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2022 | Vol. 10, Iss. 1 | 1-20
Tytuł artykułu

The Coercion-Extraction Cycle and the Paradox of Stability

Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
Our paper revisits the work of Samuel Finer and David Easton in order to establish a firmer grasp on the problem of political stability within a given state or regime. We suggest that Finer's approach to the problem of coercion-extraction is not wholly incompatible with Easton's political system approach (as modified by Gabriel Almond). By combining what Finer and Easton (as understood through Almond) offer, we construct a framework that allows us to better understand political stability. The model we construct off ers current researchers exploring the workings of political stability a useful tool to study and focus on the various dynamics that drive the stability of any given political system. (original abstract)
Słowa kluczowe
Twórcy
  • Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, Poland
  • University of Warsaw
Bibliografia
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
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