Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

1

Historia zamknięta w podręcznikach. O teoretycznych i metodologicznych problemach konstruowania obrazów przeszłości w edukacji szkolnej

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Stępnik A.

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nr 1(2)

97-107

EN

The 1999 reform of the Polish education system created an unprecedented situation in history teaching. Over a 10-year period starting from 1999, more than 250 textbooks for all levels of teaching were introduced into schools, with teachers free to make an autonomous decision as to which textbook to teach from. Textbooks constitute specific instances of historiographical praxis. They are traditional compendia of knowledge about the past and they constitute interesting research material for those investigating the historical awareness and culture of contemporary Poles. Given the target audience of textbooks and a teleological tendency in presenting historical events which is often espoused by educationists, textbooks evince specific and selected assumptions, both historical, philosophical and methodological. Groups of every political description have been given — more or less deliberately — an opportunity to locate their own vision of the past. Subsequent governments, whether left-or right-wing, have largely respected this principle, avoiding an instrumental treatment of education to further their own ends. The right to a world view and a vision of the past has become an inalienable if unwritten civil right. The author of the article has attempted a classification of the available textbooks into metaphorical categories and ventured their assessment. The categories of textbooks assessed in the article are: “museum textbooks”, which follow traditional models; “archive textbooks”, which attempt to amass substantial factual and source texts with no authorial commentary; “picture book textbooks”, in which the explanatory burden rests on images; “reliquary textbooks”, which emphasise traditional values, both national and religious; “mystery textbooks”, which hardly yield to scientific scrutiny; and the most numerous “academia textbooks”, consistent with commonly accepted educational and historiographic trends in the academia. The most recent reform of the curriculum aims to alter this situation.

2

Popper's Third World from the Obligingly Critical Perspective

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Stępnik A.

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tom 14

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nr 1

9-29

PL

In the first part of the paper, the author presents Popper's theory of the objective knowledge and the three worlds in ten theses with a commentary, showing difficulties and vagueness of Popper's theory and trying to clarify it. The second part comprises discussion with a few Popper's theses. The author especially argues against the thesis about autonomy of the third world, and about epistemology limited to examination of only the objects from the third world. In relation to this, the author shows some defects of Popper's argumentation from Objective Knowledge. The conclusion of the article is a different interpretation and an anew formulation of Popper's theory.

3

Filozoficzne konsekwencje przyjęcia paradygmatu ewolucyjnego w badaniach nad umysłem

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Stępnik A.

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tom 48

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nr 1

105-127

EN

The aim of the article is to consider the philosophical consequences of the evolutionary paradigm in mind examination and to examine some methodological problems connected with evolutionary explanations. The article consists of four parts. The theory of evolution and contemporary controversies related to it are outlined in the first part. The second concerns the evolutionary paradigm applied to mind examination, especially from the methodological perspective. The third is entirely dedicated to an analysis of the philosophical consequences of the evolutionary paradigm, and the last is a summary. The result is the recognition of the evolutionary paradigm as an interesting perspective, which doesn’t demand far-reaching ontological assumptions, which allows for the rejection of some views concerning the mind-body problem. But the evolutionary paradigm cannot be the only universal paradigm, and some of the evolutionary explanations are nothing more than hypotheses or speculations.

PL

Celem artykułu jest rozważenie filozoficznych konsekwencji, jakie niesie za sobą przyjęcie paradygmatu ewolucyjnego w badaniach nad umysłem, a także zbadanie metodologicznych trudności związanych z generowaniem wyjaśnień ewolucyjnych. Artykuł składa się z czterech części. W pierwszej zarysowana zostaje teoria ewolucji i współczesne kontrowersje wokół niej, w szczególności wokół jej statusu. W drugiej omawia się paradygmat ewolucyjny w badaniach nad umysłem, a także pewne aspekty metodologiczne z nim związane. Trzecia poświęcona jest analizie filozoficznych konsekwencji przyjęcia paradygmatu ewolucyjnego, a czwarta stanowi próbę oceny jego głównych wad i zalet, z odniesieniem do przyszłości badań nad umysłem i dociekań z zakresu filozofii umysłu. Rezultatem jest stwierdzenie, że paradygmat ewolucyjny stanowi interesującą perspektywę badawczą, nie nakładającą zbytnich zobowiązań ontologicznych i pozwalającą na odrzucenie niektórych stanowisk odnoszących się do problemu psychofizycznego. Jednakże ze względu na trudności metodologiczne nie może być to paradygmat jedyny i uniwersalny, a do wielu wyjaśnień ewolucyjnych należy podchodzić z odpowiednią rezerwą.

4

Laws of Nature, Scientific Laws and Mmiracles. Criticism of Hume's Arguments against miracles

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Stępnik A.

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nr 4

97-109

PL

In the article I consider Hume’s arguments against miracles and the notion of miracle. From Hume’s perspective, miracles are violations of the laws of nature caused by the supernatural being or beings. In Part I of On Miracles Hume argues that miracles can never be believed by a rational person. In Part II he attempts to demonstrate that there is actually no evidence for a miracle. Using distinction between laws of nature and scientific laws, and the deductive-nomological model of explanation, I come to some conclusions: 1. The Hume’s arguments against miracles are not conclusive. 2. The Mackie’s defense of Hume’s arguments is unsatisfactory. Moreover, Mackie himself gives the reasons which weaken his and Hume’s arguments against miracles. 3. There is consistent notion of miracle: miracle can be understood as a result of bursting supernatural factor into relatively isolated system of nature. 4. Miracles can occur without the violations of the laws of nature or the scientific law - the Hume’s notion of miracle is incorrect.

5

Russella podział na wiedzę bezpośrednią oraz wiedzę przez opis w świetle współczesnych badań

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Stępnik A.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2022

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nr 4

319-335

EN

The article analyzes Bertrand Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description contained in his writings from 1910 to 1912. I point to some problems that arise from Russell’s concept of direct knowledge if they are observed in the light of modern psychological and neuroscientific research. In some cases knowledge by acquaintance may be mediated by certain unconscious operations and by mental representations of conceptual nature. I point out however that some of the examples given in The Problems of Philosophy can be characterized by a different degree of indirectness. Consequently, I propose to view Russell’s distinction as a typology. Because Russell narrows knowledge by description to specific descriptions, Russell’s division is not exhaustive and therefore is not a logical one. The article also shows that there are reasons for both narrowing his category of direct knowledge (e.g. by excluding universals) and for expanding it (e.g. by unconscious experiences).