Ochrona patentowa jako instrument polityki handlowej w zakresie dóbr zaawansowanych technologicznie

• Autorzy: Szymon Truskolaski

Warianty tytułu

Protection of Patents as an Instrument of Trade Policy in the Sphere of High-tech Products

• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

Autor analizuje się wewnętrzny i zewnętrzny aspekt ochrony patentowej jako instrumentu polityki handlowej. Ten pierwszy jest związany ze strukturą rynku dóbr o wyższym poziomie zaawansowania technologicznego, wywierając wpływ na konkurencyjność gospodarki, natomiast drugi odnosi się do przepływu zagranicznych patentów oraz innowatorów. W przypadku ujęcia zewnętrznego sformułowany zostaje istotny wniosek, iż polityka patentowa wywiera silny wpływ na kierunki handlu międzynarodowego dobrami zaawansowanymi technologicznie.

EN

Launching innovations onto the market and international trade in the field of high-tech products depend mainly on the level of profit which can be achieved by an innovator. The innovator's profits, apart from the quality of innovation are influenced by the possibility of excluding other entities from manufacturing technologically advanced goods through protection of know-how which enables the innovator to obtain a monopolistic position on the market and achieve the so-called monopolistic rent. The state policy, by means of proper protection of patents, can additionally increase or decrease the size of the monopolistic rent, influencing in this way the rate of technological progress and the growth of productivity. Patent policy can secure profits of the innovator who competes with manufacturers of non-patented goods, outside patent protection area and with imitators - manufacturers of goods which infringe patent protection. Therefore, state authorities face the problem of how to strengthen the innovator's position at the expense of reducing the consumer's surplus due to market monopolization and deterioration in the position of potential domestic innovators. As regards open economy, government activities concerning determination of monopolistic rent of the innovator, can additionally influence the directions and structure of trade exchange - in this sense protection of patents may be regarded as an element of trade policy. In a more developed country, i.e. the country of origin of the innovator, competitors may be foreign economic entities - in this case more extensive protection of patents is favourable because it strengthens the position of a domestic entity - innovator. In a less-developed country stronger protection of patents weakens the position of domestic entities at the expense of a foreign innovator but at the same time it enhances the inflow of technologies to a country by means of licenses. This facilitates production of a high-tech commodity and its export to the country of origin of the innovation using lower production costs. In conclusion the article suggests that strong protection of patents should be introduced both in more and in less-developed countries. (original abstract)

Słowa kluczowe

PL

Patenty; Polityka handlowa; Polityka innowacyjna państwa

EN

Patent; Trade policy; State innovation policy

• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe / Akademia Ekonomiczna w Poznaniu
• Rocznik: 2005
• Numer: nr 63
• Strony: 71-96

Twórcy

autor

Szymon Truskolaski

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