Czasopismo
Tytuł artykułu
Autorzy
Wybrane pełne teksty z tego czasopisma
Warianty tytułu
Variations of Moral Responsibility
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
The traditional understanding of moral responsibility (from Aristotle to Kant) includes libertarian freedom, the existence of which has been questioned since the rise of modern science (D. Hume, J. S. Mill). The positions of certain contemporary philosophers and neuroscientists (such as G. Strawson, D. Pereboom) reinforce this skepticism. Neuroscience as such cannot, however, provide evidence for or against morally significant libertarian freedom, which is based on rational reasons and moral values. Although there are problems with the explanation of libertarian freedom, the reasons for abandoning the merit based view of responsibility appear (thus far) insufficient for the change to be a purely consequentialist understanding. It is rather important to deepen the traditional meaning and complement it with contemporary scientific achievements, when examining accountability in concrete situations of human life and society, and also examine the possible social, legal, and theological implications of adoption of purely consequentialist responsibility.
Słowa kluczowe
Czasopismo
Rocznik
Tom
Strony
135-154
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
- Studia theologica, redakce, Cyrilometodějská teologická fakulta Univerzity Palackého v Olomouci, Univerzitní 22, 771 11 Olomouc, Czech Republic, http://www.studiatheologica.eu
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.desklight-ebcd7307-29f3-4a81-ba26-db37aecbf0e1