A general framework for defining security properties is presented. It allows us to model many traditional security properties as well as to define new ones. The framework is based on process algebras contexts and processes relations. By appropriate choice of both of them we can model also probabilistic and quantified security properties.
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Opacity testing is formalized and studied. We specify opacity testers as well as tested systems by (timed) process algebras. We model various testers according to how sophisticated observations of tested system they can make and which kind of conclusions they can obtain. We use this technique to define several realistic security properties. The properties are studied and compared with other security concepts.
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Process testing as a way to obtain information on confidential data is investigated. Our working formalism is based on an appropriate (probabilistic) process algebra and (probabilistic) testing. We define testing noninterference as well as sets of private actions which execution is guaranteed by a given test and sets of actions which execution could be excluded by a given test. Moreover, we relate obtained information to a size of the test.
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A formal model for diagnostics of biological systems modelled as P systems is presented. We assume the presence of some biologically motivated changes (frequently pathological) in the systems behavior and investigate when these changes could be diagnosed by an external observer by exploiting some techniques originally developed for reasoning on system security.
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