On the Evolution of Corruption Patterns in the Post-Communist Countries

• Autorzy: Andrzej Cieślik , Łukasz Goczek
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In this paper, we study the evolution of corruption patterns in 27 post-communist countries during the period 1996-2012 using the Control of Corruption Index and the corruption category Markov transition probability matrix. This method allows us to generate the long-run distribution of corruption among the post-communist countries. Our empirical findings suggest that corruption in the post-communist countries is a very persistent phenomenon that does not change much over time. Several theoretical explanations for such a result are provided. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Korupcja; Kraje postkomunistyczne

EN

Corruption; Post-communist countries

• Czasopismo: Equilibrium
• Rocznik: 2015
• Tom: 10
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 33-53

Twórcy

autor

Andrzej Cieślik

• University of Warsaw, Poland

autor

Łukasz Goczek

• University of Warsaw, Poland

Bibliografia

• Arndt C., & Oman C. (2006). Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators. OECD Development Centre Studies, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264026865-en.
• Asiedu E., & Freeman J. (2009). The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from Firms in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Transition Countries. Review of Development Economics, 13(2). http://dx.doi.org/10.11 11/j.1467-9361.2009.00507.x.
• Åslund A. (1999). Law in Russia. East European Constitutional Review, 8(4).
• Aslund A. (2002). Building Capitalism - The Transformation of the former Soviet Block. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cb o9780511528538.
• Bardhan P. (1997). Corruption and development: a review of issues. Journal of Economic Literature. 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203044858.
• Boesche R. (2003). Kautilya's Arthaśāstra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India. Journal of Military History. 67 (1), http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2003.0006.
• Dabrowski M., Gomulka S. & Rostowski J. (2001). Whence reform? A critique of the Stiglitz perspective. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 4(4). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13841280108523423.
• Ferri G. (2004). More Analysis, Better Ratings: Do Rating Agencies Invest Enough in Less Developed Countries. Journal of Applied Economics 7:77-98.
• Golden M. & Picci L. (2005). Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption: Illustrated with Italian Data. Economics and Politics. 17(1), http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2005.00146.x.
• Goczek Ł. (2012). Metody ekonometryczne w modelach wzrostu gospodarczego. Gospodarka Narodowa, 10.
• Goczek Ł. (2010). Badanie empiryczne przyczyn korupcji w krajach transformacji. Gospodarka Narodowa, 4.
• Goczek Ł. (2009). Corruption and Social Norms. Ekonomia, 24.
• Goczek Ł. (2007). Skuteczność strategii antykorupcyjnych i przyczyny korupcji: przegląd literatury empirycznej. Gospodarka Narodowa, 4.
• Hellman J., & Kaufmann D. (2004). The Inequality of Influence. In: J. Kornai & S. Rose-Ackerman (Eds.). Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition, New York: Palgrave, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.386901.
• Hellman J., & Schankerman M. (2000). Intervention, Corruption and Capture: The Nexus between Enterprises and the State. Economics of Transition, 8(3). http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0351.00055.
• Hellman J., Jones G., Kaufmann D. & Schankerman M. (1999). Measuring governance, corruption and state capture. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2312.
• Hellman J., Jones G., & Kaufmann D. (2003). Seize the State, Seize the Day": State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition. Journal of Comparative Economics, 31.
• Henderson J.V., & Kuncoro A. (2004). Corruption in Indonesia. NBER Working Paper No. 10674.
• Hoff K., & Stiglitz J. (2004). After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies. American Economic Review, 94(3). http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0002828041464533.
• Jain A. (2001). Corruption: A Review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1).
• Jones Ch.I. (1997). On the Evolution of the World Income Distribution. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(3). http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.3.19.
• Kaufmann D. (1997).Corruption: The Facts. Foreign Policy, Summer.
• Kaufmann D. (2007). Governance Crossroads: An Empirical Perspective, mimeo.
• Kaufmann D., & Kraay A. (2002). Growth Without Governance. Economia. Fall. Retrieved from: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/growthgov.pdf.
• Kaufmann D., & Siegelbaum P. (1995). Privatisation and Corruption in Transition Economies. Journal of International Affairs, 50(2).
• Kaufman D., & Wei S. (1999). Does "grease money" speed up the wheels of commerce?. NBER Working Paper No. 7093.
• Kaufmann D., Kraay A., & Mastruzzi M. (2005). Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004. World Bank.
• Kaufmann D., Kraay A., & Mastruzzi M. (2006). Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005. World Bank Policy Research, http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3630.
• Klitgaard R. (1988). Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Kuncoro A. (2004). Bribery in Indonesia: Some Evidence from Micro-Level Data. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. 40(3).
• Lambsdorff J. (1998). An Empirical Investigation of Bribery in International Trade. European Journal of Development Research, 10 (1). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09578819808426701.
• Lambsdorff J. (2003). How Corruption Affects Persistent Capital Flows. Economics of Governance, 4(3).
• Lambsdorff J. (2004). Framework Document to the 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index. Transparency International Background Paper.
• Lambsdorff J. (2005). Consequences and Causes of Corruption - What do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries?. Discussion Paper of the Economics Department, Passau University, No. 34-05.
• Manzetti L., & Blake C. (1996). Market Reforms and Corruption in Latin America. Review of International Political Economy, 3.
• Murray-Rust H., & Velde V. (1994). Changes in Hydraulic Performance and Comparative Costs of Lining and Desalting of Secondary Canals in Punjab, Pakistan. Irrigation and Drainage Systems, 8(3).
• Paldam M. (2002). The Big Pattern of Corruption. Economics, Culture and the Seesaw Dynamics. European Journal of Political Economy, 18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(02)00078-2.
• Sandholtz W., & Taagepera R. (2005). Corruption, Culture, and Communism. International Review of Sociology: Revue Internationale de Sociologie, 15(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03906700500038678.
• Stiglitz E., (1999). Whither Reform: Ten Years of the Transition: Paper Prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April 28-30.
• Svensson J. (2003). Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/00335530360535180.
• Treisman D. (2000). The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3).
• Wade R. (1982). Irrigation Reform in Conditions of Populist Anarchy: An Indian Case. Journal of Development Economics, 14(3).
• World Bank (2006). Anticorruption in Transition 3. Washington, D.C. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-6692-9.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.12775/EQUIL.2015.002