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3 Kijewska A.

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Bóg jako Primum Cognitum – dyskusje i kontrowersje (bł. Duns Szkot, Henryk z Gandawy, św. Tomasz z Akwinu, św. Bonawentura, Mikołaj z Kuzy)

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Kijewska A.

nr 2

5-30

W artykule przedstawiam, jak u najważniejszych przedstawicieli XIII-wiecznej scholastyki kształtowała się koncepcja pierwszego przedmiotu ludzkiego intelektu (primum cognitum), takie-go przedmiotu, który określa horyzont ludzkich możliwości poznawczych. Ta szczegółowa kwestia wymaga określonych rozwiązań teoriopoznawczych, metafizycznych i antropologicznych. Wśród różnych stanowisk należy wyróżnić stanowisko Henryka z Gandawy i św. Bonawentury, którzy głosili, że pierwszym przedmiotem naszego intelektu jest Bóg, oraz stanowisko św. Tomasza, który uważał, że tym przedmiotem jest istota rzeczy materialnej. Duns Szkot zaproponował rozwiązanie, które łączy stanowiska poprzedników, a zarazem wychodzi poza różnorodne ograniczenia ich koncepcji. Uważam, że epistemologia Mikołaja z Kuzy, wybitnego myśliciela XV wieku, pozostawała pod silnym wpływem rozwiązań scholastyków.

In this article, I present the conception of the first object of human intellect (primum cognitum) in the thought of the leading representatives of 13th century Scholasticism. The first object of a cognitive faculty is the essence that determines the proper domain of that faculty; thus the first object of human intellect is what defines the possible extension of human epistemic possibilities. The conception of the first object of human intellect presupposes and implies definite solution of important epistemological, metaphysical, and anthropological questions. While one current of scholastic opinion, represented by St. Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent favored God as the first object of human intellect, more empirically minded Aquinas upheld the Aristotelian position that the proper object of human intellectual cognition is the essence of material reality; Duns Scotus evolved an elaborate position that tried to steer the middle course between the solutions of his predecessors and overcome the one-sidedness of their insights. Finally, I proceed to vindicate my opinion, that the epistemology of the 15th century thinker Nicholas of Cusa remained under significant influence of the scholastic debates and solutions.

Stróżewskiego koncepcja symbolu jako klucz do analiz historyczno-filozoficznych

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Kijewska A.

nr 3-4

51- 68

The article presents the concept of a symbol as it is described in the various texts by Władysław Stróżewski. It attempts to reconstruct the relationship between the symbol and reality as perceived by Stróżewski, and to then apply this concept to some classical texts, mainly from the domain of medieval philosophy (Dionysius Areopagite, Eriugena, St. Bonaventure, Nicholas of Cusa). In the author's opinion, this procedure makes it possible to read these texts anew, on a deeper, more inspiring level. The texts selected for analysis were primarily those whose authors Władysław Stróżewski included in his typology of medieval metaphysics as representatives of the “metaphysics of sign and designate”.

Znaleźć twórcę i ojca tego całego wszechświata jest wielkim przedsięwzięciem (Tim. 28c). Myśl starożytności i chrześcijańskiej i średniowiecza w poszukiwaniu Boga jako ens perfectum

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Kijewska A.

nr 1-4

91-130

When we talk about a perfect being, we can mean two mutually non-excluding states, although accentuated differently. A perfect being is, first, a being that lacks nothing, and therefore the distinguishing feature of such a being is, above all, immutability. In Christian Antiquity we find such a concept in those thinkers who emphasized the perfection and immutability of the Divine Being, as exemplified by the thought of St. Augustine with his noological argument for the existence of God, understood as the supreme, unchanging Truth. In a certain sense, it can be said that this idea of a perfect being culminates in the thought of St. Anselm of Canterbury in his ontological proof, which presupposes that God is to that extent perfect that He cannot be conceived as non-existent. In another sense, the perfection of God is understood above all as the incomparable intensity of His mode of existence, the essential expression of which is infinity. This current of thought was rooted in Neoplatonism, and especially in Plotinian philosophy. We find this very idea in Aquinas, for whom the Being of God is a pure, infinite – because unlimited – Being, whose fullness of perfection is expressed in the Name: ‘I Am who I am’. For Duns Scotus, the proper concept of God is the concept of infinite being, with infinity understood as the specific modus intrinsecus of God's existence. This concept of God’s perfection culminates in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa, for whom God is the absolute Maximum and Minimum, to which one can draw nearer through mathematical symbols raised to infinity. Another way of expressing God’s perfection is through negation of being; because of the otherness of God’s mode of existence, it is more appropriate to call him Nothingness. We find this type of thinking in the philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena and Meister Eckhart. This article presents, on selected examples from Christian Antiquity and the Middle Ages, these three concepts of God: (1) as a Perfect Being; (2) as Nothingness, (3) as an Infinite Being.