LOWE ON LOCKE'S AND FREGE'S CONCEPTION OF NUMBER

• Autorzy: Arrieta-Urtizberea Agustin
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In his last book on Locke's philosophy, E. J. Lowe claims that Frege's arguments against the Lockean conception of number are not compelling, while at the same time he painstakingly defines the Lockean conception Lowe himself espouses. The aim of this paper is to show that the textual evidence considered by Lowe may be interpreted in another direction. This alternative 'reading' of Frege's arguments throws light on Frege's and Lowe's different 'agendas'. Moreover, in this paper, the problem of singular sentences of number is presented, and Frege's and Lowe's views are confronted with it.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

CONCEPT OF NUMBER; EXISTENCE; FREGE GOTTLOB; LOCKE JOHN; LOWE JONATHAN; NUMBER ONE; NUMBER ZERO; SINGULAR SENTENCES

• Wydawca: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Czasopismo: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Rocznik: 2010
• Tom: 17
• Numer: 1
• Strony: 39-52
• Rodzaj publikacji: ARTICLE

Twórcy

autor

Arrieta-Urtizberea Agustin,

• Agustin Arrieta-Urtizberea, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country, Apartado 1249, 20080 San Sebastian, Spain

Identyfikatory

CEJSH db identifier

11SKAAAA090518