The article draws on Tugendhat’s idea of the twofold character of truth resulting from the twofold structure of self-conciousness. When asking the question Who is a person?, there is always our implicit self-evidence present. And from Kant on we also ask explicit questions, such as How do we want to understand ourselves? And What is better for us? This articulation of the problem – a product of Enlightenment – involves a rejection of the traditionally shared truth about a person. Therefore, Tugendhat’s project includes the transformation of an implicitly valid universe of meaning into explicitly justified positions. Wittgenstein’s arguing that when thematising the limits of language we cannot transcend these limits is used to show that Tugendhat’s efforts to explicitly articulate the universal structure of understanding of the concept of a human being as a whole does have its implicitly shared cultural determinations, too.
The aim of the paper is to analyze Dreyfus' phenomenological conception of moral maturity in a critical relation to the Kantian tradition of the ethics. A special attention is paid to the refutation of the Cartesian subject and a radical elimination of the subject-object relationship. These two points make the starting point of Dreyfus' philosophical reflection on the ideal of moral behavior, as well as on its implications for the ethics of the everyday life. The main objective of the paper is to show the problem of the freedom and choice as a crucial challenge of the Dreyfus primordial understanding of the ethical ways of the being.
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