Czasopismo
Tytuł artykułu
Autorzy
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
In this paper we study equilibrium dynamics in a simple duopoly game. We show that the beliefs about the structure of the game influence the actual dynamics. Furthermore, we argue that beliefs induced dynamics can be complex and can in equilibrium be consistent with the underlying beliefs. We illustrate that the beliefs can be consistent even if the underlying beliefs do not correspond to the objective truth.(original abstract)
Słowa kluczowe
Rocznik
Strony
45-54
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
- Vistula University, Poland
Bibliografia
- Dudek, M. K. (2012). Living in an imaginary world that looks real. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 41: 209-223.
- Hommes, C. H. (1998). On the consistency of backward-looking expectations: The case of the cobweb. Journal of Behavior and Organization, 33(3-4): 333-362.
- Sorger, G. (1998). Imperfect foresight and chaos: An example of a self-fulfilling mistake. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 33(3-4): 363-383
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ekon-element-000171491874