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2 Čana T.

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O METAJAZYKOVOM ODMIETNUTÍ ZLOMYSEĽNÉHO KLAMÁRA

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Čana T.

nr 4

291 – 307

The main aim of the paper is to reconstruct Wittgenstein's criticism of the possibility of holding the sceptical position we traditionally call Cartesian doubt. According to Wittgenstein, the concept of this position is unintelligent because of the specific way language works. In any system of linguistic signs, there is a constitutive – unique – connection between what competent users take to be unassailable about the external world on the one hand, and what the signs they use mean, on the other. As a result, it is not possible to comprehend a scenario in which I am not sure whether or not there is an external world all around me, and, at the same time, am able to understand the language I use. It looks as though what this scenario aimed to describe does not, in fact, represent a meaningful step in our game.

NESKORÝ WITTGENSTEIN O LOGICKÝCH PRAVIDLÁCH

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Čana T.

nr 2

109-121

In his remarks from the late period, Ludwig Wittgenstein is frequently concerned with so-called external roots of our logical operations. He asks questions like: 'How is possible anything like logical necessity?'‚ How is possible anything like following a logical rule under normal circumstances?'‚ Where is the compelling force of a logical proof coming from?'; etc. In the philosophical community, it is generally accepted that the late Wittgenstein's remarks deal with these questions, but the philosophical motivation behind these remarks is still not clear. Instead, there is a growing disagreement among various interpretations over these remarks. The present consideration is built upon the belief that Wittgenstein's remarks try to communicate a new sense to us. The author argues that, contrary to the generally accepted view, there is a new and positive sense in these remarks. His aim in this paper is to clarify the philosophical motivation behind them.