Skuteczność polityki fiskalnej w unii gospodarczej i walutowej

• Autorzy: Michał Konopczyński

Warianty tytułu

Performance of Fiscal Policy in an Economic and Monetary Union

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

W artykule autor analizuje skuteczność polityki fiskalnej w małej gospodarce należącej do unii gospodarczej i walutowej (UGW). Posługując się statystycznymi i dynamicznymi modelami makroekonomicznymi wykazuje, że w warunkach unijnych skuteczność takiej polityki jest bardzo wysoka w krótkim okresie, natomiast z czasem uzyskane korzyści całkowicie znikają. Tezę tę ilustrujemy przy pomocy krótkotrwałego impulsu fiskalnego. Wysoka krótkookresowa skuteczność polityki fiskalnej wynika stąd, że ożywienie gospodarcze w danym kraju osiągane jest częściowo kosztem innych państw unii monetarnej. Wobec faktu, że politycy kierują się głównie perspektywą krótkookresowa, realne wydaje się niebezpieczeństwo „wyścigu deficytów”, przejawiającego się na przykład obniżeniem dochodów budżetowych przy wyraźnie wolniejszej redukcji wydatków. Dlatego za konieczne uważa wyegzekwowanie ograniczeń fiskalnych uzgodnionych w ramach Paktu Stabilności i Wzrostu nawet, jeśli jest to trudne z powodów politycznych.

EN

The author analyzes the efficacy of fiscal policy of a small economy being a member of economic and monetary union. Basing his research on simple static and dynamic macroeconomic models he demonstrates that fiscal policies might display positive effects in the short run, but with time, positive effects of fiscal expansion tend to vanish or even might produce undesired results. That conclusion is arrived thanks to the application of a dynamic numerical simulation of the fiscal impulse. Spectacular results of fiscal policies pursued by a given country in the short run, resulting in economic upturn, are achieved in part, at the expense of other members of the monetary union. Policy makers, being guided by short term benefits, might engineer a situation in which to the reduction in budgetary revenues does not correspond an adequate reduction in expenditures. He argues that it is indispensable to safeguard the adherence to the constraints agreed to in the Pact of Stability and Growth irrespective of political difficulties that might ensue. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Polityka podatkowa; Unia Gospodarcza i Walutowa (UGW); Modele ekonomiczne; Równowaga pieniężna; Impuls fiskalny

EN

Tax policy; Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); Economic models; Monetary equilibrium; Fiscal impulse

• Czasopismo: Ekonomista
• Rocznik: 2006
• Numer: nr 5
• Strony: 619-646

Twórcy

autor

Michał Konopczyński

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