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Resistance in the borderland: The expeditions of prince Casimir and prince John I Albert into the Kingdom of Hungary and the fates of their allies

Abstract: While the expeditions of prince Casimir and later prince John I Albert took place in different political situations, they share some similarities. Both military campaigns had the same background in the regions of north-eastern Hungary. The study focuses on the power support of two members of the Jagiellonian dynasty in Hungary. Prince Casimir's expedition of 1471–1472 and Prince John I Albert's expedition of 1490–1492 were characterised by continuous Hungarian support. Due to intensive contacts in the borderlands, the Polish party was supported by members of several generations of the magnate families, as well as local landowners. The Jagiellonians were mainly supported by the Rozgonyi and Perényi families in the regions of Šariš and Zemplín. The reasons for this multi-generational support can be attributed to the proximity of the magnates and their estates to Poland, and in the personal, economic and cultural ties in the borderlands. It is significant that, despite the failure of the expeditions, the rebellious magnate families were not stripped of their status, unlike lower-ranking nobles.

Keywords: invasions of the Jagiellonian princes; Hungary in the second half of the 15th century; support for Polish politics among Hungarian nobility

Słowa kluczowe: najazdy książąt jagiellońskich; Węgry w drugiej połowie XV w.; poparcie dla polityki polskiej wśród szlachty węgierskiej

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Jagiellonian military and political engagements in the medieval Kingdom of Hungary have long been in the scope of interest of many historians. From a national perspective, the subject has been prevalent in Polish and Hungarian historiography, less so in their Slovak, Czech, German and Croatian counterparts. Attention is drawn to two events, two military interventions, caused by two Jagiellonian princes, two brothers. Each of them was a direct claimant to the Hungarian throne. It is a well-documented fact that both brothers failed in taking the Hungarian crown. Casimir, the son of the Polish king Casimir IV, was the first to lead a military campaign into Hungary in 1471–72. His goal was to dethrone king Matthias Corvinus. Then, John Albert, another son of Casimir IV, took an active part in the War of the Hungarian Succession in 1490–92. Ironically, his struggle was aimed mainly against his own brother Wladyslaw – the King of Bohemia and, later, Hungary. The first conflict lasted only for a few months which could explain the modest amount of attention it has received¹. The second conflict, on the other hand, dragged out longer. There are also more relevant sources available, it is therefore much better researched. In his monographs Krzysztof Baczkowski, a Polish historian, looked at both military conflicts down to the last detail². At first glance, the conflicts are separate instances,

¹ A selection of works, not necessarily exhaustive: K. Nehring, *Matthias Corvinus, Kaiser Friedrich III. und das Reich: Zum hunyadisch-habsburgischen Gegensatz im Donauraum*, München 1989, pp. 54–58; A. Kubinyi, *Matthias Corvinus: Die Regierung eines Königreichs in Ostmitteleuropa 1458–1490*, Herne 1999, pp. 142–148; A. Kalous, *Matyáš Korvín (1443–1490): Uherský a český král*, České Budějovice 2009, pp. 158–161; K. Baczkowski, *Między czeskim utrakwizmem a rzymską ortodoksją czyli Walka Jagiellonów z Maciejem Korwinem o koronę czeską w latach 1471–1479*, Oświęcim 2014, pp. 59–70; T. Homola, *S kráľom alebo proti kráľovi? Sprisahanie voči Matejovi Korvínovi v roku 1471*, *Historický časopis* 68 (2020), no. 2, pp. 221–247; T. Matić, *Bishop John Vitez and Early Renaissance Central Europe*, Leeds 2022, pp. 167–181.

² A. Kubinyi, *Két sorsdöntő esztendő (1490–1491)*, *Történelmi Szemle* 33 (1991), no. 12, pp. 1–54; Gy. Székely, *A rendek válaszáton: a dinasztiaaváltás harcai 1490–1492-ben*, *Had-történelmi Közlemények* 116 (2003), no. 2, pp. 427–462; K. Baczkowski, *Habsburgowie i Jagiellonowie w walce o Węgry w latach 1490–1492*, Oświęcim 2014, pp. 83–167; T. Neumann, *A kassai hadjárat. II. Ulászló zsoldosserege és a Lengyelek elleni harc (1490–1491)*, [in:] *Elfeledett háborúk. Középkori csaták és várostromok (6–16. század)*, ed. by L. Pószán, and L. Veszprémy, Budapest 2016, pp. 363–397; P. Maliniak, *Spojenci a protivníci Jagelovcov. O niektorých účastníkoch zápasu medzi Vladislavom a Jánom Albrechtom v Uhorsku v rokoch 1490–1492*, [in:] *Jagiellonowie i ich świat: Centrum a peryferie w systemie władzy Jagiellonów*, ed. by B. Czwojdrak, J. Sperka, and P. Węcowski, Kraków 2018, pp. 101–112.

each caused by a different Jagiellonian prince aspiring for the Hungarian throne. However, both cases are connected via a latent conflict, seemingly merely regional in character. Above all, the same, or a very similar power structure supported both Polish interventions in Hungary. This power structure stood alongside a stable regional opposition against the authority of the Hungarian king. This article focuses on precisely these geographic specifics and personal connections, which, until now, have received scant attention. The goal is also to pinpoint the positions, motivations, and strategies of the rebels.

Older research defined various reasons for prince Casimir's Hungarian campaign. Among them was Matthias Corvinus's expansion into the Kingdom of Bohemia and poor defence of the southern border of Hungary and Croatia, threatened by the Ottoman Empire. High taxes and the taxation of the clergy also raised defiance against king Matthias. The local environment provided an optimal breeding ground for opposition, which then led to an open rebellion of the prelates and barons. They took advantage of Polish interest, especially of Casimir IV's ambition to put his second-born son, prince Casimir, on the Hungarian throne. Once Wladyslaw, prince Casimir's elder brother, became king of Bohemia in 1471 as a result of Matthias Corvinus's failed political activities, Casimir IV's ambition seemed well-grounded. Notably, king Matthias learned about the brewing plot in the summer of 1471. He also knew about the planned Polish attack. More detailed data concerning the rebels' communication with the Polish king are non-existent. It is undeniable, however, that sixteen unidentified Hungarian lords approached the king of Poland. They pled for his son to assume the Hungarian throne³. Matthias Corvinus therefore promptly called for all the prelates, barons, and other nobles to attend an assembly in Buda. As a result, on 18 September 1471, the king promised to grant his nobles various rights. At the same time, however, he ordered several castles and forts to be destroyed or confiscated, due to the crime of treason committed by their owners (*sub nota perpetue infidelitatis*). Baron Nicholas Perényi was one such noble. It may come as a surprise that the king granted his estates in the Zemplín, Abov, and Bor-

The research development focused on Hungary has been introduced by S. Kuzmová, *The memory of the Jagiellonians in the Kingdom of Hungary, and in Hungarian and Slovak national narratives*, [in:] *Remembering the Jagiellonians*, ed. by N. Nowakowska, London–New York 2019, pp. 71–100.

³ K. Baczkowski, *Między czeskim utrakwizmem*, pp. 60–62; T. Homola, *S kráľom alebo proti kráľovi?*, pp. 227–230; *CES – Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti* 3, ed. by A. Lewicki, Kraków 1894, p. 158, no. 132.

sod counties to his brothers, Stephen and Peter Perényi. Nicholas' border fortress of Stropkov, which presented a clear problem, was supposed to be destroyed within 25 days. Other strongholds decreed for destruction were Oborín and Cejkov in Zemplín county, and the more remote Gelénes in ereg county. They belonged to a local noble, Ladislaus Upori. It seems that he conspired with the rebels too, thus provoking the king's reaction. Both Ladislaus Upori and Nicholas Perényi served as county heads or deputy county heads in the local counties, which was characteristic for the region⁴. For the sake of completeness, it must be said that, at the time of the assembly, the king knew about other rebellion leaders too. For example, Reinold Rozgonyi, the Royal Master of the Treasury and John Vitez, Archbishop of Esztergom. They both refused to attend the assembly without letters of transit (*salvus conductus*). They demanded the king to guarantee no punishment⁵. Although Matthias unfolded their plans, he failed to stop the Polish attack.

Shortly after, a letter in the name of prince Casimir was sent from Krakow to Matthias Corvinus. The letter was a manifest or a proclamation, which accused Matthias of usurpation and blamed him for the poor standards of living in Hungary. According to his claim, prince Casimir, the 13-year-old son of the Polish king, was the one to defend the Hungarian people and right all wrongs. It is possible that the Archbishop of Esztergom himself wrote this letter. At the same time, however, other Hungarian nobles addressed a letter to the Polish king Casimir IV. They officially declared their loyalty to king Matthias and called prince Casimir's claim into question. Unsurprisingly, John Vitez signed no such letter, but dozens of other high-ranking nobles did. Matthias Corvinus' position was therefore not as weak as it would have seemed⁶. On the other hand, the declaration did not stop the military interven-

⁴ *Decreta regni Hungariae: Gesetze und Verordnungen Ungarns 1458–1490*, ed. by G. Bónis, F. Döry, G. Érszegi, and S. Teke, Budapest 1989, p. 201; MNL OL – Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára Budapest, DF – Diplomatikai fényképgyűjtemény 209 865, 209 867; I. Tringli, *Hunyadi Mátyás és a Perényiek*, *Levéltári Közlemények* 63 (1992), no. 1–2, p. 185; T. Homola, *S kráľom alebo proti kráľovi?*, pp. 232–233; N.C. Tóth, R. Horváth, T. Neumann, T. Pálosfalvi, A. W. Kovács, *Magyarország világi archontológiája 1458–1526. 2: Megyék*, Budapest 2017, pp. 149, 297, 301.

⁵ *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i morawské S*, ed. by F. Palacký, Praha 1862, p. 330, no. 28; MNL OL, DL – Diplomatikai levéltár [Collection of Diplomats] 83 794; V. Fraknoi, *Vitéz János esztergomi érsek élete*, Budapest 1879, pp. 210–214; T. Matic, *Bishop John Vitez*, pp. 171–173.

⁶ CDPL – *Codex diplomaticus regni Poloniae et magni ducatus Litvaniae 1*, ed. by M. Dogiel Vilnae 1758, pp. 60–61, no. 19; P. Eschenloer, *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau: Teilband*

tion. The Polish army numbering 12,000 men led by prince Casimir left Krakow on 2 October 1471. A few days later, near the town of Stará Ľubovňa, they crossed the Hungarian border. Slowly, the army advanced south. In the village of Lipany, Prince Casimir's supreme field commander (*supremus campiductor*) Peter Dunin called all serfs from around Bardejov to declare their allegiance to the prince. The army then moved to Šariš Castle, the administrative centre of the region. There, prince Casimir ordered his captains not to do any damage to the nearby town of Sabinov. A similar order was issued in the name of Casimir, „by the Grace of God rightful and natural heir to the Kingdom of Hungary”, by his commander Przeclaw of Dmosice. He ordered Casimir's captains, field commanders, and sergeants to do no damage to the estates belonging to a fortress or a noble residence (*fortalicium*) in the nearby village of Svinia, property of the noble widow Elizabeth⁷. Casimir's gestures of goodwill in Šariš County are no coincidence. He aimed to win over the local burghers and nobles. Šariš and Zemplín regions on the Polish border provided an important staging ground for the prince's future activities in Hungary.

The Hungarian aristocracy was another possible source of support. In personal contact, both parties most likely preferred different Slavic dialects. In official written contact, however, Latin was employed⁸. During his march inland, on 1 November 1471 Casimir issued a letter to Stephen and Peter Perényi near the village of Drienov on the road from Prešov to Košice. He informed them of his intention to depose the false king Matthias and of his own claim to the throne. He told them of his journey to Buda and Pest, where he planned to arrive on 18 November. He therefore requested both brothers to be ready and provide their loyal service. This is an interesting paradox, since both Stephen and Peter had gained estates confiscated from their brother Nicholas Perényi shortly beforehand. It appears that the Perényi

2. *Chronik ab 1467*, ed. by G. Roth, Münster–New York–München–Berlin 2003, pp. 863–864; K. Baczkowski, *Między czeskim utrakwizmem*, p. 62; T. Homola, *S kráľom alebo proti kráľovi?*, pp. 233–237.

⁷ F. Uličný, *Poľské vojenské vpády na Slovensko v druhej polovici 15. storočia*, *Historické štúdie* 15 (1970), p. 254; *Documenta ad res Poloniae pertinentia, quae in archivis veteris regni Hungariae asservantur 2 (documenta ex annis 1451–1480)*, ed. by S.A. Sroka, Kraków 2000, pp. 139–140, no. 243–244; *DCS – Diplomatarium comitatus Sarosiensis*, ed. by C. Wagner, Posonii–Cassovia 1780, pp. 186–187, no. 9.

⁸ An exception may be letters of transit issued by Reinold Rozgonyi, written in Czech and addressed to Przeclaw. It may have been about the aforementioned Polish commander. *Stredoveké české listiny*, ed. by Š. Kniezsa, Budapest 1952, p. 121, no. 75.

brothers did not join Casimir's side⁹. The prince and his advisors were probably simply probing for allies.

Casimir's army bypassed Košice, the town being armed and ready for defence. The army continued through Szikszó and Eger into Hatvan, where they made camp on 8 November. Other than Nicholas Perényi and Reinold Rozgonyi, not many nobles joined the prince. On the other hand, the Polish army was still to meet significant resistance. However, Matthias amassed a greater force near Pest. It was not clear if a decisive battle would take place. Casimir did not risk confrontation, therefore did not move on to Pest and Buda. He marched northwest to the monastic town of Šahy and to the river Hron. The army remained there, most likely until December. About that time rumours spread that it would move to Kremnica¹⁰. In the end, the army marched to the castle and town of Nitra, controlled by the Archbishop of Esztergom. Janus Pannonius, Bishop of Pécs and John Vitez' nephew, arrived in Nitra too, along with 200 riders. However, he left for Esztergom, now besieged by Matthias Corvinus. The king thus managed to stop John Vitez from joining Casimir. He pressured the Archbishop and forced him into an agreement on 19 December. John Vitez pledged his loyalty directly in front of Matthias Corvinus. He vowed to grant all his castles and forts to loyal men and garrison them with Hungarians, bound to serve him and the king. Should the Archbishop die, all his castles and forts would befall to the king. The Archbishop was also required to let the king's servants enter any of his castles, to better resist their enemies, should the king ever so demand. The king promised not to expel the Archbishop's castellans and servants from his castles, and not to do them any harm. The Archbishop promised to do everything in his power to return the castle and town of Nitra, as well as the Breznica fort¹¹. The agreement confirmed the defeat of the local rebellion and marked the beginning of a dramatic series of events pertaining to prince Casimir's retreat.

⁹ *Documenta ad res Poloniae* 2, pp. 141–142, no. 245; I. Tringli, *Hunyadi Mátyás és a Perényiek*, p. 186; T. Homola, *S kráľom alebo proti kráľovi?*, pp. 238–239.

¹⁰ J. Długossius, *Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae. Lib. 12*, ed. by K. Baczkowski, Kraków 2005, pp. 276–277; *Urkundliche Nachträge zur österreichisch-deutschen Geschichte im Zeitalter Kaiser Friedrich III.*, ed. by A. Bachmann, [in:] *Fontes rerum Austriacarum. Diplomataria et acta*, 2/46, Wien 1892, p. 171, no. 159; K. Baczkowski, *Między czeskim utrakwizmem*, p. 65; T. Homola, *S kráľom alebo proti kráľovi?*, pp. 239–240.

¹¹ J. Długossius, *Annales seu Cronicae* 12, p. 277; V. Fraknói, *Vitéz János*, pp. 218–220; F. Uličný, *Polské vojenské vpády*, pp. 254–255; *Magyarország primása. Közjogi és történeti vázolat. 2: Oklevelek*, ed. by J. Török, Pest 1859, p. 79, no. 71; T. Matić, *Bishop John Vitez*, pp. 175–176.

After the agreement, the royal army marched from Esztergom to Nitra. Expecting an attack, Casimir left the town during the night of 26 December 1471. He left behind his officer Paul Jasieński who protected the town at first, but then made a truce with Matthias Corvinus, via Bishop Janus Pannonius. According to Jan Długosz, a Polish chronicler, Nitra remained in Casimir's hands, garrisoned with 300 men. During a 15-day truce, 4,000 men marched from Nitra to Turiec County (*versus Thurcz*). They were pursued by Hungarian nobles, allegedly those who had conspired against king Matthias, violating the truce. The retreating Polish army raided and pillaged. The march towards Turiec, which could refer to either the castle or the region, led from Nitra to the river Hron. An account by Peter Eschenloer, a chronicler from Wrocław, testifies as such. According to him, one way of retreat led along the town of Kremnica. King Matthias pursued the Polish too, but was stopped by a flood, caused by prolonged rain and thaw. The Polish army suffered great losses: all of their wagons and about a thousand men¹². The road to Kremnica was guarded by John Vitez' castles. Specifically, the Breznica fort (modern: Tekovská Breznica), the Revište and Teplica castles (modern: Sklené Teplice). Šášov was another castle in the region, held by Ladislaus Upori. The Polish army passed through without any problems. In Kremnica, however, a town famous for its gold mines and minting coins, they faced resistance. According to a letter written on 3 January 1472 by the town's mayor and council to the nearby towns of Banská Štiavnica and Banská Belá, in two days, Andrew Mühlstein was to arrive in Kremnica, along with cavalry and infantry. He was sent by his brother, Veit Mühlstein, head of Zvolen County. Kremnica had asked the neighbouring Banská Bystrica for cavalry and infantry support. They requested Banská Štiavnica and Banská Belá to send as many reinforcements as possible within three or four days. Lord Noffri (owner of the Bojnice castle) promised aid too. They fielded 500 or 600 men in total. It is possible that the two armies met. An attack against Ladislaus Upori may have been launched at the same time, which is only reported later in a document from 1476. The town of Banská Štiavnica complained about estates taken by Ladislaus Upori earlier in time. Upori had allegedly added them to his castle Šášov. King Matthias then conquered the castle and drove Upori out (*expugnatus et eiectus*). Veit Mühlstein governed the castle in the

¹² J. Długossius, *Annales seu Cronicae* 12, pp. 279, 285; J. de Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum* 1. *Textus*, ed. by E. Galántai, and J. Kristó, Budapest 1985, pp. 289–290; A. de Bonfinis, *Rerum Ungaricarum decades. Tomus 4. Pars 1*, ed. by I. Fógel, B. Iványi, and L. Juhász, Budapest 1941, pp. 45–46; P. Eschenloer, *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau* 2, pp. 869–870; T. Homola, *S kráľom alebo proti kráľovi?*, pp. 241–242.

king's name¹³. Despite the losses, the Polish army passed through Turiec County in January 1472 and continued east. On 25 January, 2,000 men under Jasieński's command passed through Liptov region and entered Spiš County. According to a notary from Levoča, the men were stark naked and pale. Each was barely able to carry his crossbow and gear¹⁴. This return of the army was extremely difficult.

Prince Casimir and his courtiers had a calmer retreat. He left behind garrisons that fortified the village of Hubina (close to Piešťany) and Michalov Vrch Castle (east of Topolčany, no longer in existence). These garrisons were probably only supposed to keep Matthias Corvinus busy. The King besieged them both in the second half of January¹⁵. Casimir continued north to Ilava, a castle in the hands of his allies. Sztefek of Wierzbna, a nobleman hailing from Silesia, let the prince in. King Matthias later confiscated Sztefek's estates for this act of treason¹⁶. In the meantime, Casimir passed along the Váh River into Ružomberok. Peter Komorowski, a nobleman with a Polish background, took him in. Komorowski was the hereditary county head of Liptov and Orava counties, both offices given to him by king Matthias. Nevertheless, Komorowski promised prince Casimir to hand over all his Hungarian castles to him. It is possible that the prince distrusted his host and expected to be betrayed. He returned to Poland through Orava region before the end of January¹⁷. Thus, his Hungarian campaign was officially over.

However, the rebellion continued. John Vitez, one of its leaders, kept his title of archbishop. Vitez therefore remained in Esztergom. On 24 February 1472, he issued a decree with noteworthy contents and addressee. He gave his castle of Revište and its adjacent estates to his servant (*familiaris*) Ladislaus Markus, for mere 1,000 gold

¹³ Štátny archív v Banskej Bystrici, Pracovisko Archív Banská Štiavnica, Magistrát mesta Banská Štiavnica, box 16, sign. MMBŠ-N 16, box 4, sign. MMBŠ-MOL I-674.

¹⁴ He mentions them having 400 wagons, which differs from Eschenloer's report. MNL OL, DF 214 548.

¹⁵ *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské 6*, ed. by F. Palacký, Praha 1872, p. 49, no. 7; MNL OL, DF 214 548; J. Długossius, *Annales seu Cronicae* 12, p. 285; R. Horváth, *Itineraria regis Matthiae Corvini et reginae Beatricis de Aragonia (1458–[1476]–1490*, Budapest 2011, p. 95.

¹⁶ J. Długossius, *Annales seu Cronicae* 12, pp. 279, 284; *A Podmanini Podmaniczky-család oklevéltára 1*, ed. by I. Lukinich, Budapest 1937, p. 101, no. 55.

¹⁷ J. Długossius, *Annales seu Cronicae* 12, p. 284; N.C. Tóth, *Magyarország világi archontológiája 2*, pp. 34, 142; A. Prochaska, *Wyprawa św. Kazimierza na Węgry (1471–1474)*, *Ateneum Wileńskie* 1 (1923), pp. 15–17; G. Żabiński, *Działalność braci Piotra i Mikołaja Komorowskich na Górnych Węgrzech w okresie rządów Macieja Korwina*, *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne* 128 (2001), pp. 87–88.

pieces. Markus was supposed to keep the castle until the loan was paid, either by Vitez or one of his successors. They had both probably met at a time when Markus was Deputy Ban of Dalmatia and Croatia¹⁸. This would explain their common political interests. Markus, originally a lesser nobleman from the village of Terany, remained an ally of the Polish party. King Matthias's reaction was to imprison the Archbishop in Visegrád Castle. Historians often explain this step as a mere act of revenge on John Vitez. Possibly, the king viewed the Archbishop's activities as violating the agreement from two months before and reacted accordingly. On 1 April 1472, in the presence of a papal legate, prelates, and barons, he made a new agreement with John Vitez. He released the archbishop but did not allow him to leave Esztergom and ordered him to remain under the supervision of John Beckensloer, Bishop of Eger. The Archbishop's castellans and servants had to submit themselves to Beckensloer, who also received all of Vitez' castles. According to John Długosz, the Archbishop's subordinates refused to hand the castles over, which started a lengthy process of numerous sieges. Some castles surrendered¹⁹. Revište, Teplica, and Breznica refused to comply. As per the request of their captains, Ladislaus Markus, Stanislaus Košecký, and George Jurcz, on 28 June 1472 Polish king Casimir IV issued a letter in Krakow. The king pledged his military and diplomatic support against the Hungarian king, calling upon their loyalty. Should the Hungarian king step against them, Markus, Košecký and Jurcz were supposed to defend the castles for three months. Casimir IV promised to provide military support within the three-month period. Should they lose the castles, he promised compensation²⁰. John Vitez' death put a halt to the rebellion's plans. However, the rebels were able to negotiate and secure a royal pardon thanks to the Polish king's guarantees. In a short time, Ladislaus Markus became a royal courtier and eventually a castellan and county head in Esztergom²¹.

The other rebels were not as lucky, despite their high social standings. Bishop Janus Pannonius fled Pécs and most likely headed towards Venice. On his way, however, he died in Medvedgrad, a Croatian castle, probably of natural causes, much like

¹⁸ MNL OL, DL 17 294; N.C. Tóth, R. Horváth, T. Neumann, T. Pálosfalvi, *Magyarország világi archontológiája 1458–1526. 1: Főpapok és bárók*, Budapest 2017, p. 102; T. Matić, *Bishop John Vitez*, p. 177.

¹⁹ *Historia critica regum Hungariae stirpis mixtae. Tomulus 8. Ordine 15*, ed. by S. Katona, Colotzae 1792, pp. 554–559; J. Długossius, *Annales seu Cronicae* 12, p. 286; J. Huszti, *Janus Pannonius*, Pécs 1931, pp. 282–283.

²⁰ A. Prochaska, *Wyprawa św. Kazimierza na Węgry*, p. 22.

²¹ A. Kubinyi, *Matthias Corvinus*, p. 79; N.C. Tóth, *Magyarország világi archontológiája* 2, p. 99.

his uncle John Vitez. Another rebel, Reinold Rozgonyi, was able to flee much earlier. According to Peter Eschenloer, he left for Venice in 1471 and remained there until reconciling with king Matthias. He still lost all his offices, castles and estates²². Matthias' relationship with Venice was tense, hence it became a more permanent place of exile for many of his opponents²³. In January 1472, Reinold Rozgonyi resided with a Viennese physician. He was severely ill. He said that he could no longer help „the child of Poland” (prince Casimir), despite him being the rightful heir to the throne. Not even a month later, however, Rozgonyi appeared in his castle of Ónod (east of Miskolc near the village of Berzék). From there, he moved north to his residence in Vranov (modern: Vranov nad Topľou). He borrowed money from his servants and gave them letters of confirmation in return. He declared to the town of Bardejov that his former health and happiness had returned. At the same time, he reassured the town of his friendly intentions²⁴. He settled his disputes with the king at least partially. Matthias Corvinus issued a consent for Rozgonyi to build and fortify a house in Vranov. Several barons vouched for him. Subsequently, Rozgonyi handed Ónod castle to the king. The king agreed for Reinold's three nephews to inherit Vranov and his other estates after his death (he died in 1472). In Vranov, Rozgonyi's new residence, the trade with Poland played an important role. The Rozgonyi family also managed to keep the nearby castles of Čičava and Skrabské. They used them as secure documents storage and for accommodation in times of turmoil²⁵.

In a short time, most of the rebellion leaders died, except for Nicholas Perényi, who kept opposing the king and relying on his Polish allies. He gave the Stropkov fortress to a Polish garrison. The fortress, located on the Hungarian and Polish

²² Eschenloer mentions the Bishop of Pécs's flight first, and Reinold following suit, but the events took place the other way around. Jannus Pannonius fled in March the next year. P. Eschenloer, *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau* 2, p. 869; J. Huszti, *Janus Pannonius*, pp. 283–284; N.C. Tóth, *Magyarország világi archontológiája* 2, p. 20, footnote 15; T. Homola, *S kráľom alebo proti kráľovi?*, pp. 244–245.

²³ Later, another courtier and rebel, the former Ban of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, John Thuz, lived in Venice too. A. Kubinyi, *Matthias Corvinus*, pp. 24, 96; A. Kalous, *Matyáš Korvín*, pp. 81, 258–260, 291; A. de Bonfinis, *Rerum Ungaricarum decades* 4/1, p. 105.

²⁴ CES 3, p. 163, no. 137; MNL OL, DL 83 796, 60 824, 83 797, DF 214 559.

²⁵ MNL OL, DL 17 305, 17 325, 17 326, 17 400; A. Kubinyi, *Residenz- und Herrschaftsbildung in Ungarn in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts und am Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts*, [in:] *Fürstliche Residenzen im spätmittelalterlichen Europa*, ed. by H. Patze, and W. Paravicini, Sigmaringen 1991, pp. 454, 458–459; D. Magdoško, Čičava, [in:] *Stredoveké hrady na Slovensku: Život, kultúra, spoločnosť*, ed. by D. Dvořáková, Bratislava 2017, p. 280.

border, remained a source of conflict. Other than its political impacts, the garrison raided and pillaged its surroundings. On 31 March 1472, king Casimir IV and his son (neither of them in person) developed an agreement with king Matthias in Buda, setting the conditions for the fortress' further existence. The truce was to be held between 1 May 1472 and 1 May 1473. The garrison captain in Nitra had to decide whether he would remain subject to the Polish King or submit himself to the Archbishop of Esztergom. The garrison in Stropkov could only take the revenue belonging to the fortress' estates. They were forbidden to build new structures and fortifications. The garrison, however, kept harassing the area and allowing more Polish units cross the border. In September 1473, a large Polish army threatened Humenné. Emeric Zapolya, the Spiš County Head asked Košice, Prešov, and Levoča for support in defending the town²⁶. Šariš County started mobilising its military units.

King Matthias took precautions and raided the Polish borderlands as an act of revenge. In December 1473, during ongoing hostilities, he pardoned Nicholas Perényi and his servants for their crimes, especially those committed in Stropkov and its adjacent estates. Should their treasonous activities have resumed, the pardon would have become invalid. Nicholas Perényi indeed put a halt to his activities. It is hard to say if he was motivated by the rumour that Janus Pannonius, John Vitez, and Reinold Rozgonyi were poisoned. He may have also been deterred by king Matthias's act in the spring of 1474, when he stripped Peter Komorowski of all his castles and forced him to retreat to Poland²⁷. After a while, however, complaints started to amass about Stephen Perényi and later his brother Nicholas causing conflicts and organizing highwayman attacks. Despite repeated appeals, Nicholas Perényi refused to appear in court. King Matthias therefore ordered a military intervention against „this presumptuous and furious man” (*temerarium illum et furiosum hominem*). In the second half of 1483, the royal army besieged and conquered the fortress of Stropkov and the castles of Filakovo, Trebišov, Šariš, and Hanigovce. It is possible the castles of Füzér and Csorbakő (both in the Perényi family) were also conquered. Nicholas

²⁶ CDPL 1, pp. 62–64, no. 21; P. Eschenloer, *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau* 2, pp. 906–909; K. Baczkowski, *Między czeskim utrakwizmem*, pp. 69–70; I. Tringli, *Hunyadi Mátyás és a Perényiek*, pp. 186–187; *A Szapolyai család oklevéltára* 1, ed. by T. Neumann, Budapest 2012, pp. 136–138, no. 127.

²⁷ MNL OL, DF 252 618; I. Tringli, *Hunyadi Mátyás és a Perényiek*, p. 187; J. Dlugossius, *Annales seu Cronicae* 12, pp. 292, 305, 309, 319–320, 329–330; G. Żabiński, *Działalność braci Piotra i Mikołaja Komorowskich*, pp. 88–89; R. Horváth, *Itineraria regis Matthiae Corvini*, pp. 99–100.

Perényi died in the conflict. The castles and estates passed into the king's hands. This branch of the Perényi family, also called the Palatine branch, lost a significant fortune²⁸. In all likelihood, the Perényi brothers had no political motives. It is undeniable, however, that due to the rebellion of 1471, they lost positions in Abov and Zemplín counties. Before, they would share the office of the county heads with the Rozgonyi family. Matthias Corvinus would never bestow any of these offices to any Perényi family member again²⁹. This may be one of the causes for their opposition against the status quo and the monarch's authority.

The King's death in April 1490 gave way to a new division of power. He had primed his illegitimate son John Corvinus to take the throne. John had received some of the former Perényi castles too. Soon after Matthias' death, however, new strong competitors from the neighbouring countries turned up. Emperor Frederick III Habsburg and his son, the Archduke Maximilian, received only meagre local support. Wladyslaw Jagiellon, the King of Bohemia, had more allies, his direct rival being his own brother, the Polish prince John Albert. As early as on 9 June 1490, a part of the assembly voted for John Albert to succeed the throne. His older brother, however, gained more support. On 15 June 1490, he was elected Wladyslaw II, King of Hungary. Despite both siblings coming from the same dynasty, each of them represented a different political plan, Bohemian and Polish. Therefore, they came into an open conflict with both local and foreign support. On 1 July 1490, a Polish army, 8,000 men strong, crossed the Hungarian border. This was a milestone for the said conflict. The army was led by the energetic, 30-year-old John Albert³⁰.

They made camp by Kamenica castle (southeast of Stará Ľubovňa), where they met with their Hungarian allies. It remains unclear if the lord of Kamenica, Thomas Tárcai, supported John Albert. However, he informed the town of Bardejov that John Albert's forces spent the night on his land³¹. The Polish army found no op-

²⁸ *Hunyadiak kora Magyarországon 12*, ed. by J. Teleki, Pest 1857, pp. 249–256, no. 708–712; *A Szapolyai család oklevéltára 1*, pp. 160–161, no. 159–160; I. Tringli, *Hunyadi Mátyás és a Perényiek*, pp. 187–189; T. Neumann, *Várat vennék, de miből? Perényi Imre szerzeményei az 1490-es években*, A nyíregyházi Jósza András Múzeum Évkönyve 59 (2017), no. 1, p. 92.

²⁹ N.C. Tóth, *Magyarország világi archontológiája 2*, pp. 19–20, 370–373.

³⁰ A. Kubinyi, *Matthias Corvinus*, pp. 118–126; K. Baczkowski, *Habsburgowie i Jagiellonowie*, pp. 65, 83–84.

³¹ Dating the letter is problematic but it is most likely from 4 July 1490. F. Papée, *Jan Olbracht*, Kraków 1999, p. 219; K. Baczkowski, *Habsburgowie i Jagiellonowie*, p. 84; MNL OL, DF 215 620.

position and quickly moved further into Hungary proper. They passed the village of Hernádszentandrás and the town of Szikszó. It would appear that John Albert tried to race the freshly elected King Wladyslaw into the political centre in Buda. On 8 August, he appeared on the bank of the Danube near Pest. He negotiated with his brother in person, however, no agreement was reached. He did not risk clashing with a larger army and moved through Hatvan to the town of Szerencs, where he was stationed on 2 September. According to András Kubinyi, at that point John Albert made it his goal to target and occupy vital towns and castles. They represented a stepping stone in a future struggle for the throne³². Yet again, the border regions offered their support to the Polish prince. Benedict Borsos of Berzék held an important office in Šariš County. In the final years of Matthias Corvinus' life, he was Deputy Head of Šariš County an elected representative of the local nobility. For some time, he shared this office with a local nobleman – Benedict Liptay. He was also captain of Šariš Castle³³. He gave the castle to John Albert. This step was a matter of significance for the prince. Šariš provided the staging ground he needed, and the local nobility gave him a good local political base³⁴. Borsos and Liptay became John Albert's influential local allies. According to a letter sent on 14 September from Prešov to Bardejov, all of Šariš County sided with the Polish prince. Emeric Perényi, John Cékei, and the nobles of Brezovica all joined John Albert³⁵. Their actions can be attributed to family ties. Emeric Perényi was the son of Stephen and the nephew of Nicholas, the infamous Perényi brothers. John Cékei, the owner of Cejkov castle, was a son-in-law of Ladislaus Upori, at that time already dead. Cékei had seized Upori's estates confiscated by Matthias Corvinus only shortly beforehand³⁶. In joining John Albert, the two noblemen perhaps saw an opportunity to gain (or regain) their estates and status.

³² K. Baczkowski, *Habsburgowie i Jagiellonowie*, p. 94; A. de Bonfinis, *Rerum Ungaricarum decades 4/1*, pp. 192–193; MNL OL, DL 30 920, DF 215 575, 258 887; DCS, pp. 135–136, no. 30; A. Kubinyi, *Két sorsdöntő esztendő*, p. 34.

³³ N.C. Tóth, *Magyarország világi archontológiája 2*, p. 203; T. Neumann, *A zavaros idők Szabolcs, Szatmár és Bereg megyékben (1490–1492)*, [in:] *Az ecsedi Báthoriak a XV–XVII. században*, ed. by S. Szabó, and N.C. Tóth, Nyírbátor 2012, p. 94.

³⁴ A. Kubinyi, *Két sorsdöntő esztendő*, pp. 34–35; K. Baczkowski, *Habsburgowie i Jagiellonowie*, p. 110.

³⁵ MNL OL, DF 215 597; F. Uličný, *Polské vojenské vpády*, p. 258.

³⁶ P. Engel, *Középkori magyar genealógia*, Budapest 2001, CD-ROM, branch Perényi: 2, branch Upori; *Okmányok a kellemesi Melczer család levéltárából*, ed. by I. Melczer, Budapest 1890, pp. 123–124, no. 73.

According to the aforementioned letter from Prešov, the Polish commander Nicholas Rozembariski also planned to occupy Kapušany and Skrabské castles in mid- September. Here, the Rozgonyi family stepped in again. With a document issued on 23 September 1490, John Albert and Stephen Rozgonyi the Younger (*iunior*) of Skrabské came to an agreement. The late Reinold Rozgonyi had a nephew, Stephen the Elder. Stephen the Younger belonged to a different Rozgonyi branch. According to the agreement, the governors and sergeants at Stephen Rozgonyi's castles of Skrabské and Brezovica were to remain loyal until John Albert sent their own garrisons. Should these estates suffer any losses (including casualties), John Albert was to compensate Stephen Rozgonyi accordingly, or give him similar estates in Hungary. Rozgonyi himself was to be under John Albert's protection, who pledged to defend his castles against his enemies. Should John Albert and his brother Wladyslaw II have reconciled, Stephen Rozgonyi was to attend all meetings as John Albert's proper advisor (*verus consiliarius*)³⁷. These guarantees and the title of advisor suggest that Stephen Rozgonyi was a member of John Albert's inner circle and could have been his source of information on the internal political situation.

On top of several castles, the towns of Prešov and Sabinov submitted themselves to John Albert. However, the important trade hub of Košice remained hostile. Therefore, John Albert's army under the experienced leadership of Blase Magyar besieged Košice in early October. Thanks to its firm walls, the town kept resisting. At this time, more local allies emerged on the side of the Polish prince. On 20 November 1490, in his siege camp, John Albert issued letters of passage for John Perényi. The addressee was a distant relative of the Perényi family and also a close relative of Stephen Rozgonyi the Younger. For ten days, the letters guaranteed John Perényi, his family, his servant, and his horses safe passage, especially on the way directly to John Albert. He ordered his military commanders, sergeants, and soldiers to respect the letters³⁸. A similar order was issued by Benedict Borsos on 29 December 1490. He proclaimed himself Captain of Šariš and John Albert's chief military commander (*belliductor generalis*) in Hungary. He ordered all his soldiers not to harm John Perényi, his servants, and all that he owned. They were to protect Perényi, for they

³⁷ CES 3, pp. 369–371, no. 364; P. Engel, *Középkori magyar genealógia*, branch Básztély: 2, branch 4 Rozgonyi; D. Magdoško, *Skrabské*, [in:] *Stredoveké hrady na Slovensku: Život, kultúra, spoločnosť*, ed. by D. Dvořáková, Bratislava 2017, p. 377.

³⁸ F. Uličný, *Polské vojenské vpády*, pp. 257–258; K. Baczkowski, *Habsburgowie i Jagiello-nowie*, pp. 111–113; MNL OL, DL 71 028; P. Engel, *Középkori magyar genealógia*, branch Perényi: 1, branch Modrár.

had sworn their loyalty on the Holy Cross³⁹. John's distant relative, Emeric Perényi, was engaged in the fighting directly. He kept close to John Albert in his field camp near Košice. There, he wrote a letter to Košice's representatives, declaring war. Afterwards, he chose a calmer approach and requested that the besieged town released his wife and one servant. At first, he used the title of Head of Zemplín County, later he added Novohrad County. He was given both offices by John Albert, although the prince never legally gained the rights of the Hungarian king⁴⁰. In the meantime, the Hungarian crown passed to Wladyslaw II. He answered by confiscating the estates of Emeric Perényi. In early 1491, Wladyslaw II gave all of Emeric Perényi's estates to the Bishop of Eger and Urban, the former royal treasurer. The estates were to be used by Urban's relatives as well⁴¹. It remains disputable if the bishop actually claimed the estates, located in the north-eastern parts of the country, the hotspot of all the fighting.

In February 1491, king Wladyslaw's army approached Košice, vastly outnumbering John Albert's troops, forcing him to parley. According to Antonio Bonfini, the brothers met in person in a tent, with their soldiers present at attention. John Albert dismounted his horse to honour Wladyslaw as a king. Wladyslaw reciprocated the gesture, offering him his right hand and allegedly stating: „*Albert, why do you pursue me with the opposition of an enemy?*” Albert answered: „*Not you, lord, do I pursue, but those (meaning the Hungarians) who called me to seize the throne and bore false witness*”⁴². In the chronicler's report, John Albert masterly shifted the blame onto his Hungarian allies. It is unknown if such a discussion actually took place. However, the mediators sent by Polish king Casimir IV helped reach an agreement. In the peace declaration of 20 February 1491, John Albert pledged to respect his brother Wladyslaw as the rightful king of Hungary. For that, he was to receive the duchy of Głogów in Silesia. John Albert was to keep the towns of Prešov and Sabinov, until Wladyslaw handed over Głogów to him. Should Wladyslaw II have died heirless, John Albert was to succeed him in Hungary. At the same time, the prince released all his allies

³⁹ MNL OL, DL 71 029; T. Neumann, *A zavaros idők*, p. 97.

⁴⁰ MNL OL, DF 271 234, 270 695, 270 696; T. Neumann, *Várat vennék, de miből?*, p. 94; N.C. Tóth, *Magyarország világi archontológiája 2*, pp. 162, 373.

⁴¹ MNL OL, DL 19 705; P. Maliniak, *Spojenci a protivníci Jagelovcov*, pp. 104–105.

⁴² *Alberto ex equo desiliēti, ut fratrem pro regni dignitate veneraretur, Wladislaus parī eum honore afficiens dexteram porrexit statimque, Cur me hostili odio, Alberte, prosequeris? inquit. Cui ille: Non te, domine, persequor, sed hos (Ungaros designans), qui me ad regnum capessendum accersiverunt fidemque sefellerunt. A. de Bonfinis, Rerum Ungaricarum decades 4/1, p. 218.*

from their oaths. They were all given deadlines in which they were to pledge their loyalty to the king⁴³. Still in Košice, on 4 March 1491, Wladyslaw granted mercy to all nobles and non-nobles who had sided with John Albert. He returned the confiscated ecclesiastical and secular estates and let them keep their offices. He ordered his courtiers and high county officers not to judge John Albert's allies and not to cause them any trouble. The king pardoned several local rebels, among them John Cékei⁴⁴. Most of his Hungarian allies abandoned John Albert, but some refused to accept the new terms and stayed by his side.

Nicholas of Ploské, a nobleman from a village north of Košice, was John Albert's active supporter. He held a local administrative office as deputy head of Zemplín County. This position accelerated his career in the service of the Polish prince. Back on 29 September 1490, John Albert sent two of his men: his advisor Nicholas of Ploské and his secretary Nicholas Rozembarski, from Prešov to Bardejov. They were both unsuccessful in turning the burghers of Bardejov to their side⁴⁵. During the siege of Košice, John Albert awarded estates to Nicholas for his services. From a legal standpoint, this disputable donation lost its validity with the peace treaty of February 1491. The estates were returned to their original owners. Thereafter, Nicholas came into a conflict with Košice; he even threatened the town. The local magistrates informed king Wladyslaw II. His answer was to leave the matters be, for under God's guidance, all grounds for threats should end shortly. A while later, in August 1491, the king confiscated all of Nicholas of Ploské's estates, including Šebeš castle (east of Prešov) and gave them to Košice. He referred to Nicholas's alliance with John Albert⁴⁶. After some time of silence, Nicholas appeared in Poland in John Albert's service. He settled in Jasło, as a royal castle captain. Later, he managed to own a part

⁴³ S. Kuzmová, *Rodinné stretnutia a dynastické summy Jagelovcov koncom 15. a začiatkom 16. storočia*, [in:] *Prelomové obdobie dejín (Politika, spoločnosť, kultúra v roku 1515)*, ed. by E. Frimmová, Bratislava 2017, p. 48; *CDPL 1*, pp. 79–85, no. 31; K. Baczkowski, *Habsburgowie i Jagiellonowie*, pp. 126–128; T. Neumann, *A kassai hadjárat*, pp. 391–395.

⁴⁴ *Epistolae procerum regni Hungariae 1*, ed. by G. Pray, Posonii 1806, pp. 22–25, no. 13; MNL OL, DL 82 031.

⁴⁵ MNL OL, DF 215 603; F. Uličný, *Poľské vojenské vpády*, p. 259; Gy. Székely, *A rendek válaszúton*, p. 451.

⁴⁶ MNL OL, DF 223 948, DL 19 748; T. Neumann, *A zavaros idők*, pp. 98–99; *Sprawozdanie z poszukiwań na Węgrzech dokonanych z ramienia Akademii umiejętności*, ed. by W. Baran, J. Dąbrowski, J. Łos, J. Ptaśnik, and S. Zachorowski, Kraków 1919, p. 79, no. 178.

of the Šebeš estates as a guarantee for repayment of debt⁴⁷. His financial situation may have been sufficient, allowing him to do so. He is the only known Hungarian supporter of John Albert, who took the opportunity of exile in Poland.

After having made peace, John Albert controlled the towns of Prešov, Sabinov, and Šariš Castle. In April 1491, he resumed his claim to the Hungarian throne. Benedict Borsos, still the captain of Šariš, remained his supporter. John Albert recruited new forces in Poland, mostly Polish and Bohemian mercenaries. The army besieged the Stropkov Fortress, but the Hungarian garrison successfully repelled them⁴⁸. Benedict Borsos's position during these events is unknown. However, in September 1491, Head of Spiš County and Stephen Zapolya, the Palatine of Hungary gave a full share of Berzék village together with the local noble house to the Diósgyőr Castellan and Head of Borsod County, Bartholomew Patócsi. These estates belonged to the disloyal Benedict Borsos. By April 1492, Borsos was no longer alive. Only his widow tried to claim the confiscated estates, without success⁴⁹. It is possible he had died in battle.

The possessions of Benedict Liptay, another of John Albert's allies, the former deputy head of Šariš County, also followed a rocky path. In November 1491, King Wladyslaw II gave his estates in Liptov, Turiec, and Zvolen counties to Andrew Justh of Víglaš, a Hungarian nobleman. Liptay lost these estates for treason (supporting John Albert). In March 1493, long after Liptay's death the estates were still not completely in Justh's hands⁵⁰. The circumstances of his death are more than interesting. Shortly after the conflict, both Wladyslaw II and John Albert met with several other relatives at a summit in Levoča, Kingdom of Hungary. The summit was held in 1494 and lasted several weeks. There, John Albert, new King of Poland, issued a document which confirmed that in the past, he imprisoned Benedict Liptay in Prešov. Liptay had committed a crime against John Albert and subsequently died in prison, as was the will of God⁵¹. It is possible that the document was issued on the request of the town of Prešov itself, which would have allowed it to defend itself against

⁴⁷ *Documenta ad res Poloniae pertinentia, quae in archivis veteris regni Hungariae asservantur 3 (documenta ex annis 1481–1500)*, ed. by S.A. Sroka, Kraków 2003, pp. 224–225, no. 569; P. Maliniak, *Spojenci a protivníci Jagelovcov*, pp. 107–108; P. Hudáček, Šebeš/Podhradik, [in:] *Stredoveké hrady na Slovensku: Život, kultúra, spoločnosť*, ed. by D. Dvořáková, Bratislava 2017, p. 395.

⁴⁸ N.C. Tóth, *Magyarország világi archontológiája 2*, p. 203; K. Baczkowski, *Habsburgowie i Jagiellonowie*, pp. 146–150; F. Uličný, *Polské vojenské vpády*, pp. 259–260.

⁴⁹ *A Szapolyai család oklevéltára 1*, pp. 193–194, no. 204; MNL OL, DL 19 712, 19 826.

⁵⁰ MNL OL, DF 280 637, DL 63 380.

⁵¹ *Documenta ad res Poloniae 3*, p. 203, no. 546.

possible future accusations. Several Hungarian and Polish noblemen attended the Levoča summit too, which could have also been held to settle any remaining individual disputes from 1490–92⁵². Benedict Liptay paid twofold for his opposition against authority: in the end, both Władysław II and John Albert stood against him. It seems that he was imprisoned before the battle of Prešov in early 1492, in which the combined forces of Stephen Zapolya and John Haugwitz definitively defeated John Albert. Afterwards, John Albert left Hungary. At the end of the same year, after a series of negotiations, Władysław II and John Albert came into an agreement of mutual help, support, and alliance⁵³.

The better-situated Hungarian allies of the Polish prince did not suffer such dreadful fates. They did not end up in prison, nor did they have to go into exile. They lost some castles and estates, if only temporarily. In 1492, Palatine Stephen Zapolya took Makovica castle at the Polish border from the Rozgonyi family. Stephen Rozgonyi the Younger protested. He was continuously given other castles and estates by King Władysław II, „for his loyal service”. Stephen seemingly found use for the guarantees given to him by John Albert some time beforehand. The new division of power, however, was not free from issues. The Rozgonyi estates were turned to waste by the fighting. Later sources even document the siege of Čičava Castle and the devastation of the noble house in Vranov⁵⁴. The Perényi family, especially the two family members who fought with John Albert, had to reconstruct their wealth too, even more so. The guarantees and their oaths given to the King of Hungary may have made their situation significantly better. At the end of 1492, king Władysław II returned all hereditary estates, including castles, to John Perényi. His relative, Emeric Perényi, carved out a successful career. He became the royal steward, moved to the position of palatine and even reached the rank of royal deputy. He systematically received numerous castles and estates, including Makovica⁵⁵. The members of both magnate families could lean on a vast network of family members and other

⁵² F. Papée, *Jan Olbracht*, pp. 69–70; K. Baczkowski, *Polska i jej sąsiedzi za Jagiellonów*, Kraków 2012, pp. 527–528; S. Kuzmová, *Rodinné stretnutia a dynastické summity*, pp. 49–54.

⁵³ P. Maliniak, *Spojenci a protivníci Jagelovcov*, pp. 108–109; K. Baczkowski, *Habsburgowie i Jagiellonowie*, pp. 165–166; A. Kubinyi, *Két sorsdöntő esztendő*, p. 40; A. de Bonfinis, *Rerum Ungaricarum decades 4/1*, pp. 229–231; *CDPL 1*, p. 86, no. 32; S. Kuzmová, *Rodinné stretnutia a dynastické summity*, p. 52.

⁵⁴ P. Hudáček, *Makovica/Zborov*, [in:] *Stredoveké hrady na Slovensku: Život, kultúra, spoločnosť*, ed. by D. Dvořáková, Bratislava 2017, pp. 345–346; D. Magdoško, *Čičava*, p. 281.

⁵⁵ MNL OL, DL 71 038; N.C. Tóth, *Magyarország világi archontológiája 1*, pp. 79, 82, 115; T. Neumann, *Várat vennék, de miből?*, pp. 96–107.

contacts. Unsurprisingly, as was characteristic of the time, both families were tied by several marriages. After a short period of weakness, they emerged even more influential and wealthier. The title of baron and their knowledge of court politics and diplomacy played a significant role as well.

A comparison of the military campaigns and political ambitions of both Jagiellonian princes in Hungary poses several questions and possible interpretations. The intervention of each prince was caused by different political conditions. When it comes to local support, however, there were common denominators on a regional, as well as personal level. Especially the borderline regions provided a more continuous support, as it was a natural breeding ground for connections. The local nobility, including several magnates, found it attractive to lean to the Polish side in the critical years of 1471 and 1490. The regions of Šariš and Zemplín provided the staging grounds for both princes. Multiple generations of the Perényi and Rozgonyi families provided their support. The explanation can be attributed to the ownership structure and its ties to the central political power, as has already been pointed out by András Kubinyi. The borderlands with no royal or ecclesiastical lands were home to enclosed and scattered estates of magnate families. They were also very far away from the capital – the monarch's seat of Buda. On the other hand, they had easier access to the border. Especially the Perényi family's vast estates bordered Poland directly.⁵⁶ These factors combined helped form coalitions during the struggles for power. The coalition members played for high stakes and faced the consequences afterwards. Matthias Corvinus was stricter and more thorough in pursuing the rebels, compared to Władysław II Jagiellon. Both kings had to rely on realistic options of exercising their power. They were influenced, however, by different environments and different social relationships.

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⁵⁶ A. Kubinyi, *Residenz- und Herrschaftsbildung*, pp. 425, 432, 456–457.

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