Procedural Fairness, a Sense of Alienation and Paying Taxes

• Autorzy: Małgorzata Niesiobędzka , Sabina Kołodziej

Warianty tytułu

Sprawiedliwość proceduralna, poczucie alienacji i płacenie podatków

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

Artykuł przedstawia wyniki dwóch badań analizujących wpływ sprawiedliwości proceduralnej oraz poczucia alienacji na rzeczywiste wpłaty podatkowe w grze o dobro wspólne. W badaniu 1 stwierdzono, że niesprawiedliwy sposób ustalania reguł gry zwiększa częstość uchylania się od płacenia podatków. W badaniu 2 uchylanie się od podatków wiązało się z wywołanym u badanych poczuciem alienacji rozumianym jako przekonanie o nieskuteczności własnych działań. Wyniki badań przedstawionych w artykule wskazują wagę sposobu traktowania podatników przez system podatkowy jako czynnika kształtującego skłonność do popełniania oszustw podatkowych. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

This paper presents the results of two studies analysing the impact of procedural fairness and a sense of alienation on real tax payments in the public goods game. Study 1 showed that an unfair procedure of determining the rules of the game increases the frequency of tax evasion. In Study 2, tax evasion was associated with a sense of alienation induced in the subjects, understood as a conviction about the ineffectiveness of one's own actions. The results of the studies presented in this paper indicate the importance of the treatment of taxpayers by the tax system as a factor influencing the propensity for tax fraud. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Podatki; Sprawiedliwość; Alienacja; Dobro wspólne

EN

Taxes; Justice; Alienation; Common good

• Czasopismo: Decyzje
• Rocznik: 2019
• Numer: nr 31
• Strony: 57-71

Twórcy

autor

Małgorzata Niesiobędzka

• University of Białystok

autor

Sabina Kołodziej

• Kozminski University

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.121