Emotions and Political Rhetoric: Perception of Danger, Group Conflict and the Biopolitics of Fear

• Autorzy: Marta Gil
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In the present article I shall argue that human emotion is multifaceted and has a cognitive dimension in virtue of its intricate connections with beliefs, memories, imagination, and other products of human rationality. Human emotion also has a social and political dimension. When we think about fear we cannot characterize it as a mere stimulus-response phenomenon: it is, due to its cognitive facet, more complex and related to our ideas about survival and well-being. This leaves fear exposed to political rhetoric, and thus to political manipulation. Fear can be aroused, guided and nourished amongst the population, giving rise to a biopolitics of fear. In this article, I will consider the heuristics and biases that lead people to evaluate risks mistakenly, and governments to consequently act erroneously. I will also consider how these psychological mechanisms are exploited by social entrepreneurs in order to achieve their own goals, such as reinforce in-group bonds, generate a sense of crisis or keep hold of power. I shall argue that we must be alert to certain kinds of political discourse that pose a threat to democratic society.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

emotions; political rhetoric; biopolitics; heuristics and biases; intergroup conflict; democracy

• Wydawca: Sciendo
• Czasopismo: Human Affairs
• Rocznik: 2015
• Tom: 26
• Numer: 2
• Strony: 212-226

Daty

wydano

2016-04-01

online

2016-04-06

Twórcy

autor

Marta Gil

• Department of Philosophy of Law, Moral Philosophy and Political Philosophy, University of Valencia Av. de Blasco Ibá ez, 30 46010 Valencia, Spain,

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.1515/humaff-2016-0020