Optimization and decision-making for a service contract on machine maintenance

• Autorzy: LUO Zeyu , YANG Zhixin , WU Jinbiao , LIAN Zhaotong
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We investigate a novel maintenance service contract model. The service provider of the machine must determine the optimal pricing structure and staffing levels, while the client selects an appropriate plan for the warranty duration. We consider linear, quadratic, polynomial, and exponential pricing functions for three types of warranties. By building a service model with a non-cooperative game, we obtain the Nash equilibrium of the bargaining solution. Numerical analysis reveals that the optimal warranty period decreases monotonically with service provider revenue and increases monotonically with the maximum prospective service time. Additionally, the market size does not affect the ideal warranty duration when the machine’s lifetime is constant.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

service contract; reliability; queueing system; optimization; game theory

• Wydawca: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2024
• Tom: 34
• Numer: 4
• Strony: 89-101

Twórcy

autor

LUO Zeyu

• Faculty of Science and Technology, University of Macau, Macau SAR, China

autor

YANG Zhixin

• Faculty of Science and Technology, University of Macau, Macau SAR, China

autor

WU Jinbiao

• Faculty of Business Administration, University of Macau, Macau SAR, China

autor

LIAN Zhaotong

• School of Mathematics and Statistics, Central South University, Changsha 410075, Hunan, China,

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Identyfikatory

DOI

10.37190/ord240406