Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Ograniczanie wyników

Znaleziono wyników: 2

Liczba wyników na stronie

Wyniki wyszukiwania

Sortuj według:

Ogranicz wyniki do:

Access Pricing Under Imperfect Competition Reconsidered

100%

Staněk R. , Kvasnička M.

Review of Economic Perspectives

2012

tom 12

nr 4

223-234

This paper claims that Onemli’s results published in “Access Pricing under Imperfect Competition”, Review of Economic Perspectives, 2012, are incorrect. Contrary to Onemli, we claim that in an industry, where a monopoly incumbent produces a key input used by itself and its competitors on a downstream market which is Cournot oligopoly, the regulator should set the second-best access charge such that the incumbent’s total profit is zero if the first-best access charge is not feasible. The competitors’ ability to produce the key input themselves does not change the outcome since no competitor chooses to use this option under this regulation. We also discuss some limitations of the Onemli’s model.

Do Auctions Improve Public Procurement? Evidence from the Czech Republic

80%

Kvasnička M. , Staněk R. , Krčál O.

DANUBE: Law and Economics Review

2015

tom 6

nr 4

241-257

This paper explores the effect of various contract-awarding procedures in public procurement on the price of the contract. We provide a theoretical model that compares prices in different procedures and tests whether there is a significant price difference between the procedures using data from Czech public procurement. The model predicts that auctions are more efficient than negotiations given the same number of suppliers, and open procedures are more efficient than closed procedures if high-cost firms are selected for the closed procedure. In accordance with the first prediction, we find that open auctions are more efficient than open negotiations. Concerning the second prediction, we find that closed procedures are less efficient than open procedures, which suggests that procurers tend to select relatively more costly firms to participate in closed procedures. Comparing all four awarding procedures, we find that open auctions are the most efficient procedure used in the Czech Republic. We estimate that the inefficiencies due to the use of other contract-awarding procedures are substantial.