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2004
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nr 2(6)
115-138
EN
The author of the article is trying to analyze the policy concerning nations during WW II in Upper Silesia, or, to be more precise, in the area included into Upper Silesian province by the Third Reich. The main elements of the policy were: classification of residents based on nation and race criteria (made by the police census in 1939 and within so called German National List (Deutsche Volksliste) in 1941–1945), displacement of Poles, settling down Germans from the territory of the USSR and extermination of Jews. The nationality policy in Upper Silesia was different than in other Polish areas included into Reich. The reason for it was usually seen in the different economic conditions and the necessity to keep qualified manpower essential in Silesian heavy industry. In some historical researches it has also been noticed, although less explicitly, that nationality policy of local German elites was also consciously different. It seems that gauleiter Josef Wagner, as well as his successor at the post, Fritz Bracht, saw the necessity to exclude Silesian people from qualification made only on the basis of race criteria which were emphasized by Heinrich Himmler when he was a Reich commissar for strengthening the Germanity. Fritz and Bracht used also political criteria, which made the situation similar to Pomerania and western areas included into Reich (e.g. Alsace and Lorraine). It resulted in comparatively low (when compared to demographic potential of Upper Silesia) number of displacements and in accepting the rule that majority of Upper Silesians could gain German citizenship, although their rights were limited compared to other German citizens. Those differences were underestimated after the end of the war by new communist Polish authorities, the representatives of which knew little about them. After 1945 Upper Silesians were treated suspiciously by Polish communist authorities and their loyalty towards Poland was questioned. Consequently in the fifties the area was acknowledged as endangered with so called revisionism.
EN
The articles discusses the attempts at recruiting Polish citizens to Waffen-SS during the first stage of the war (the years 1939-1941). According to the correspondence of the SS leaders, at the time Germans wanted to conscript only ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche). However, the said group of the pre-war Polish citizens was so negligibly small that it stood no change of having been organized as a separate armed formation. Another advanture that wounded up as a fiasco was the attempt to forma a Waffen-SS unit composed of the so-called racially mixed folk, which included the Gorals (Highlanders), the Kashubians, and the Silesians, who were yet to be granted German citizenship. From 1942 onwards, after the Volksliste had been introduced in the so-called Third Reich-annexed Polish lands and after the previously enforced racial restrictions had been lifted, the Waffen-SS draft was conducted as a part of compulsary enlistment. Being in the Waffen-SS, that was responsible for war crimes, genocide and extermination of civil population, for was by the Poles unequivocally meant collaboration and equalled with the active participation in the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi Germany.
PL
W artykule omówione zostały próby rekrutacji obywateli polskich do Waffen-SS w pierwszym etapie wojny (w latach 1939-1941). Z korespondencji dowódców SS wynika, że w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie Niemcy chcieli zmobilizować wówczas, ze względów rasowych, tylko etnicznych Niemców (volksdeutschy). Jednak ta grupa przedwojennych polskich obywateli była tak znikoma, że nie dała szans na utworzenie osobnej formacji. Fiaskiem zakończyła się też próba stworzenia oddziałów Waffen-SS z tzw. ludności mieszanej pod względem rasowym, do której zaliczono Górali, Kaszubów i Ślązaków, którzy mieli dopiero otrzymać obywatelstwo niemieckie. Od 1942 roku, po wprowadzeniu volkslisty na tzw. polskich ziemiach wcielonych do Rzeszy Niemieckiej i po rezygnacji z obowiązujących do tej pory ograniczeń rasowych, pobór do Waffen-SS był przeprowadzany jako część przymusowego wcielenia do armii niemieckiej. Przynależność do Waffen-SS, odpowiedzialnego za zbrodnie wojenne, ludobójstwo i eksterminację ludności cywilnej na polskich ziemiach okupowanych, była przez Polaków oceniana jednoznacznie jako kolaboracjonizm i aktywny udział w zbrodniach nazistowskich Niemiec.
EN
After World War I, a conflict broke out between Poland and Germany over Upper Silesia. It was to be settled, according to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, by a plebiscite. However, on May 3, 1921, the Polish uprising broke out. Insurgent troops occupied the eastern part of the plebiscite area. On May 21, 1921, German troops of the so-called Upper Silesia Self-Defense (Selbstschutz Oberschlesiens) carried out an effective counteroffensive, known as the Battle of St. Anne’s Mountain. In this article, Ryszard Kaczmarek discusses the dispute that has been going on for many years among historians about who had planned and who commanded this military operation. The main opponents in this operation were: Karl Hoefer, the commander-in-chief of the Self-Defense, and Bernhard Hülsen, the commander of one of the Self-Defense’s units. For many years, until the outbreak of World War II, both these officers claimed victory in the Battle of St. Anne’s Mountain. On the basis of the extant correspondence stored in the military section of the Federal Archives in Freiburg, Kaczmarek reconstructs the course of events during the operation. He author shows the political conditions of military decisions and the complicated relations of the democratic government of the Weimar Republic with officers who were associated with the nationalist right.
PL
Po I wojnie światowej doszło do konfliktu polsko-niemieckiego o Górny Śląsk, którego apogeum było polskie powstanie w 1921 roku. W niemieckim dowództwie powstał spór podczas zwycięskiej kontrofensywy, znanej jako bitwa o Górę św. Anny. Autor pokazuje uwarunkowania polityczne podejmowanych wówczas decyzji wojskowych i skomplikowane relacje demokratycznego rządu Republiki Weimarskiej z sympatyzującymi z nacjonalistyczną prawicą oficerami.
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2023
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tom 9
197-207
EN
The article presents Silesian culinary customs in the context of the cultural changes of the last few centuries. The author refers to the remarks of Norbert Elias, who illustrated these metamorphoses by describing behaviour in everyday life, including culinary customs. This methodology is applied to the description of regional cooking customs - the author postulates broadening the field of research and going beyond the analysis of the Upper Silesian peasant’s behaviour only. He argues against the stereotype of identifying the description of native cuisine with plebeian menus, citing, for example, the case of the cuisine of Prince George Rudolf of Legnica, where the Swiss cookbook by Anna Wecker (1605) was used, the English menu at the Pszczyna court of the Hochberg family, or the influence of the Schlesisches Kochbuch by Henrietta Pelz on Silesian bourgeois cuisine at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. These examples lead the author to conclude that Silesian cuisine was open to the transfer of culinary customs, a phenomenon he interprets as a readiness to embrace cultural change by different social groups in the region.
PL
W artykule przedstawione zostały śląskie obyczaje kulinarne w kontekście przemian kulturowych ostatnich kilku wieków. Autor przywołuje uwagi Norberta Eliasa, który te metamorfozy ilustrował poprzez opis zachowań w życiu codziennym, w tym – obyczajów kulinarnych. Ta metodologia jest odniesiona do opisu obyczajów kuchni regionalnej – autor postuluje poszerzenia pola badań i wyjście poza analizę wyłącznie zachowań górnośląskiego chłopa. Polemizuje ze stereotypem utożsamiania opisu rodzimej kuchni z jadłospisem plebejskim, przywołując m.in. przykład kuchni legnickiego księcia Jerzego Rudolfa, gdzie korzystano ze szwajcarskiej książki kucharskiej Anny Wecker (1605), angielskie menu na pszczyńskim dworze Hochbergów czy wpływ Schlesisches Kochbuch autorstwa Henrietty Pelz na śląską kuchnię mieszczańską na przełomie XIX i XX wieku. Te przykłady prowadzą autora do wniosku, iż śląska kuchnia była otwarta na transfer obyczajów kulinarnych, a to zjawisko interpretuje jako gotowość do przyjmowania kulturowych zmian przez różne grupy społeczne regionu.
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2022
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tom 8
45-57
EN
Following the decision to divide Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland, detailed regulations were established according to which individual counties were supposed to be taken over by both states. Major celebrations on the German side were held in the summer of 1922 in Opole, where the official assumption of control over the German Upper Silesia by the government of the German Reich took place. The legality of the actions undertaken in the Upper Silesia by the victorious western states was undermined and postulates were put forward to peacefully revise the course of the border established in the wake of the plebiscite and the Silesian Uprisings. In his article, the author presents this issue, as seen from the perspective of the then German press.
PL
Po decyzji o podziale Górnego Śląska między Niemcy i Polskę uzgodniono warunki przejmowania poszczególnych powiatów przez obydwa państwa. Po stronie niemieckiej najważniejsze uroczystości miały miejsce latem 1922 roku w Opolu, gdzie nastąpiło oficjalne przejęcie władzy nad niemieckim Górnym Śląskiem przez rząd Rzeszy Niemieckiej. Otwarcie podważono wówczas legalność działań zwycięskich mocarstw zachodnich na Górnym Śląsku i domagano się pokojowej rewizji granicy wytyczonej po plebiscycie i powstaniach śląskich. Autor w swoim artykule przedstawia tę historię z perspektywy ówczesnej prasy niemieckiej.
7
100%
XX
The article analyzes the phenomena of collaboration and collaborationism in all territories incorporated into the Third Reich. Nowhere, apart from a specific situation in Luxembourg, one may find in those territories national collaboration, that is to say the creation of state institutions collaborating with the Germans. The reason was the lack of initiative on the part of Germans. All territories incorporated into the Reich were treated offi cially or unoffi cially as parts of the Third Reich, and that is why the possibility to create there state semi-sovereign institutions was not planned. The support of collaboration in the annexed territories looked different. Simultaneously when integrating with the Reich the attempts were made to develop collaborative attitudes by Nazifi cation. The process of Nazifi cation was very unequal and was taking place differently in every analyzed territory. In the Polish incorporated territories the process of establishing the Nazi Party (National Socialist German Workers Party) and transmitting organizations were nearly instantly being initiated. They acquired members nearly solely from the circle of the representatives of the pre-war German minority members who were politically active before 1939. The membership in the Nazi Party was elitist in the east and amounted to 2–3 per cent. In the west the intermediary solution was adopted, that is to say – the national socialist movements were being created which constituted the step in the path to the membership in the Nazi Party. The membership in those organizations in Luxembourg, Alsace and Lorraine was a mass scale phenomenon, and was not restricted by ‘racial’ limitations. After the end of the war, there were no precise criteria how to differentiate between the collaboration attitudes in the incorporated territories from those which are described as adjustment and passive and active resistance. It resulted in accusing a large part of the native population of collaboration without differentiation between that group and the German minority which in fact participated in that process on a mass scale. The indicator factor of collaboration in the eastern territories was rather the membership in Nazi organizations, than the active engagement in the activities of the German state apparatus, party structures and terror apparatus.
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