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Źródła dualizmu schematu pojęciowego i treści, czyli o kilku błędach filozofii zachodniej. Uwagi z zakresu filozofii analitycznej

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Godlewski R. P.

nr 5

243-258

The aim in the article is to explain why we fall in dualism of content and conceptual scheme. The dualism says that there is a relation between languages and the world (meant as an object). The first cause is mechanistic way of thinking which characterizes Indoeuropean mind. The way on thinking is to treat every object as if it had formal properties of physical objects. The term is taken from Whorf’s works. Concequences of mechanistic thinking for research in abstract sciences is considered. It is demonstrated how mechanistic thinking lets to pass from belief that there are some relations between expressions of a language and elements of the world to belief that there is a relation between the language as a whole and the whole world. The fallowing causes of the dualism are also considered: 1. literal understanding of metaphores used in philosophy of language, 2. wrong understanding of suppositions, 4. attempts to explain language in natural terms, e.g. causal theory of meaning.

Kłopoty z Davidsonem, czyli „O pojęciu schematu pojęciowego” inaczej

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Godlewski R. P.

nr 8

207-223

In his article “On the very idea of the conceptual scheme”, Davidson rejected the dualism of content and conceptual scheme. The article is hard to understand for the following reasons: 1. Davidson seems to claim that the third dogma of empiricism is independent from the first one; 2. he seems to maintain that the idea of conceptual scheme may have sense even when the notion of meaning is rejected; 3. he does not fight conceptual relativism arguing that it breaks the principle of contradiction or that incommensurable conceptual schemes cannot speak about the same; 4. he considers only the question of how to identify an alien scheme at another person but passes over the possibility that one person has a few schemes; 5. contrary to his previous statements, he says that translatability is not necessary for the concept of conceptual scheme but in return he gives a few metaphors only.