Public Sector’s Principal-Agent Theory in a Global World

• Autorzy: Attila György
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The problem of institutionalization and the impact of institutions on individual and collective action is discussed by Attila György in his article. The author focuses on communication processes that take place at various levels of the state and society. Participants’ behaviour (public and private actors), administrative and legal regulations influence the quality and effectiveness of communication. The article examines the factors determining the model of power distribution and how it shapes interaction between individuals and institutions.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

power distribution; state; institution; society

• Wydawca: Księgarnia Akademicka
• Czasopismo: Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
• Rocznik: 2012
• Numer: 2.3(20.3)
• Strony: 101-107

Twórcy

autor

Attila György

• Bucharest University of Economics (Bucharest, Romania)

Bibliografia

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