements, and if so, what are the features of these changes? These questions are analyzed with help of the tools of the New Comparative Economics (NCE) approach, employing the premises property rights economics at the level of national economies and governance.

PL

Po dziesięcioleciach rosnącego dobrobytu, w latach 1995-2005 kondycja niemieckiej gospodarki osłabła, o czym świadczy średnioroczny wzrost PKB na poziomie 1,5% czy zwiększenie się liczby bezrobotnych do ponad 5 mln w 2005 roku. Autor rozważa dwie kwestie: Jak można wytłumaczyć załamanie ekonomiczne z punktu widzenia ustanowień instytucjonalnych, jakie są źródła recesji i dlaczego zaczęły one oddziaływać? Czy reformy, jakie podjęto w ostatnich latach, zmieniły ustanowienia instytucjonalne, a jeśli tak, to czym cechują się te zmiany? Pytania te analizowano wykorzystując narzędzia nowej ekonomii porównawczej (ang.: New Comparative Economics, NCE), bazującej na założeniach ekonomii praw własności na poziomie gospodarki krajowej oraz współrządzenia (ang.: governance).

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Germany's attitude towards the enlargement of the eurozone

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Płóciennik S.

Economics and Business Review

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2021

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tom 7

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nr 1

47-67

EN

The purpose of this paper is to answer the question as to why Germany is cautious towards a faster enlargement of the euro area. The usual explanation focuses on concerns that some of the candidate countries are not economically ready to adopt the common currency and their membership could destabilize the monetary union. However, such an approach does not take into account other factors that may influence Germany's reluctance to speed up the enlargement process. One of them is the conviction that the existing division of integration does not translate into economic costs and a long-term political cleavage in the EU. Another argument explaining Germany's position is their doubt about the economic policy preferences of the candidates which may prove to be crucial in the upcoming reform of the euro area governance. Some of them can drift towards more interventionism and support for the debtors' positions which is at odds with German interest.