Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
In his last book on Locke's philosophy, E. J. Lowe claims that Frege's arguments against the Lockean conception of number are not compelling, while at the same time he painstakingly defines the Lockean conception Lowe himself espouses. The aim of this paper is to show that the textual evidence considered by Lowe may be interpreted in another direction. This alternative 'reading' of Frege's arguments throws light on Frege's and Lowe's different 'agendas'. Moreover, in this paper, the problem of singular sentences of number is presented, and Frege's and Lowe's views are confronted with it.
Rocznik
Tom
Numer
Strony
39-52
Opis fizyczny
Rodzaj publikacji
ARTICLE
Twórcy
- Agustin Arrieta-Urtizberea, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country, Apartado 1249, 20080 San Sebastian, Spain
Bibliografia
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikatory
CEJSH db identifier
11SKAAAA090518
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.ec433f0a-7f16-3599-bbc3-f6c44d776d01