Warianty tytułu
Asymmetry of Information on the Market of Bank Loan Commitments
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
Autor podjął próbę uzasadnienia tezy, że forma w jakiej kredytobiorca płaci bankowi za udzielone zobowiązanie może ujawnić jego wiarygodność kredytową.
The author in the paper tries to carry his point that a form in which a borrower pays to bank for allowed obligation can disclose customer's creditability. (AŁ)
Rocznik
Numer
Strony
19-30
Opis fizyczny
Twórcy
autor
Bibliografia
- Boot A., Thakor A., Udelli G.; Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments, Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. XI, 1987;
- Cootner P.; ed. The random character of stock market prices, 1964;
- James C.; The self-selection and the bank services: an analysis of the market for loan commitments and the role of compensating balance requirements, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. XVI 1981;
- Kanatas G.; Commercial paper, bank reserve requirements, and the informational role of loan commitments, Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. XI, 1987;
- Riley J.; Informational equilibrium, Econometrica, vol. 47, 1979
- Spence A.; Competitive and optimal responses to signals, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 7, 1974.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
Identyfikator YADDA
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