Self-reference and the divorce between meaning and truth

• Autorzy: Tsohatzidis L. Savas
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This paper argues that a certain type of self-referential sentence falsifies the widespread assumption that a declarative sentence’s meaning is identical to its truth condition. It then argues that this problem cannot be assimilated to certain other problems that the assumption in question is independently known to face.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

self-reference; truth-theories; meaning-theories; compositionality; natural language semantics

• Wydawca: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Czasopismo: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Rocznik: 2013
• Tom: 22
• Numer: 4
• Strony: 445–452

Daty

wydano

2013-12-01

online

2013-09-03

Twórcy

autor

Tsohatzidis L. Savas

• Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Philosophy, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, GR-54124 Thessaloniki, Greece,

Bibliografia

• [Kaplan, 1989] Kaplan, D., “Demonstratives”, pages 481–564 in: J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
• [Soames, 2010] Soames, S., What is Meaning?, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010.
• [Yablo, 1993] Yablo, S., “Paradox without self-reference”, Analysis, 53 (1993): 251-252. DOI: 10.2307/3328245

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.12775/LLP.2013.025