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Philosophy as a Diagnosis. On Barry Stroud’s Conception of Philosophy
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The main goal of this article is to outline Barry Stroud’s conception of philosophy. Philosophy, in his opinion, aims at understanding of various kinds of phenomena and our attitude towards them, but this understanding doesn’t manifest in a set of philosophical theses. A philosopher should become aware of a peculiar character of understanding which he wants to reach, and in consequence, admit that a metaphilosophical reflection is integral part of philosophical investigations. An understanding of the nature of philosophical investigations is not possible without pointing to their sources. Thus the task of a philosopher is to diagnose philosophical problems by showing from which earlier questions and theories they have arisen. On the other hand, philosophical reflection must be always confronted with the things which are accepted by all of us, otherwise understanding caused by that reflection wouldn’t refer to phenomena belonging to our world. Stroud thinks that a description of one’s conception of philosophy requires looking at the manner in which that philosopher approaches to a given problem. Acknowledging the rightness of his remark I consider his approach to philosophy using as an example his treatment of the question “what is meaning?”. I point out that Stroud looks into the source of the Wittgensteinian slogan “meaning of the expression is its use”. The main Stroud’s conclusion is that if a description of a use of a certain expression is to explain the meaning of that expression, semantical terms have to appear in that description. This statement could be abandoned, Stroud claims, only if we rejected the things which all of us acknowledge as obvious.
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119-142
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