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The original and hybrid character of the Constitution of the 5th French Republic

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Wawrzyniak J.

tom 22

In the article, the distinctive features of the Constitution of the 5th Republic are abalyzed. A brief discussion on some of the constitutional institutions showed the originality and novelty of the political system that was adopted after 1958. Built in the spirit of the French republican tradition, the system was based, on the one hand, on a strong and central constitutional position of the President, a twofold executive, and a parliament limited in its competences, and on the other hand, on parliamentary accountability of the government and well-developed direct democracy institutions. The French example could be considered excellent evidence of how the powerful and historic constitutional institutions could be adopted in a modern democratic state even under a concise constitution of a hybrid charakter.

Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim

The Logical Discipline of Normative Argumentation. Some considerations on the axiological status of speech acts

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Wawrzyniak J.

2006

tom 13

196-205

This paper is intended to promote a way of is-ought derivation, rooted in neonaturalistic solutions which were worked out within the scope of both the ontology of values and meta-ethical applications of 20th Century linguistic philosophy. Normative, especially in the sphere of morality, reasoning is supposed to be the most significant component of the structure of social communication. The common practices of normative persuasion employ a variety of modes of argumentation, such as the usage of evaluations, norms, imperatives, performative utterances, prescriptions, and optatives. There is a wide range of kinds of emotive pressure produced by speech acts, behind which some intentions of perlocutionary effects are hidden, and which all have methodologically differentiated status. Therefore, the ability to recognize some tricks employed in such practices, as well as the qualified faculty of argumentation for and validation of one‟s own moral convictions seems to be an indispensable component of a subject‟s high cultural competency. The moral responsibility for social states-of-affairs generated by speech acts requires such competency. The neonaturalistic approach – itself representing cognitive meta-ethics and recognizing the pragmatic functions of speech acts as a social phenomenon – proposes a philosophical alternative to the cage of formalized languages (like various systems of deontic logic) for normative reasoning in order to find real, verifiable – not necessarily of contractual origin – value-referred premises for the inference of socially applied judgments of duty. The distinction between logical validation and moral (value-referred) justification of imperatives is emphasized at the same time. On this account certain philosophical interpretations of the categories of “fact”, “value” and “personal agent of valuation and cognition” are carried out and an example of is-ought inference is presented.

Czym są tak zwane tezy Traktatu? Drabina Wittgensteina

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Wawrzyniak J.

tom 38

21-38

The main objective of my article is the presentation and critical analysis of two possible interpretations of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I juxtapose the so-called resolute reading with the metaphysical reading. The crucial dissimilarity between these interpretations is that they ascribe different roles to the sentences contained in the Tractatus. According to the metaphysical reading, these sentences – although they are nonsensical from the point of view of the Tractatus – attempt to express a certain view of reality and language, whereas according to the resolute reading, these sentences are mere nonsense and only seem to make sense; they exemplify nonsense and therefore show the nonsensicality of philosophical theories. I consider the objections against both interpretations and point out that although the resolute reading adequately presents and explains many questions concerning Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, it requires essential modifications. In the last part of my article, I suggest that the sentences of the Tractatus do not function as propositions but as rules of translation.