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1

The Structure of Everyday Aesthetic Experience

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Andrzejewski A.

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tom 22

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nr 3

125-135

PL

In the project of everyday aesthetics all elements of daily life, such as sunset, cooking one’s favourite dish, or sitting in a comfortable chair, are a subject of philosophical reflection. According to the proponents of the project (e.g. Yuriko Saito, Sherry Irvin, Ted Leddy), these activities and objects, despite their commonness, have a profoundly aesthetic character. The main goal of this paper is to present and analyze a general structure of the central category of everyday aesthetics - the concept of aesthetic experience. The paper consists of three sections. First, I outline two common understandings of everyday aesthetic experience, introduced by Saito and Irvin. It is shown that despite their novelty they appear to be rather confusing. A major doubt is that they do not clearly show how to distinguish aesthetic pleasures from non-aesthetic pleasures (Irvin) or everyday aesthetic experience from other daily experiences (Saito). As a result, the concept of everyday aesthetic experience turns out to be too broad, and thus it lacks explanatory power. Second, I argue that the categories used by Saito and Irvin to describe everyday aesthetics, although immensely helpful, are not sufficient to capture all phenomena of ordinary life. It is because they only apply to some of the properties which can be recognized as aesthetic in everyday life (e.g. “dirty”), but they say nothing about the very structure of the experience. Therefore, I put forward definitions of certain properties which, in my opinion, adequately describe and individualize experiences characteristic of everyday aesthetics. These are: contingency, repetition, and permeability. Finally, it is highlighted how a reconsidered concept of everyday experience matter to the issues outside the realm of aesthetics. It is revealed that the crucial feature of everyday aesthetic experience is its ambivalence. Our immersion into society, current affairs, and complex relations with other agents force us to make decisions all the time. Each everyday aesthetic judgement requires decision(s) which may be followed by serious consequences (e.g. in socio-economical life). Thus I would contend that judgements in everyday aesthetics are “decision-making” (contrary to tradition ally understood aesthetic judgements, which do not require, necessarily, any action in the outer world). In perceiving common things as objects eliciting aesthetic experience, we are always asked to choose which dimension (a set of meanings) of particular experience is crucial for us. The structure of everyday aesthetic experience, as defined above, explains and justifies what we often call (following Saito) “the power of the aesthetic”.

2

Kompulsywne nadużywanie mediów społecznościowych a ryzyko rozwoju zaburzeń odżywiania – na przykładzie aplikacji Instagram

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Andrzejewski A.

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nr 2

EN

The article focuses on Instagram and its immense power to influence the perception of humans own self. The author has been presenting data showing confrontation of the trend prevailing on the website to strive for a perfect image with the risk of the youth becoming involved in very dangerous eating habits, which in turn lead to eating disorders. The publication discusses the following issues: compulsive abuse of social media, body worship on Instagram, an unhealthy trend for orthorexia, the educational environment importance in creating a correct attitude towards social media.

PL

W artykule skoncentrowano się na Instagramie oraz jego ogromnej sile wpływu na postrzeganie własnego „ja”. Konfrontacji poddano panujący w serwisie trend dążenia do doskonałego wizerunku, wiążący się z ryzykiem uwikłania się przez młodzież w bardzo niebezpieczne nawyki żywieniowe, które w konsekwencji prowadzą do zaburzeń odżywiania. W pracy poruszono następujące zagadnienia: kompulsywne nadużywanie mediów społecznościowych, kult ciała na Instagramie, niezdrowy trend na ortoreksję, znaczenie środowiska wychowawczego w kreowaniu prawidłowej postawy wobec mediów społecznościowych.

3

Ontologia czterowymiarowa a podróż w czasie analiza argumentu Theodore’a Sidera

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Andrzejewski A.

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nr nr 17

163-180

EN

The main goal of this paper is to show that Theodore Sider’s argument from time travel cannot be treated as convincing, elegant, and in favour of perdurantism. The author reconstructs and debates foundations of Sider’s perdurantist time travel scenario. A set of arguments reveals a plethora of unwelcome metaphysical consequences of this vision, including problems of: (i) identification of temporal parts, (ii) person stages and (iii) identity. Agreeing with the latter, the author acknowledges a few general comments about using the possibility of time travel in ontological debate between perdurantism and endurantism.

4

Substantial and Verbal Disputes

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Andrzejewski A. , Brożek A.

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nr 4

31-44

PL

The main subject of the paper is to present the criteria which help us to establish whether a given ontological controversy (or even a whole dispute) is substantial or merely verbal. Metaphysics is often perceived as a discipline composed of endless disputes with no glimpse of hope for solution. This fact makes many philosophers claim that ontology is nothing more than matter of linguistic choice. In this paper, we argue that there exist certain methodological tools which enable us to establish whether particular ontological disagreement is substantial or merely verbal. However, as we emphasize, the scope of application of these tools is limited to strictly defined cases. At first, we clarify the general background for an occurrence of ontological controversy. Assume that a controversy occurs between the person A and the person B iff: (a) A uses language LA, and B uses language LB (we do not decide what is the relation between those two languages and especially - if they are identical, or not); (b) in both languages there is a sentence ‘S’ (c) A accepts the sentence ‘S’ and person B rejects the sentence ‘S’ (d) A aims at making person B accept the sentence ‘S’ and person B aims at making person A reject the sentence ‘S’. Having defined the above, we formulate and justify following definitions: [SUBSTANTIAL CONTROVERSY] Suppose the conditions (a)-(d) occurred. If the controversy between A and B is substantial, then: there are two different sentences S1 and S2 of the language L, such that a translation of S from the language LA into L is S1 and the translation S from LB into L is S2. [VERBAL CONTROVERSY] Suppose the conditions (a)-(d) occurred. If the controversy between A and B is verbal, then: there is a sentence S3 of the language L that both the translation of S from the language LA as well as the translation of S from the language LB into L is S3. [SEEMINGLY SUBSTANTIAL CONTROVERSY] Suppose the conditions (a)- (d) occurred. A controversy between A and B is seemingly substantial when A and B are sure that the controversy between them is substantial but it is merely verbal. In the above definitions, the concept of language L occurs. We assume that it is a quasi-universal language to which every sentence of LA and every sentence of LB may be translated. We focus on how to recognize the language L, scil., how to establish the rules of translation of an ontological term of LA to another ontological term in LB. The proposed idea is that such a quasi-universal language L may be (re-)constructed only if A and B share the same pragmatic and/or cognitive attitudes (they want to solve a considerably similar set of problems within theirs ontologies). Then, it is highlighted how the presented conception of types of ontological controversies may be applied to the analysis of some ontological controversies, in particular, the debate between endurantism and perdurantism. The goal is achieved in two steps. Firstly, we use the required presuppositions of the language L in order to compare endurantism and perdurantism. Then, the following ontological concepts from these ontologies are discussed: „a thing of a common experience”, „part” and „ontological sum”. In consequence of the analysis, the serious affinity between endurantism and perdurantism is revealed. That is, the main differences between those ontologies are revealed as merely verbal. This fact is elicited by conceptual analysis which may be - to some extent - useful in process of defining whether (or not) some ontological disagreement is genuine or not.