Wyniki wyszukiwania - Biblioteka Nauki

Nowa wersja platformy, zawierająca wyłącznie zasoby pełnotekstowe, jest już dostępna.
Przejdź na https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Ograniczanie wyników

2 2022

Znaleziono wyników: 2

Liczba wyników na stronie

Wyniki wyszukiwania

Sortuj według:

Ogranicz wyniki do:

To overcome gender inequality in legal education: Ethical awareness

100%

Uygur G. , Özdemir N.

Studia Iuridica

2021

tom 90

185-203

We claim that to combat stereotyping regarding gender inequalities in law, students should gain ethical awareness which includes awareness of prejudices and stereotypes. For this reason, we organized our clinical legal education in such a way as to combat students’ bias and make a transformation. In our lectures we used transformative methodology that includes intersectional analysis. In this article we explain our educational experience and describe our courses with its main principles.

‘Improve the Law’ as a Judicial Duty on the Borderlines of Free Speech: Judges as Responsible Epistemic Agents

100%

Uygur G. , İrem Çaglar Gürgey F.

Krytyka Prawa. Niezależne studia nad prawem

2022

tom 14

nr 4

60-73

This paper discusses judicial duty of improving the law on epistemic grounds and claims in that regarding this obligation, it is possible to give a place to free speech from an epistemic point of view. As a requirement of having epistemic agency, judges like other human beings have epistemological responsibility. Different from the others’ responsibility, judges’ responsibility is connected to their duty of improving the law, which is required by their job as well as the idea of the rule of law and judicial professional principles. Judges should improve the law’s capacity to guide the conduct of its citizens, who are obligated to obey the law. Improving the law also improves the delivery of justice. The ways of legal interpretation and justification are important to improve it. While applying the law, judges can find the law unclear or they may encounter some norm conflicts. In these cases, they should resolve them to keep the law ‘legally in good shape’, which should meet epistemological requirements. When fulfilling this obligation, judicial free speech on epistemic grounds should not be limited.