Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Krytyka neorepublikańskiej koncepcji wolności politycznej Philipa Pettita/A Critique of Philip Pettit’s neo-republican conception of political freedom

100%

Eliasz K.

Avant

|

2018

|

tom 9

|

nr 1

PL

Celem artykułu jest rekonstrukcja i krytyka koncepcji wolności politycznej przedstawionej na gruncie współczesnego instrumentalnego republikanizmu reprezentowanego przede wszystkim w pracach Philipa Pettita. Instrumentalny republikanizm zakłada, że wolność polityczna jest wartością instrumentalną, służącą realizowaniu naczelnej wartości, jaką jest wolność rozumiana jako nieobecność dominacji. Uznanie nie-dominacji za naczelną wartość pociąga za sobą postulat ograniczenia wolności politycznej, która – jak wskazuje Pettit – może być jednym ze źródeł dominacji (w związku z groźbą tyranii większości). W artykule wskazuję, że argumenty Pettita narażone są na dwa podstawowe zarzuty. Po pierwsze, w wyznaczonym przez niego (zbyt wąskim) zakresie, wolność polityczna nie sprzyja nie-dominacji. Po drugie, skupiając się wyłącznie na instrumentalnej roli wolności politycznej, Pettit pomija jej głębszy wymiar jako wartości demokratycznej. The aim of this article is a reconstruction and critique of the conception of political freedom as understood in contemporary instrumental republicanism, represented primarily by Philip Pettit. Instrumental republicanism endows political freedom with a merely instrumental value, serving as a means to achieving non-domination which, on republican assumptions, is a chief value. From the claim that the value of political freedom is merely instrumental follows a significant limitation of its scope (since outcomes of political freedom are potentially dominating). In this article I claim that Pettit’s arguments are vulnerable to two main objections. First, a significantly limited scope of political freedom does not foster non-domination. Second, having focused on merely instrumental value of political freedom, Pettit does not acknowledge the deeper dimension of political freedom as democratic value.

2

Edukacja demokratyczna według Hannah Arendt

100%

Eliasz K.

Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna

|

2016

|

tom 5

|

nr 1

200-218

EN

Among various modes of the vita activa considered by Hannah Arendt, the ability for action and particularly political action is the crucial one as it endows life with meaning and constitutes human freedom. The question I address in this essay is whether it is possible – according to Arendt – to create active citizenship by means of democratic education. In order to answer this question I consider three models of democratic education, two of which should be rejected if one agrees with Arendt’s assumptions. The third model, aimed at developing abilities to think critically, is the only one that can support those values, which are essential for a healthy democracy.

3

Krytyka neorepublikańskiej koncepcji wolności politycznej Philipa Pettita/A Critique of Philip Pettit’s neo-republican conception of political freedom

100%

Eliasz K.

Avant

|

2018

|

tom 9

|

nr 1

PL

Celem artykułu jest rekonstrukcja i krytyka koncepcji wolności politycznej przedstawionej na gruncie współczesnego instrumentalnego republikanizmu reprezentowanego przede wszystkim w pracach Philipa Pettita. Instrumentalny republikanizm zakłada, że wolność polityczna jest wartością instrumentalną, służącą realizowaniu naczelnej wartości, jaką jest wolność rozumiana jako nieobecność dominacji. Uznanie nie-dominacji za naczelną wartość pociąga za sobą postulat ograniczenia wolności politycznej, która – jak wskazuje Pettit – może być jednym ze źródeł dominacji (w związku z groźbą tyranii większości). W artykule wskazuję, że argumenty Pettita narażone są na dwa podstawowe zarzuty. Po pierwsze, w wyznaczonym przez niego (zbyt wąskim) zakresie, wolność polityczna nie sprzyja nie-dominacji. Po drugie, skupiając się wyłącznie na instrumentalnej roli wolności politycznej, Pettit pomija jej głębszy wymiar jako wartości demokratycznej. The aim of this article is a reconstruction and critique of the conception of political freedom as understood in contemporary instrumental republicanism, represented primarily by Philip Pettit. Instrumental republicanism endows political freedom with a merely instrumental value, serving as a means to achieving non-domination which, on republican assumptions, is a chief value. From the claim that the value of political freedom is merely instrumental follows a significant limitation of its scope (since outcomes of political freedom are potentially dominating). In this article I claim that Pettit’s arguments are vulnerable to two main objections. First, a significantly limited scope of political freedom does not foster non-domination. Second, having focused on merely instrumental value of political freedom, Pettit does not acknowledge the deeper dimension of political freedom as democratic value.

4

Kontrowersje wokół pozytywnej dyskryminacji

100%

Eliasz K.

Studia Iuridica

|

2021

|

tom 89

47-61

EN

The concept of reverse discrimination refers to a variety of strategies that entail giving strong preferential treatment in employment or education to the groups in a society that have been institutionally discriminated against. “Giving strong preferential treatment” means that candidates with lower qualifications are given priority over better qualified members of the groups that have not been discriminated against in the past. Reverse discrimination can be justified with reference to two strategies: backward-looking and forward-looking. On the backward-looking justification, reverse discrimination is a means of compensating victims of past discrimination, while on the forward-looking justification, reverse discrimination is a means of creating more diverse and egalitarian society. The aim of this paper is to challenge both justifications. First, against backwardlooking justification, I shall claim that reverse discrimination is not a proper method of compensating for past wrongs of discrimination. Second, I shall challenge the forwardlooking argument by pointing at the risks inherent in perceiving reverse discrimination as the means of creating more egalitarian society. Importantly, the objections presented in this paper refer only to reverse discrimination, and they do not undermine other methods used within the affirmative action (including tie-breaker provisions).

5

The Structure of the Concept of Political Freedom in Hannah Arendt’s Philosophy

100%

Eliasz K.

Avant

|

2019

|

tom 10

|

nr 1

29-42

EN

This paper is devoted to clarifying Hannah Arendt’s concept of political freedom (which, at certain points, is markedly obscure) by the means of analysing its structure. My analysis proceeds in three steps. Firstly, I distinguish a pre-political concept of freedom as exercising spontaneity, which is at the root of Arendt’s understanding of political freedom. Secondly, I analyse her account of freedom as exercising action and indicate its relationship to the elementary freedom of spontaneity. Arendt endowed action with a distinguished importance, since she assumed that it is the only activity within the vita activa (the other two being labour and work), which has a special anthropological and axiological significance. According to Arendt, only action allows one to truly experience the fundamental aspect of the human condition, which is the fact of human plurality; it is also the only activity which allows one to exercise specifically public principles, such as solidarity, equality, or justice. Thirdly, I indicate how these two accounts of freedom translate into Arendt’s concept of political freedom. This analysis reveals that the Arendtian concept of political freedom is markedly original. She did not define it in a usual manner, i.e. through indicating bundles of legal and political rights which determine the accepted scope of participation in the public affairs. The inherent part of her concept of political freedom is a specific account of how it must be exercised (i.e. through action). Political freedom understood as the participation in governance exercised through action is not merely an activity of instrumental, but also anthropological and axiological importance, which is due to the special anthropological and axiological meaning of action. In the final section, I discuss the practical dimension of Arendt’s theory. She doubted whether the traditional representative democracy is capable of accommodating her ‘rich’ ideal of political freedom, therefore she proposed an alternative account of political system based on councils. I formulate objections against this proposition and demonstrate that councils would presumably fail to accommodate Arendt’s exacting account of political freedom

6

The Theory and Practice of Political Freedom in Interdisciplinary Perspective: Introduction

100%

Eliasz K.

Avant

|

2019

|

tom 10

|

nr 1

9-14

7

The Vienna Circle and the Uppsala School as philosophical inspirations for the Scandinavian Legal Realism

63%

Eliasz K. , Jakubiec M.

Semina Scientiarum

|

2016

|

tom 15

EN

The Uppsala School in philosophy and the Vienna Circle are prima facie similar currents in contemporary philosophy. Both reject metaphysics, claim that reality is a spatio‑temporal realm and adhere to noncognitivism in terms of values. However, justifications of these assumptions are quite different. In the following article we reconstruct main theses of both mentioned currents and then we indicate their impact on one of the major jurisprudential movements, namely Scandinavian Legal Realism. We focus on Alf Ross’ legal philosophy, as it was an attempt to accommodate both: the philosophy of the Uppsala School and of the Vienna Circle (while other Scandinavian realists referred exclusively to Uppsala philosophy). We trace those two sources of inspiration in Ross’ theory of legal validity and of legal concepts.