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3 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

3 Taliga M.

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Čo iné je poznanie, ak nie zdôvodnené pravdivé presvedčenie?

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Taliga M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2023

tom 71

nr 3

475-488

If truth is an objective property of statements, then we are faced with the following dilemma: If the condition of truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, then knowledge can neither evolve nor disappear because true statements cannot become false, and at the same time, if the condition of truth is not a necessary condition of knowledge, then knowledge can also be something that is false. The condition of truth either is or is not a necessary condition of knowledge. Therefore: either knowledge cannot evolve or disappear, or knowledge can also be something that is false. The author of the article attempts to resolve the dilemma by a critical analysis of its conjunctive premise. He rejects the condition of truth as a necessary condition of knowledge in order to make room for the evolution and extinction of knowledge. He argues that the evolution and extinction of knowledge can be explained if we understand knowledge as unrefuted criticizable hypotheses. He provides his explanation within the framework of the philosophy of science of critical rationalism.

Od skepticizmu k objektívnemu poznaniu

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Taliga M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2016

tom 64

nr 5

691-704

The critical arguments of scepticism lead to the conclusion that no proposition can be justified as true. The attempts to define knowledge as justified true belief therefore fail, even within externalism. If we attribute knowledge to someone else, we can never justifiably know that we have done it correctly. Attributing knowledge is a hypothetical activity. Moreover, knowledge itself is hypothetical as well. There are no justifiably identifiable good reasons telling us that an investigated proposition is true. Scepticism thus leads an optimist, who holds that knowledge exists, to objectivism, i.e. to the view that knowledge is objective because its truth can be reduced neither to good reasons nor to the beliefs of investigators. Keywords: scepticism, objective knowledge, internalism, externalism, objectivism

Nekonečný príbeh zdôvodňovania

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Taliga M.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2009

tom 57

nr 3

353-374

This paper states, in a provocative way, the main objections against the possibility of the justification of knowledge. It may be loosely divided into two parts. The first one (Chapters 1, 2 and 3) attacks so called argumentative strategies of justification, i.e. arguments—including reductio ad absurdum argumentswhich are found to be futile in justifying our knowledge owing to their commital of the petitio principii fallacy, and also owing to the infinite regress of attempts at justification. The second part (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) attacks so called non-argumentative strategies of justification, such as direct verification and inductive support. Although it is often claimed that the last strategy is a special case of inductive logic, the paper tries to explain why it also fails to justify our knowledge. The conclusion thus reached is indeed a radical one: there are no good reasons for our knowledge, whether conclusive or inconclusive ones. However, there is room for rationality, because, as David Miller puts it, reason nowhere depends on reasons. To behave rationally means to criticize our supposed knowledge. In this case deductive reductio ad absurdum arguments may be fruitful, but only for the criticism of their own premises. Moreover, at end of Chapter 3 we explain why it is useful to defend (but not to justify) our knowledge against potential criticism. Our knowledge is thus formed by unrefuted conjectures. There is no justified knowledge. And argumentation consists of defensive and critical (deductive) arguments. There is no room for any justificatory arguments, be they deductive or inductive. Anyone who disagrees with these conclusions is invited to criticize them.