Corruption, Political Instability and Economic Development in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Is There a Causal Relationship?

• Autorzy: Nurudeen Abu , Mohd Zaini Abd Karim
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Despite the abundant research on economic development, corruption and political instability, little research has attempted to examine whether there is a causal relationship among them. This paper examines the causal relationship among corruption, political instability and economic development in the ECOWAS using the Granger causality test within a multivariate cointegration and error-correction framework for the 1996-2012 period. The findings indicate that political instability Granger-causes economic development in the short term, while political instability and economic development Granger-cause corruption in the long term. In addition, we employed the forecast error variance decomposition and impulse response function analyses to investigate the dynamic interaction between the variables. The results demonstrate positive unidirectional Granger causality from political instability to economic development in the short term and positive unidirectional Granger causality from political instability and economic development to corruption in the long term in ECOWAS countries. Thus, ECOWAS governments should employ policies to promote political stability in the region.(original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Korupcja; Rozwój gospodarczy; Studium przypadku

EN

Corruption; Economic development; Case study

• Czasopismo: Contemporary Economics
• Rocznik: 2015
• Tom: 9
• Numer: nr 1
• Strony: 45-60

Twórcy

autor

Nurudeen Abu

• Universiti Utara Malaysia, Malaysia

autor

Mohd Zaini Abd Karim

• Universiti Utara Malaysia, Malaysia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5709/ce.1897-9254.159