The methods of abstraction and idealization are commonly viewed as basic to both the natural and the social sciences. Since the 1970s, they have been also a focus of attention in the philosophy and methodology of science. However, their nature as methods, i.e., sequences of instructions, has not been adequately explicated. The paper attempts to capture the core of these methods in the sense of the simplified sequences of instructions. The proposal is illustrated in a reconstruction of the application of both methods in economics as a representative of the social sciences.
In this second part of the paper (its 1st part was published in the previous issue), the rules which govern the rational use of Marx’s categories are applied to the three misinterpretations of Marx’s theory: those of Michael Hauser, Wei Xiaoping and Ľuboš Blaha.
The paper offers a reconstruction of Marx’s explanation of the origin of surplus-value in the production process. Subsequently, the analysis of the fundamental concepts or “categories” of this explanation leads to their classification embodying two pairs of “registers”. Rules which govern the rational use of these categories are derived as well. Thus Marx’s critique of political economy can be interpreted as a critique of systematic “categorial mistakes” due to breaking these rules when using categories in explanations and definitions. In the second part of the paper (intended to be published in the next issue), these rules are applied to three misinterpretations of Marx’s theory by Michael Hauser, Wei Xiaoping and Ľuboš Blaha.
The paper presents a survey of classical and contemporary approaches to abstraction and idealization in the philosophy of science. This first part of the paper provides a brief explication of both terms and focuses on the contributions of Leszek Nowak and Ernan McMullin. Nowak’s notions of gradual concretization and deformation procedures are discussed, as are McMullin’s different types of idealization techniques. The final section of this first part of the paper is devoted to the contributions of Czechoslovak philosophers, especially to Václav Černík, who developed an interest in idealization independently of the Poznan School. The second part of the paper will summarize more recent discussions on this topic.
The aim of this paper is to show that Karl Marx’s critique of political economy can be interpreted as a critique of what philosophers have termed “category-mistakes”. Therefore, the author turns first to the origins of this term in Gilbert Ryle’s “Categories”, to further developments in “Philosophical Arguments” and in P. F. Strawson, as well as to W. H. Walsh’s approach to categories, to establish a workable meaning of the term “category-mistake”. In the second part, he discusses briefly some of the previous uses of this term in exegeses of Marx. Based on Marx’s writings and D. Sayer’s work on Marx’s methodology, the author explicate the meaning of Marx’s term “economic category”. Finally, he arrive at an interpretation of Marx’s critique of economic theories as an analysis concerned with the improper use of theoretical concepts. By way of conclusion, the author offers some general remarks on one important aspect of critique in Marx and in social science in general.
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