RECENT FORMS OF THE REALISM DEBATE (Wspolczesne postacie sporu o realizm)
The debate between realism and antirealism is of crucial significance for epistemology and metaphysics. The paper discusses three recent forms of it, developed in the writings of Michael Dummett, Kit Fine, and Paul Horwich. They are presented against the traditional or standard picture of the debate. The thrust of Dummett's proposal is that the debate should be given an explicitly semantical form as the opposition between truth-conditional and justificationist theories of meaning. For Fine this attempt to resolve characteristically metaphysical issues in semantical terms is rather misguided, since the metaphysical conception of reality which is at stake here cannot be understood in fundamentally different terms. Horwich, in opposition to both Dummett and Fine, thinks that one should overcome the debate by embracing metaphilosophical quietism or deflationism. It seems that the debate at its current stage is still far from being conclusive, although its present terms are more precise than those employed in the past.
CEJSH db identifier