Recenzja książki: Krzysztof Wójtowicz, Spór o istnienie w matematyce, Wyd. Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2003, ss. 506. Recenzja książki: Krzysztof Wójtowicz, Spór o istnienie w matematyce, Wyd. Naukowe Semper, Warszawa 2003, ss. 506.
At the turn of the 19th and 20th century, Wladyslaw Heinrich introduced a new style of philosophizing in the Cracow rather traditional philosophical milieu. His way of presenting philosophical ideas in a strict contact with empirical sciences arose great interest and found several talented followers. In the Jagiellonian Library in Cracow the manuscript is preserved bearing the title 'Theory of Cognition'; it was written by Heinrich in 1912. The author presents and critically assesses his 'philosophy of nature' as it can be reconstructed from the above mentioned manuscript.
Recenzja książki: William R. Shea, Designing Experiments and Games of Chance - The Unconvecional Science of Blaise Pascal, Science History Publication / USA, Watson Publishing International, Canton MA, 2003, ss. XII 4- 354.
The paper discusses the idea of quantum creation of the universe. After a few remarks concerning inflationary models and Tryon's idea of the world's origin as a fluctuation in the preexisting vacuum, the Hartle-Hawking quantum creation model is presented. Its structure and assumptions are discussed, and interpretative difficulties related to the mechanism of 'quantum creation' pointed out. The paper discusses the idea of quantum creation of the universe. After a few remarks concerning inflationary models and Tryon's idea of the world's origin as a fluctuation in the preexisting vacuum, the Hartle-Hawking quantum creation model is presented. Its structure and assumptions are discussed, and interpretative difficulties related to the mechanism of 'quantum creation' pointed out.
The paper can be regarded as a short and informal introduction to noncommutative calculi of probability. The standard theory of probability is reformulated in the algebraic language. In this form it is readily generalized to that its version which is virtually present in quantum mechanics, and then generalized to the so-called free theory of probability. Noncommutative theory of probability is a pair (M, φ) where M is a von Neumann algebra, and φ a normal state on M which plays the role of a noncommutative probability measure. In the standard (commutative) theory of probability, there is, in principle, one mathematically interesting probability measure, namely the Lebesgue measure, whereas in the noncommutative theories there are many nonequivalent probability measures. Philosophical implications of this fact are briefly discussed.
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A proposal is put forward to extend Quine’s criterion of existence (a theory is committed to the existence of bound variables) to mathematical structures. In the spirit of this criterion every mathematical structure can be regarded as a world in which only those entities exist that are necessary for the meaning of the structure. Some of mathematical worlds are used by physicist to model the real world. In such a case, ontology of a given mathematical world is transferred to the physical world or, more prosaically, some mathematical structures are interpreted as structures of the physical world. The miracle of understanding consists in the miracle of this interpretation.
Our present knowledge in the field of dynamical systems, information theory, probability theory and other similar domains indicates that the human brain is a complex dynamical system working in a strong chaotic regime in which random processes play important roles. In this environment our mental life develops. To choose a logically ordered sequence from a random or almost random stream of thoughts is a difficult and energy consuming task. The only domain in which we are able to do this with a full success is mathematics. Leibniz’s life ambition was to extend this success, with the help of what he called characteristica universalis, to other areas of human activity. The belief that this is possible lies at the basis of Leibniz’s rationalist system. Reasoning within his system, Leibniz claimed that also fundamental laws of physics can be deduced from the “first principles”. Just as linguistic or conceptual units are at the basis of the charactersistica universalis, his monads are responsible for physical activity of material bodies. When this rationalistic strategy is applied to the philosophy of space and time, it leads to their radically relational conception. Leibniz’s rationalistic approach to philosophy and science arouses out sympathy but it was Newton’s mathematical-empirical method that turned out to be effective in human endeavour to understand the functioning of the physical world. Successes of the Newtonian method compel us to revise our concept of rationality.
In the two-volume work Theism and the Analytical Philosophy (1985; 1988a) Joseph Życiński took up the challenge of renewing Christian metaphysics so that it could appear as a full-fledged partner in the dialogue with other streams of contemporary philosophy. This renewal should use two sources: the methodological principles of analytic philosophy, especially its philosophy of language, and certain elements of Whitehead’s process philosophy. This study presents a critical reconstruction of Życiński’s arguments contained in the first two chapters of (1985), which are devoted to the problem of language. Main results of this part of Życiński’s work are negative, that is, they refute the arguments and interpretations of those analytical philosophers who show the meaninglessness of the theistic language or try to assimilate it to other standard languages, depriving it of a reference to the transcendent reality. How can a positive part of the Życiński program be developed? It seems that only by formulating specific problems in the field of philosophy of God, or even theology, and choosing the right linguistic tools to drill down on a given problem and seek its solution. This is in line with Wittgenstein’s concept of language games. Życiński tries to do this in (1988a). Życiński turned out to be a precursor of nowadays increasingly developing analytical theology.
Book review: K. Chamcham, J. Silk, J.D. Barrow, S. Saunders (eds.), The Philosophy of Cosmology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017, pp. XII + 514.
PL
Recenzja książki: K. Chamcham, J. Silk, J.D. Barrow, S. Saunders (red.), The Philosophy of Cosmology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017, ss. XII + 514.
There are many ways of reading a book of the book. One could take a look at the table of content, read a few pages and skip the rest; one could look for the main line of reasoning not bothering about details; one could read carefully from cover to cover (this does not happen to often); and one could not only to read everything, and also to ponder over the argument (this is rather exceptional) but even to enter into discussion with the author. Such readers should be precious to every author. I had a happy chance to have at least one such reader on whose critical remarks I now want to comment. After politely praising my book, professor Burdzy carefully classified his remarks into four groups: errors, omissions, misleading information, and discussion. Errors (happily enough, only a few have been found) are not to be discussed with but corrected. I readily admit omissions; at least in some cases they could be called selection effects. As far as misleading material is concerned, I should say that to mislead the specialist is not the same as to mislead a common reader. In such a subtle matter as probability calculus many things depend on interpretation and interpretations are usually manifold. My account of interpretative questions related to probability are based on standard monographs and textbooks in the field (they are quoted in the book). It is a pity that, when working on the book, I did not know the book by professor Burdzy; if I did, perhaps my presentation of subjective interpretation would have been different. And finally, discussion…, I am open for it. A book that not excite discussion is a failed book.
The paper contains a comment on the criticism of the author's book Początek jest wszędzie (Prószynski i S-ka, 2002) by Marek Lagosz ("Przegląd Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria, 14, 2005, 121-133). The comment focuses on the following issues: (1) the conception of philosophy of physics; (2) some methodological questions, especially the role of models in physics; (3) some explanations concerning the model proposed by the present author and his coworkers. A few "ideological remarks" are also made.
Zygmunt Zawirski, a member of the Lwow-Warsaw Philosophical School, in 1927-28 published an extensive paper (in three parts) devoted to the critical examination of the eternal return hypothesis - the idea that the history of the universe is fundamentally a cyclic process. After presenting the development of this idea throughout the ages Zawirski discusses arguments on its behalf coming mainly from the second law of thermodynamics and from the Poincaré recurrence theorem. Zawirski's criticism is confronted with the present state of art. in this domain. Three new theoretical inputs are taken into account: first, our present knowledge of the global structure of space-time geometries with closed timelike curves; second, some results of relativistic thermodynamics; third, Tipler's no-return theorem (relativistic counterpart of the Poincaré theorem). Our knowledge regarding the eternal return, although not less hypothetical, is more „formalized” and more sophisticated than it was in Zawirski's time.
The original view of Joseph Życiński, presented in his book The Structure of the Metascientific Revolution (1988), boils down to the observation that almost before our eyes a great revolution took place, not in science, but in the philosophy of science, that is the meta-scientific revolution. His concept of the meta-scientific revolution grew out of his fascination with the revolution that took place in the foundations of mathematics in the first decades of the twentieth century. Whether a change in science deserves to be called a revolution is determined by whether the transformations it underwent also reached the meta-level. The set of presuppositions underlying transformations on the meta-level Życiński calls ideata. One of the aims of this article is to critically reconstruct the meaning of this term. The action of Życiński’s book takes place mainly on meta-level, but the meta-level constantly interacts with what is happening in science itself. The book sometimes makes an impression as if it were a study of the history of science, but history of science in a specific sense – something like a “sampling” of history with numerous examples. Among the creations of human thought, it is difficult to point to an area that changes more dynamically than science itself, but looking at it from a meta-perspective allows us to grasp those of its features that operate on a much broader scale.