Punishment Makes Large-Scale Markets Possible

• Autorzy: Tomasz Wysocki , Dominik Dziedzic

Warianty tytułu

Kary umożliwiają wymianę rynkową

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

W publikacji omawiamy eksperymenty, których wyniki okazały się sprzeczne z przewidywaniem teorii gier oraz staramy się pokazać, że można je wyjaśnić przez odwołanie do norm kulturowych. Uzasadniamy, dlaczego za zachowania zorientowane na współpracę odpowiadają normy, a następnie przy pomocy ewolucyjnej teorii gier i symulacji komputerowych badamy stabilność ewolucyjną pewnych prostych strategii rządzących współpracą. (abstrakt oryginalny)

EN

In this paper we discuss some experimental results which go against predictions of game theory and show how those results can be explained by incorporating norms into economic explanations. We justify the claim that norms are responsible for cooperative behavior. Finally, using evolutionary game theory and computer simulations we investigate the evolutionary stability of some simple strategies governing cooperation and show the importance of punishment for the persistence of cooperative strategies. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Teoria gier; Symulacje komputerowe

EN

Game theory; Computing simulation

• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu. Ekonomia
• Rocznik: 2011
• Tom: 15
• Numer: nr 208
• Strony: 90-103

Twórcy

autor

Tomasz Wysocki

• Wrocław University of Economics, Poland

autor

Dominik Dziedzic

• Wrocław University of Economics, Poland

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