The Myth of the Given and the Grip of the Given

• Autorzy: Robert Hanna
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In this paper I argue that the Sellarsian Myth of the Given does not apply to all forms of Non-Conceptualism; that Kant is in fact a non-conceptualist of the right-thinking kind and not a Conceptualist, as most Kant-interpreters think; and that an intelligible and defensible Kantian Non-Conceptualism can be developed which supports the thesis that true perceptual beliefs are non-inferentially justified and also normatively funded by direct, embodied, intentional interactions with the manifest world (a.k.a. the Grip of the Given).

• Wydawca: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Czasopismo: Diametros
• Rocznik: 2011
• Numer: 27
• Strony: 25-46

Twórcy

autor

Robert Hanna

• University of Colorado at Boulder, USA

Bibliografia

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.13153/diam.27.2011.426