In the article I deal with some paradoxes and errors caused by improper usage of logical and philosophical terms appearing in the arguments for existence of God and other philosophical issues. I point at first some paradoxes coming from improper usage of propositional calculus as an instrument for analysis of a natural language. This language is actually not using simple sentences but rather propositional functions, their logical connections, and some replacements for variables in them. We still have to deal with so called paradox of material implication. The second paragraph provides formal and metatheoretical critics of Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory of deduction, induction and abduction. I argue that what Peirce and his followers call abduction is actually deduction or some reasoning unable to describe in terms of the logic used by them. Both syllogistic and inferential theory of abduction generate some paradoxes and contradictions. In the last paragraph also some paradoxes and contradictions resulting from the theory of causation by Jan Łukasiewicz are presented. The central issue of the article is erroneous usage of the implication: in logical paraphrases of a natural language, in description of the scientific reasoning, and in description of causality. However, my objective is not to solve all problems mentioned above but rather to open a discussion over them.
Jan Łukasiewicz, a prominent Polish logician and philosopher, dealt with the scientific analysis of the concept of cause using logic. He wanted first and foremost to construct a definition, which reconciles the irreversibility of causal relationship to the exclusion of time sequence. In this article, I show that his attempts led to many contradictions, paradoxes and inconsistencies between Łukasiewicz’s definitions and commonly recognized examples of causality, even those given by the author himself. First, I present the semantic and formal aspects of the definition proposed by him, and then I analyze examples, most of them proposed by the author. The main charges against his concept of causality are: the ambiguity of the concept of necessity; exclusion “for reasons of terminological” some causal phenomena from the range specified by the definition; paradoxes such as: the existence of the world is the cause of the existence of God; baseless demand, different subjects, and different features for cause and effect; disregard of the defnitive difference between post hoc and propter hoc; unjustified requirement of affirmative statements expressing a possession of attributes. The critique presented in this article is incomplete, but its function is to indicate both the value of logical analysis of philosophical concepts, and the dificulties of which such an analysis can entangle. Such an analysis can sometimes complete the process of defining certain concepts, but more often it provides an opportunity for further discussion and a better overall understanding.
Artykuł przedstawia krytykę pewnych ujęć i zastosowań abdukcji, która jest przedstawiana jako przeciwieństwo rozumowań dedukcyjnych. Analizując pewne schematy formalne i kilka przykładów, wskazuję na rzeczywistą obecność schematów dedukcyjnych tam, gdzie miały występować abdukcyjne. Staram się wskazać najważniejsze powody takich pomyłek, są nimi m.in. niewłaściwe rozumienie związku przyczynowego, wieloznaczność pojęcia wyjaśnienia, braki w logicznej analizie rozumowań, nieumiejętność właściwego rozróżnienia rozumowań dedukcyjnych i redukcyjnych. Na zakończenie formułuję postulaty, które mogą pomóc w unikaniu najważniejszych błędów związanych z niewłaściwym posługiwaniem się rozumowaniami abdukcyjnymi.
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Tolerance is very important in modern society, philosophy and theology, but it is not easy to define the notion of tolerance. Sometimes we can use our intuitive notion but very often this way of using it in a philosophical or even practical discourse can increase a danger of misunderstanding. I want to present a trial of a more specific definition of the notion of tolerance as a relation between some variables. The basic definition is: Tol(x,n,y,z,o), which can be read: the person x tolerates in grade n person y in area z and in circumstances o. Starting from this basic definition, I will present and analyze some examples which can help to better understand the meaning of different kinds of tolerance. These examples also encourage us to extend proposed definitions in order to capture different meanings of tolerance. In addition, they describe such oc currences which are similar to tolerance but in fact they are beyond the typical meaning of its notion. I also propose some remarks about a theory of tolerance. In this theory, I show how we can move the line between theory and the notion of tolerance and other notions and theories. At the end of the paper, there is an example concerning the Catholic Church and its tolerance in some difficult matters. It explains how the Church is intolerant in moral teaching; however, can be more tolerant than other institutions in the practice of tolerance.
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